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“Old truths have been relearned; untruths have been unlearned. We have always known that 
heedless self-interest was bad morals; we know now that it is bad economics. Out of the 
collapse of a prosperity whose builders boasted their practicality has come the conviction that 
in the long run, economic morality pays.” 
 Franklin D. Rooseveldt, 1937, Second Inaugural Address 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-2008 subprime crisis showed how risks can be transferred and amplified in the 
interdependent business networks and economies which exist today. Insufficient monitoring by 
mortgage providers of the creditworthiness of borrowers in a relatively small sector of the 
American housing economy has contributed to the bankruptcy of banks and other financial 
institutions at the other side of the world (see Van Hengel and Knot, 2011; Jacobs, 2009). 
Inadequate monitoring activities were undertaken because the mortgage providers had little or 
no incentive that the borrowers repaid these loans; they had repackaged and resold (most of) 
the rights to receive the loan repayments to other investors (see Den Butter, 2011; Haldane, 
2008).  
Besides crippling the world economy, the crisis has also drawn renewed attention to those 
economic and managerial disciplines, like institutional economics, which examine transaction 
risks and failures resulting from conflicts of interests between transaction parties. For example, 
O.E. Williamson, who has studied the different types of inter-organizational contract forms 
that can prevent such failures, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2009.  
However, many such studies, including those based on the work of Williamson (2000; 1991; 
1985), focus mainly on transaction risks and failures, as well as their resolutions, in individual 
transactions. Such approaches ignore the consequences of a transaction failure for the wider 
business network or supply chain in which the transaction takes place.  
The present thesis aims to make a modest contribution to addressing this issue, by examining: 
(1), how risks arise in the supply chain as a result of interdependencies between the various 
transactions making up the supply chain; and (2), what types of contracts are suitable for 
supply chain actors to implement in order to reduce or eliminate their exposure to these risks. 
The thesis focuses mainly on economic risks resulting from conflicts of interests between 
supply chain actors.  
The empirical research conducted in this thesis has taken place in the context of agri-food 
supply chains, where the impact of failures is very large. Inadequate management of 
interdependencies and associated transaction risks can have not only economic consequences, 
but also public health consequences resulting from food quality problems. In the United States, 
for example, experts estimate that contaminated food causes around 76 million illnesses, 
325000 hospitalizations and 5000 deaths each year (Smith DeWaal, 2003). 
Introduction 
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1. RESEARCH THEMES AND QUESTIONS 
The present thesis addresses its subject from three different angles resulting in three sets of 
research questions which are addressed in four different studies. Each study focuses on a 
different approach taken by supply chain actors to manage interdependencies and associated 
transaction risks.  
The first study, by using the EU pork industry as an example, focuses on the role of collective 
quality management systems in reducing transaction risks related to the coordination of 
quality, like under-investments in quality improvements or quality cheating by the supply 
chain actors. As supply chain actors are exposed also to other types of transaction risks, like 
price uncertainty, the second study examines a broader range of coordination mechanisms, 
including price, volume, quality and investment mechanisms. The third and fourth study 
examine how supply chain actors’ attempts to differentiate their products to the consumer by 
means of brand names can lead to additional interdependencies and transaction risks in the 
supply chain. While the third study focuses on the types of contracts which actors can use to 
reduce their exposure to such risks, the fourth study examines a broader range of contractual 
options available to actors when risk minimization is not possible. 
Study One: Alignment between collective quality management systems and supply chain 
contracts 
Coordinating quality in agri-food supply chains is complex, as the quality of end-customer 
products (increasingly) depends on practices in preceding stages of the supply chain. For 
example, contaminated animal feed, sourced from a different continent, can lead to food safety 
hazards in a supermarket. This happens when the contamination also ends up in the consumer 
meat products which are sold from animals that have eaten the contaminated feed. Identifying 
the source of the risk and the extent of the contamination is difficult, as the contaminated 
inputs (e.g., soya) may have been mixed with other inputs (e.g., corn) to produce the animal 
feed. At farm level, a producer may mix different batches of feed in its silos. Also, animals 
which have eaten the contaminated feed are likely to have been mixed with animals from other, 
non-contaminated, farms in the slaughterhouse. As a result, it may be impossible to trace 
consumer meat products to individual farms, let alone to specific batches of feed inputs.  
To manage interdependencies related to food quality risk, several European countries have 
developed collective quality management systems that cover the whole supply chain (Van 
Chapter One 
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Plaggenhoef, 2007). These systems coordinate quality by setting quality standards, monitor 
compliance with these standards, and signalling compliance within the supply chain.   
The adoption of collective quality management systems may not only solve or reduce some 
risks within the supply chain, it may also lead to other risks. For example, the interests of the 
various actors participating in a quality management system may not be aligned (Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005)1. Although this can also be the case in supply chains without 
such a system, there may be fewer potential trading partners in a supply chain with a system. 
This can increase the risk of strategic behaviour by buyers (or suppliers), as it is more difficult 
to switch to alternative partners.  
Supply chain actors can overcome some of the challenges of participating in collective quality 
management systems by implementing supportive contractual structures, which reduce some of 
these risks. This study aims to obtain insights into what types of contracts best match with the 
various types of quality management systems used by supply chain actors. To achieve this, the 
following research question is addressed: 
Research question 1: What is the relation between the participation of supply chain actors in 
different types of quality management systems and their contracting choices? 
Compared to previous research on this subject (see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; 
González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; Sporleder and 
Goldsmith, 2001) the present study: (1), examines a broader range of different types of quality 
management systems; and (2), formalizes the relation between quality management systems 
and contracts by means of various propositions. Considering the importance of both quality 
management systems and contracts for coordinating supply chain transactions, more specific 
insights into how they can best be combined is crucial.  
Study Two: Use of contractual coordination mechanisms in differentiated and commodity 
supply chains 
Besides transaction risks related to quality coordination, supply chain actors are also exposed 
to risks related to coordination of other aspects of transactions, like prices, volumes and 
investments. For example, a variable (fixed) price contract may increase (decrease) price 
uncertainty for (one of the) the parties to a transaction if they operate in an environment with 
highly uncertain prices (see Wilson and Dahl, 2009). Furthermore, a company may have 
                                                           
1
 For example, the production of high-quality food products could be more important for a retailer participating in 
the QMS than for a producer.  
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contractually committed itself to purchase a minimum amount of products from its supplier, 
but changing market conditions may make it difficult for the company to keep its obligation 
(see Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). Additionally, a group of farmers that plans to enter into the 
processing business may have to choose between pooling investments through a hybrid 
investment vehicle, like a (traditional) cooperative, or by means of equity-based investment 
vehicle, like an investor owned company (see Chaddad and Cook, 2004). In the former, 
farmers are exposed to risks associated with dispersed ownership of an organization, like a 
slow decision making process (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 2011). In the latter, the 
continuation of the processing company as a collective entity may be difficult to guarantee, as 
concentration of ownership and control can be difficult to prevent. 
Considering the broad range of risks to which supply chain actors are exposed, it is important 
to consider the role of contracts in coordinating various aspects of transactions. This study 
examines the mechanisms which are used within contracts to coordinate prices, volume, 
quality and investments. Actors’ use of these mechanisms is compared across three different 
types of supply chains: commodity supply chains and two types of supply chains in which 
differentiated products are marketed to the consumer (collective brands and proprietary 
brands). Different types of risks are likely to arise in the different types of supply chains. For 
example, in collective brands, the actors pool reputational capital, which means that shirking2 
by one actor may damage the reputation of all other actors if no adequate measures are 
undertaken to safeguard this capital. In commodity chains, the actors do not market their 
products under a jointly owned brand and thus fewer interdependencies and associated risks 
exist in this regard. Thus, different types of contracts, which help to reduce different risks 
exposures, are needed in different types of supply chains.  
The diversity of supply chains studied allows for the examination of a wide-variety of contracts 
and underlying coordination mechanisms. The following research questions are addressed: 
Research question 2A: What types of coordination mechanisms are used within contracts? 
Research question 2B: What differences can be observed in the use of these mechanisms across 
various types of supply chains (commodity supply chains, proprietary brands and collective 
brands)? 
                                                           
2
 Shirking refers to instances in which actors falsely claim compliance with brand standards or exchange 
conditions. 
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Compared to previous studies on this subject (e.g., Ménard, 2004), the contracts used by 
supply chain actors are analyzed in more detail. Furthermore, compared to previous studies 
(e.g., Goldberg and Erickson, 1987), a broader range of aspects of contracts are considered. To 
improve the practical relevance of research into this subject, an examination of a broader and 
more in-depth range of contractual coordination mechanisms is required.  
Studies Three-Four: Interdependencies, risks and their contractual solutions in 
differentiated supply chains 
In the first study, supply chains have been distinguished based on the manner in which quality 
is coordinated in inter-company transactions; i.e., based on what types of quality management 
systems are used to govern those transactions. In the second study, supply chains have been 
distinguished based on the manner in which quality is coordinated towards the consumer; i.e., 
based on whether products are marketed to the final customer under a brand (differentiated 
supply chains) or not (commodity supply chains). The third and fourth study focus on a sub-set 
of the supply chains examined in the second study; i.e., on differentiated supply chains3.  
Supply chains that produce differentiated goods are interesting to study for at least three 
reasons. First, supply chain actors increasingly attempt to upgrade from commodity-oriented 
production towards production for high-end or differentiated markets (Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002). This means that differentiated supply chains are likely to become more common. 
Second, supply chain actors’ attempts to differentiate their products will affect the attributes of 
the transactions (see Zylbersztajn and Farina,1999) and can thus lead to additional risks within 
the supply chain. For example, participation in differentiated supply chains can lead to 
performance measurement difficulties as buyers cannot easily distinguish between 
differentiated and commodity inputs. Third, participation in differentiated supply chains does 
not only increase supply chain actors’ transaction risk exposure, it may also limit the 
contractual options the actors have in managing these risks. This is because differentiation can 
increase interdependency between an actor’s supply and demand side transactions (Wever et 
al., 2012).  
The following research questions are addressed: 
Research question 3A: What types of conditions lead to interdependencies in differentiated 
supply chains? 
                                                           
3
 Note that the focus in the studies is not on the final transaction in the supply chain (between the retailer and 
consumer), but on how differentiation in this transaction affects the preceding inter-company transactions.  
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Research question 3B: What are the consequences of interdependencies for the transaction risk 
exposure of supply chain actors? 
Research question 3C: What types of contractual options do supply chain actors have in 
managing the transaction risks arising from these interdependencies? 
 ‘Conditions’ refers in the context of this thesis to the various attributes of transactions – like 
the extent to which transaction parties have difficulties in assessing each other’s performance – 
which affect contracting decisions. It is important to examine the conditions which lead to 
transaction interdependency because its occurrence may affect the transaction risk exposure of 
the supply chain actors. For example, the use of a supply side contract may not only affect the 
(supply side) risk exposure of the parties involved in the transaction, but its effect can spill 
over into increased demand side transaction risk or increased risk elsewhere in the supply chain 
(see Studies Three-Four).  
Compared to previous studies on this subject (e.g., see Roberts and Key, 2005), the present 
studies have a broader orientation on the supply chain as a whole. For example, within 
operations management literature, researchers have begun to study ‘triadic’ relationships, in 
which the focus mainly is on interdependencies between suppliers operating at the same stage 
within the supply chain or network of a (large) buying company (e.g., Wilhelm, 2011; Choi 
and Wu, 2009; Dubois and Fredriksson, 2008; Lazzarini, Claro and Mesquita, 2008). Studies 
Three-Four focus on interdependencies amongst (at least) three different supply chain stages. 
Furthermore, compared to previous studies which examine interdependencies within structures 
larger than the dyad (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 2011; Uzzi, 1996), the present studies have a more 
specific orientation on interdependencies related to the use of contracts.  
2. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
To help companies overcome the challenges of implementing a more supply chain-wide 
approach to managing interdependencies and associated transactions risks, the literature on this 
subject is of limited use. On the one hand, there are approaches, often based on Supply Chain 
Management (SCM) literature, which insufficiently take into account potential conflicts of 
interests between actors within the supply chain. On the other hand, there are approaches, often 
based on Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) literature, which insufficiently take into account 
the supply chain context in which individual transactions are embedded.  
Chapter One 
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Limitation of Supply Chain Management theory 
SCM has a wide range of definitions and applications (see Mentzer et al., 2001), but can 
probably be best regarded as a philosophy focused on managing the flows of goods or services 
between (original) producer and the final customer (Ellram and Cooper, 1990; Houlihan, 
1988)). Literature on SCM has shifted in the 1990s from a focus mainly on the logistical 
processes required to managing these flows, to a broader perspective on the integration and 
management of (supportive) business processes (Lambert and Cooper, 2000). Amongst others, 
this shift has resulted in a rich body of literature on a wide range of tools which practitioners 
may use to manage or coordinate activities in their supply chain, like collaborative inventory 
management systems (Barrat and Oke, 2007; Sahin and Robinson Jr., 2005) or product 
tracking systems (Cooper and Tracey, 2005; Kumar and van Dissel, 1996).  
According to Zylbersztajn and Farina (1999), many of such studies are based on the (implicit) 
assumption of costless cooperation amongst the supply chain actors. As a result, such studies 
do not fully take the costs of cooperation into account, nor the benefits that may accrue to 
certain supply chain actors for not cooperating. For example, Voeth and Herbst (2006) propose 
that actors improve their cooperation in pricing products in the supply chain, amongst others 
by being more transparent about their production costs. But, as the authors themselves (tacitly) 
acknowledge, when a customer will be able to extract rent if it has access to certain 
information (e.g., about production costs), the supplier is unlikely going to provide it. 
Furthermore, Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997) suggest that supply chain actors should 
increase the sharing of order demand information, to reduce excessive inventory investments 
amongst others. However, access to certain information (e.g., about market demand) may give 
a customer the opportunity to extract rent from it4. If so, the actor is unlikely going to share 
that information with its supplier for free5. Additionally, Galaskiewicz (2011) mentions that the 
build-up of trust is an important facilitator for improving information exchange in the supply 
chain. However, supply chain actors may incur significant costs in building-up and maintaining 
relationships; costs which may also lock them into certain suppliers (customers).  
Limitation of Transaction Cost Economics  
Transaction Cost-Economics (TCE), most often associated with the work of Williamson (2000; 
1991; 1985) has arguably become the dominant theory for analyzing conflicts of interests 
                                                           
4
 For example, a buying company may lose some of its bargaining power when its supplier has full insight in its 
demand.  
5
 In the first example, a supplier has access to information and it is not in its interest to share it with customers. In 
the second example, a customer has access to information and it is not in its interest to share it with suppliers. 
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between transaction parties, and how these interests can be re-aligned, through contracting 
decisions (see Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006; Leiblein, 2003; Ghosh and John, 
1999). Amongst others, two important contributions can be attributed to TCE: (1), it has drawn 
attention to the diversity of contracts used in high performance economies; (2) it has given an 
efficiency-based explanation for this diversity (Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; 
Williamson, 1991, Williamson, 1988). TCE’s assumptions and explanations, which are 
outlined in the next chapters, have been extensively operationalized and empirically tested (see 
Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). By and large, the empirical evidence supports the central 
assumptions underlying the TCE framework (Macher and Richman, 2008; Williamson, 2000).  
However, insufficient attention has been given to a major shortcoming of TCE: its neglect of 
the wider supply chain context in which individual transactions take place (Wever et al., 2012). 
TCE studies often examine contracting decisions only in the context of bilateral transactions. 
This results from TCE studies unbundling the supply chain into dyads (Nickerson et al., 2001) 
and focusing on interdependencies which exist between the parties in each dyad (Williamson, 
2002; 1991). Unfortunately, such approaches ignore the consequences of decisions made 
within one dyad for other transactions. For example, a change in the formula used to calculate 
the price in a farmer-processor transaction (e.g., changes to bonuses or penalties), may reduce 
the incentives for farmers to produce high quality products. This can increase the risks that low 
quality products are exchanged in the processor-retailer transaction.  
A Transaction Cost Economics approach with a supply chain orientation 
To improve the practical relevance of research into the subject of contract decision making in 
supply chains, the thesis has needed to addresses the above mentioned weaknesses in these two 
streams of literature. This has been achieved by shifting TCE’s unit of analysis from a focus on 
bilateral transactions, towards examining transactions in a supply chain context. This shift in 
focus allows for the examination of transaction risks from a supply chain perspective. This has 
made it possible to examine, for example, how conflicts of interests between actors upstream in 
a supply chain can affect the transaction risk exposure of actors downstream in the supply 
chain.  
Why an (extended) TCE approach and not (also) other theoretical approaches? 
Although a wide range of theoretical frameworks have been developed to examine contracting 
decisions (e.g., Resource Based View of the firm, Real Options theory, Agency theory, 
Chapter One 
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Property Rights theory), the present thesis analyses such decisions almost exclusively through 
an (extended) TCE lens. This is for three main reasons.  
First, most of these frameworks –  amongst others the Resource Based View of the firm and 
Property Rights theory – have not been operationalized nor empirically tested to the same 
extent as TCE (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Whinston, 2003; Williamson, 2002; Williamson, 
2000). This makes TCE arguably the most robust framework to use and build on. 
Second, TCE is applicable in a much wider variety of contract decision making situations than 
most other frameworks. For example, while Agency theory applies mainly to situations in 
which (one of the) contracting parties have difficulty in monitoring, metering or measuring the 
contribution of the other party involved in the transaction (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980), Real Options theory is mostly concerned with situations in which investment 
decisions and associated contracting choices have to be made under conditions of uncertainty 
(see Trigeorgis, 2006; McGrath, Ferrier and Mendelow 2004; Folta and Miller, 2002)6. 
Although earlier versions of the TCE framework had a somewhat narrow focus on situations 
involving the use of specific investments, subsequent extensions (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp 
and Kumar, 2006; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997) have made it possible to examine most 
contracting situations through a TCE lens.  
Third, and related to the previous point, considering the wide applicability of TCE, it was not 
considered beneficial to employ other frameworks besides TCE. Although recent studies have 
started to combine or integrate (aspects of) TCE with other frameworks, the benefits of such an 
integrated approach are not always clear. This is for various reasons: a), frequently, studies  
which combine frameworks use a simplified version of the TCE framework (e.g., see McIvor, 
2009; Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 2001; Barney and Lee, 2000)7; (b), some studies  reach 
conclusions which could have been reached without relying on other frameworks (e.g., 
                                                           
6
 Furthermore, Property Right theory (see Hart 1991; 1989; Grossman and Hart, 1986) is mainly applicable to 
situations in which asset ownership is the main mechanism by which (residual) control in a transaction is 
established (Holmström and Roberts, 1998).  
7
 For example, Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada (2001) examine how Porter’s Strategic Positioning Framework can 
be combined with TCE. However, their study considers, of the various drivers of contracting decisions within the 
TCE framework, only asset specificity. 
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Sanchez, 2000)8; (c), other studies insufficiently consider whether the assumptions underlying 
the different theoretical frameworks are compatible (e.g., Hendrikse and Windsperger, 2011)9.  
3. EMPIRICAL CONTEXT 
To help to address the research questions, empirical research has been conducted in a specific 
sub-section of the agri-food sector: the pork meat industry. The role of empirical research in 
the thesis is twofold: (1), to illustrate the value en relevance for practitioners of the theoretical 
insights regarding contracting choices which have been developed in the studies; (2), to help 
refine those insights. To be able to achieve this, it is important to examine a wide variety of 
contract decision making situations. The meat industry is a particularly interesting industry to 
examine in this context because of at least four reasons.  
First, a wide variety of different types of contracts are used, not only at different supply chain 
stages (e.g., feed producer or slaughterhouse), but also across different types of supply chains 
(e.g., branded or commodity supply chains) and different countries (e.g., North and South 
European countries).  
Second, as is explained in the introduction to this chapter, the management of 
interdependencies and associated transaction risks is of particular importance in the meat 
industry because of public health consequences in case of food quality problems.  
Third, related to the previous point, the meat industry has been one of the first to develop 
quality management systems that cover the whole supply chain. Although such systems can 
help actors in coordinating quality, they may also, paradoxically, increase interdependencies 
even further in the supply chain.  
Fourth, a wide variety of different types of differentiation strategies  are used within the pork 
industry, ranging from commodity producing supply chains to brands owned by a collective of 
chain actors. As is explained in Section 1, differentiation can increase interdependencies 
between contracting decisions at different stages within the supply chain. 
                                                           
8
 For example, Sanchez (2000) combines insights from TCE and Real Options theory to examine contracting 
decisions under conditions of volume uncertainty. But, the TCE framework already considers (volume) 
uncertainty as one of the key drivers of contracting decisions.  
9
 Hendrikse and Windsperger (2011) use both Property Rights (PR) theory and TCE in their study, without 
addressing or reconciling key differences between the two frameworks. Amongst others, studies based on PR 
generally do not consider bargaining costs between transaction parties after initial contract terms have been 
established, while the presence of such costs are a key focal point within TCE (according to Williamson, 2002; 
Masten, 1999). Related to this, PR does not recognize any advantages an internalized transaction may have over a 
market transaction in adapting to (some) changing circumstances (Whinston, 2003; Williamson, 2002).  
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Although the empirical part of the thesis is focused on the pork industry, the thesis’ main 
implications should be applicable also to other, non-agri-food, contexts. Amongst others, this is 
because the theoretical part of the thesis is arguably more important than the empirical part for 
answering the research questions. Related to this, the approach which is taken in the theoretical 
part of the thesis (see Section 2), and on which the empirical results are based, has not been 
developed specifically for the agri-food sector. Most of the literature which has been used to 
develop this approach has come from general management journals rather than from specific 
agri-food oriented journals. Furthermore, special care has been taken to assure that the 
managerial implications of the thesis are relevant for managers from a wide range of sectors 
and industries.  
4. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Studies One and Two include empirical data about the pork industry. To generate the data, a 
two phase, multiple case study approach was taken in which the unit of analysis was the pork 
supply chain. The thesis examined the transactions between the supply chain actors.  
The objective of the first case study phase (Study One) was to obtain an overview of the 
variety of supply chain types which can be found in the pork industry and to characterize the 
contracts and quality management systems that are used within these supply chains. Seven 
supply chains in four European countries (Germany, Spain, The Netherlands and Hungary) 
were examined.  
The second case study phase (Study Two) examined in more detail some of the supply chain 
types identified in the first case study phase. Commodity chains, proprietary brands and 
collective brands were examined. The objective of this case study phase was to compare the 
types of contracts used within these supply chains. Eight supply chains in five countries were 
examined (Denmark, France, Spain, The Netherlands and one non-European country, Brazil)10.  
A case study approach was deemed most suitable in the context of this thesis for a number of 
reasons.  
First, considering that the thesis aimed to examine contracting decisions within a supply chain 
context, it was important to examine the contracts used in the various transactions making up 
the supply chain. As a result, it would be difficult to obtain data from a large enough sample of 
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 Note that, although the second case study phase builds on the work done in the first case study phase, 
particularly for the Dutch and Spanish cases, new research was undertaken in all of the countries (see Chapter 
Three).   
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supply chains to conduct quantitative research.  Most quantitative research examines only two-
stage supply chains; i.e., buyer-supplier relations. Furthermore, often buyers (suppliers) from 
different types of supply chains are ‘pooled’ into one group when results are analyzed. Such an 
approach is inappropriate when the objective is to examine interdependencies in contracting 
decisions between actors operating within the same supply chain. 
Second, the thesis has attempted to obtain in-depth insight into contracts and the ‘real-life 
context’ in which they are used.  Case study research is more suitable than quantitative 
approaches for obtaining these insights, as the focus of the latter is on ‘controlling’ rather than 
understanding  this context (Yin, 1999). The human action and interaction which leads to the 
implementation, adjustment and potential failure of a contract to appropriately govern a 
transaction is difficult to fully understand without in-depth knowledge of the specific context 
in which the contract is used.  
 Third, although a lack of ‘generalisability’ has often been cited as an important limitation of 
case study research (Yin, 1981), this critique is not entirely justified. To be able to understand 
to what other contexts the results of a study may apply, it is important to clearly delineate the 
empirical domain in which the study takes place (Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki, 2008). This 
domain or context is often best understood and specified by means of case study research, as is 
explained in the previous point.  
 Fourth, with increased concentration in many industries, case studies of a couple of (large) 
companies may already lead to valuable insights. For example, the car industry is dominant by 
just a few companies world-wide, which makes it possible to obtain not only in-depth, but also 
characteristic results by means of case studies. Also the pork industry has become dominated 
by a limited number of actors. For example, the largest meat companies in Denmark and The 
Netherlands execute more than half of all of the pig slaughters in their respective domestic 
markets.  
5. THEORETICAL AND MANAGERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The thesis has been written largely out of a desire to improve the practical relevance of the 
literature on inter-organizational contract forms. As is explained in Section 3, during the course 
of the study, it became clear that there were some gaps in the literature on this subject which 
made the current state-of-the-art-theory insufficient to answer the research questions. As a 
result, a significant part of the thesis is focused on theory development, in particular with 
regard to TCE, to be able to bridge these gaps.  
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The problems encountered by practitioners and the solutions implemented by them are often 
much more specific than the generic advice provided within TCE literature (e.g., see Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; Barney and Lee, 2000; Williamson, 1991). Practitioners do not 
(only) require advice about whether to make or buy their inputs (outputs) or to implement a 
formal or a verbal contract with their supplier (customer). More importantly, they require 
advice on how to do it (e.g., to fix prices for a transaction or not). To address this issue, the 
thesis makes two important contributions11. First, a typology has been developed which allows 
for a much more in-depth examination of contracts than previous typologies (see Chapter 3). 
As a result, more specific advice can be given to practitioners about the types of contracts that 
they should consider using. Second, contracts have been examined within the broader supply 
chain contexts in which they are used (see Chapters Four-Five in particular). Therefore, 
detailed advice can be given to practitioners about how they can optimize their contract use for 
the various supply chain transactions in which they participate. 
6. MAIN CONCEPTS 
This section characterizes some of the main concepts used in the thesis. 
Supply chain 
‘Supply chain’ is a broadly defined concept in the thesis. Following Mentzer et al. (2001) it 
refers to: “a set of three or more entities (organizations or individuals) directly involved in the 
upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or information from a 
source to a customer”. Note that one entity may be involved in more than one stage of the 
supply chain; i.e., it may be its own source or customer. For example, a slaughterhouse may 
also raise the pigs it slaughters. The supply chains which have been examined in the first case 
study phase consist of seven stages: feed producer-breeder-farrower-finisher-slaughterer-
processor-retailer. The second case study focuses on five supply chain stages, as the breeding 
and farrowing stage have not been examined.  
‘Breeders’ produce semen, sows and boards. They supply the genetic basis for pig farming, 
which includes both farrowing and finishing.  ‘Farrowers’ produce and raise piglets until they 
are approximately 25 kg. Subsequently, ‘finishers’ raise piglets from the previous stage until 
they reach their slaughter weight (which varies from 85 kg to more than 150 kg, depending on 
the type of pig used and type of market served). ‘Slaughterers’ kill the pigs and cut the carcass 
into various pieces. Meat parts are sold to processors or retailers directly. ‘Processors’ use the 
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 The thesis contributes also to other areas, amongst others to research into the organization of quality 
management systems. See Chapter Six for a more elaborate discussion of the thesis’s contributions. 
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meat parts (or carcasses) delivered by the slaughterer to prepare specific meat products (e.g., 
steaks, loins, ham, and sausages). ‘Retailers’ include, in the context of this thesis, all outlets in 
which consumers can purchase meat products (e.g., supermarkets, butchers, hotels). 
Contract  
The term ‘contract’ has various meanings within economics and management literature (see 
Masten, 1999; Ménard, 1997; Klein, 1992; Cheung, 1983; Williamson, 1979; Macaulay, 1963). 
In its most narrow interpretation, a ‘contract’ refers strictly to those arrangements which are 
implemented with the intention of creating legally enforceable rights and obligations for the 
parties involved in a transaction (Masten, 1999). In a broader interpretation, a ‘contract’ refers 
to the arrangements used, enforceable by legal or other means (e.g., by the threat of 
relationship termination), to govern transactions (Klein, 1992). This thesis uses the broader 
interpretation of the term ‘contract’. Both verbal and written contracts are included in this 
interpretation. Furthermore, the term also includes investment-based arrangements, like equity-
alliances or vertical integration.  
Other terms than ‘contract’ which are used by researchers to refer to arrangements between 
transaction parties, include: governance structure, form of economic organization and inter-
organizational mode (e.g., see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; Ménard, 2004; 
Webster Jr., 1992; Williamson, 1992). In this thesis, the term ‘contract’ is used, amongst others 
because it is a term which is more accurately interpreted by scholars and practitioners which 
are not operating in the field of institutional economics. 
 
Transaction risk  
 ‘Risk’ may be defined as the possibility of a harmful outcome or event (e.g., a costs or a loss) 
(see Hallikas et al., 2004). The focus in the thesis is on ‘transaction risks’; i.e., possible 
harmful events resulting from the participation of an actor in transactions with other actors. A 
TCE perspective is taken on ‘transaction risks’.  
Within the TCE framework, the main driver of contracting decisions is an actor’s exposure in a 
transaction to the risk of strategic, self-interested behavior by the counterparty to the 
transaction (Williamson, 1988). Strategic behavior refers to the attempts made by actors to 
exploit this counterparty, amongst others by renegotiating the conditions of the exchange (i.e., 
the risk of opportunism) or by falsely claiming compliance with exchange conditions (i.e., the 
risk of shirking). Strategic behavior is possible because contracts always include gaps and 
omissions (Williamson, 2008), which result from human constraints in information processing 
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capabilities (Simon, 1957). Furthermore, because of these constraints, actors cannot specify all 
changes in the circumstances surrounding a transaction in advance (Williamson, 1991). Actors 
entering into a transaction run the risk that the circumstances change (e.g., demand for a 
product falls) after the parties have agreed upon exchange conditions (e.g., after a large order is 
placed). These changes can expose the transaction parties also to the risk of maladaptation; i.e., 
the risk of a failure to adapt to environmental changes.  
Interdependency  
‘Interdependency’ refers to situations in which ties exist or arise between actors; i.e., when the 
behavior of actors, and the outcomes of their behavior, depends on the behavior of (some of 
the) other actors in the network or supply chain (based on Molm, 1994). Actors may be tied or 
interdependent through various channels or interfaces12, but the focus in this thesis is mainly 
on interdependencies related to the transactions in which they participate13.  
Transactions are regarded as ‘interdependent’ when supply chain actors’ exposure to supply 
(demand) side transaction risks affects their ability to manage exposure to demand (supply) 
side transaction risks. Interdependencies may lead to negative ‘transaction externalities’, as 
when the use of a supply side contract not only affects the (supply side) risk exposure of the 
parties involved in the transaction, but its effects spill over into increased demand side 
transaction risk or increased risk elsewhere in the supply chain (Wever et al., 2012). Note that 
only transaction externalities in the context of the supply chain are considered in this thesis; 
e.g., a spillover of supply (demand) side risks to the demand (supply) side transaction or 
elsewhere in the supply chain.  See Roberts and Key (2005) for an analysis of ‘horizontal’, 
industry wide transaction externalities as opposed to the ‘vertical’ supply chain transaction 
externalities examined in this thesis. 
Quality management system and Differentiation  
In the thesis, supply chains have been distinguished based on the type of ‘quality management 
system’ used (in study 1) and on the type of ‘differentiation’ label or signal used (in Studies 
Two-Four). A ‘quality management system’ refers to the manner in which compliance with 
quality standards is monitored and signaled between supply chain actors; i.e., within the supply 
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 For example, actors may obtain credit from the same bank. For studies of interdependencies which arise 
between actors through other channels than the transactions between them, see Borgatti and Li, 2009; Burt, 1980. 
13
 As is explained in Section 1, the participation of supply chain actors in different types of quality management 
systems (see Study One) or different types of brands (see Studies Two-Four) is expected to affect the extent to 
which interdependencies arise through the transactions in the supply chain.  
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chain (based on Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001; 
González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003). Quality management systems are distinguished 
in the thesis based on: (1), their ownership; (2), the extent to which they are used vertically 
across different supply chain stages; and (3), the extent to which they are used horizontally, by 
different actors operating at the same stage in the supply chain.  
‘Differentiation’ refers to the manner in which quality is signaled towards the consumer (based 
on Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2009). A distinction is made in the thesis based on: (1), 
whether the meat products are marketed under a brand name or not (commodity chain or 
branded chains); and (2), if the products are marketed under a brand, whether the brand is 
owned by an individual supply chain actor (proprietary brand) or by a collective of supply 
chain actors (collective brand). Note that a consumer quality signal may or may not be 
supported by a specific quality management system within the supply chain. Likewise, note 
that the use of a quality management system within the supply chain is not necessarily signaled 
towards the consumer. 
7. THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  
Chapter Two (Study One) addresses the first research question ‘What is the relation between 
the participation of supply chain actors in different types of quality management systems and 
their contracting choices?’. The research question is addressed both theoretically (based on 
TCE) and empirically (by means seven case studies).  
Chapter Three (Study Two) addresses research questions 2A ‘What types of coordination 
mechanisms are used within contracts?’ and 2B ‘What differences can be observed in the use 
of these mechanisms across various types of supply chains’. To address the research questions, 
a typology of contractual coordination mechanisms is developed based on extant literature. 
Furthermore, the value of the typology is illustrated by comparing the use of these mechanisms 
across three types of supply chains: proprietary brands, collective brands, commodity chains. 
In total, eight cases are studied. 
Chapter Four and Chapter Five addres research questions 3A ‘What types of conditions lead to 
interdependencies in differentiated supply chains?’, 3B ‘What are the consequences of 
interdependencies for the transaction risk exposure of supply chain actors?’ and 3C ‘What 
types of contractual options do supply chain actors have in managing the transaction risks 
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arising from these interdependencies?’. The research questions are answered through a TCE 
lens. Chapter Four (Study Three) first provides the theoretical justification for moving TCE’s 
unit of analysis beyond the dyad. Subsequently, various stylized contract decision making 
situations are analyzed through both a dyad-oriented TCE lens and a TCE lens with a supply 
chain-wide orientation. While Chapter Four discusses mainly contracts which actors can use to 
reduce or eliminate their transaction risk exposure, Chapter Five (Study Four) examines a 
broader range of contractual options for actors when risk minimization is not possible. 
Furthermore, compared to Chapter Four, Chapter Five more explicitly considers risks resulting 
from non-sequential interdependencies in the supply chain.  
Chapter Six discusses the main findings of the studies and concludes the thesis. Several 
propositions are outlined which could be tested in further research. Furthermore, various 
implications are outlined for practitioners on how they can take a more supply chain-wide 
approach to managing their contractual relations.
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ALIGNMENT BETWEEN QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEMS AND CONTRACTS IN EU PORK SUPPLY 
CHAINS14 
 
Although inter-company coordination of quality management is increasingly important for 
meeting end-customer demand in agri-food supply chains, few researchers focus on the 
relation between quality management systems (QMS) and the contracts used between the 
supply chain actors participating in these QMSs. However, failure to align QMSs and 
contracts may lead to inefficiencies in quality management because of high transaction costs. 
This paper addresses this gap in research by empirically examining the relation between 
QMSs and contracts in pork meat supply chains. Transaction Cost Economic theory is used to 
develop propositions about the relation between three aspects of QMSs − ownership, vertical 
scope and scale of adoption − and the use of different types of contracts in pork meat supply 
chains. To validate the propositions, seven cases are examined from four different countries. 
The results show that the different aspects of QMSs largely relate to specific contracts used in 
supply chains in the manner predicted by the propositions. This supports the view that 
alignment between QMSs and contracts is important for the efficient coordination of quality 
management in (pork meat) supply chains. 
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Research into quality management is moving from studying quality management in an intra-
company context to studying quality management in an inter-company context (Kaynaka and 
Hartley, 2008). This trend is related to a shift in the industry from competition between 
companies, to competition between supply chains (Nair, 2006). This shift is also apparent in 
agri-food supply chains. Importance of inter-company quality management is mainly related 
to two developments: (1), increased quality management demands following recent food 
crises (Trienekens and Van der Vorst, 2006); and (2), increased interdependencies between 
supply chain actors in meeting the quality demanded by the end-customer (Van Plaggenhoef, 
2007).  
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 The article on which this chapter is based has been published as “Wever, M., Wognum, N., Trienekens, J, 
Omta, O, ‘Alignment between chain quality management and chain governance in EU pork supply chains: A 
Transaction-Cost-Economics perspective’, Meat Science, (84), 2010, pp. 228-237.” 
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Although inter-company coordination of quality management is increasingly important for 
meeting end-customer demands in agri-food supply chains, few researchers focus on the 
relation between inter- or multi-company quality management systems (QMS) and the 
contracts used by the supply chain actors participating in these systems (Raynaud, Sauvée and 
Valceschini, 2005). However, insufficient alignment between QMSs and contracts can result 
in high transaction costs, amongst others by leading to under-investments in quality 
improvements, quality cheating, and difficulties in adjusting quality standards within the 
supply chain (Martinez and Zering, 2004). Besides reducing the (economic) efficiency in the 
supply chain, insufficient alignment is likely to lead to a reduction of food quality (González-
Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003).  
To address this gap in research, the paper empirically investigates the relation between QMSs 
and contracts in meat supply chains. The objective is to examine how QMSs are aligned with 
the contracts used in supply chain transactions. Meat supply chains are particularly well suited 
for this analysis because of recent quality management related developments in the industry. 
In response to severe food crises, and the accompanying loss of consumer confidence, supply 
chain actors have developed chain-wide QMSs (Van Plaggenhoef, 2008). The degree of 
participation of actors in these systems can be expected to have a large influence on relations 
within the supply chain.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Two outlines the theoretical 
approach of the study. Using Transaction Cost Economic theory, it is argued that QMSs need 
to be aligned with contracts in order to reduce transaction costs. Based on this alignment 
principle, propositions are developed about the relation between three aspects of QMSs − 
ownership, vertical scope and scale of adoption − and the types of contracts used in meat 
supply chains. Section Three outlines the methodological approach taken to examining the 
propositions. A case study approach was used, as little previous empirical work was identified 
which examines the relation between QMSs and contracts in meat supply chains. Seven pork 
supply chains were examined in four EU countries. The pork industry, because of the 
diversity of QMSs and contracts found, provides a particularly rich context for the purpose of 
this study. Only EU pork supply chains were examined to provide for a relatively 
homogenous context. Section Four gives a background to the cases. Section Five outlines the 
main results of the study. Based on the three criteria − ownership, scope and scale − four 
different types of QMSs were distinguished in the EU pork industry. For each of the four 
types of QMSs, alignment between QMSs and contracts is for the most part in accordance 
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with the propositions developed in Section two. Section Six discusses the main findings of the 
study and highlights areas for further research.  
2. QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND CONTRACTS 
Coordination of quality in the pork supply chain is achieved through a combination of (inter- 
or multi-company) quality management systems (QMSs) and contracts. QMSs may facilitate 
in the coordination of quality by setting standards, monitoring compliance with these 
standards and signaling compliance (and non-compliance) to the different actors involved in 
the pork supply chain (Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). Contracts may facilitate in 
the reduction of transaction risks related to the coordination of quality (Martinez and Zering, 
2004).  
2.1. Quality management systems 
QMSs consist of three elements (based on Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; González-
Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001): quality signals, quality 
standards and quality monitoring mechanisms. ‘Quality signals’ are employed by companies 
to indicate product and process quality to their buyers (which may be other companies or 
consumers15; Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; Sporleder and Goldsmith, 2001). 
‘Quality standards’ and ‘quality monitoring mechanisms’ support quality signals (Ordóñez et 
al., 2006). Quality standards are set by the signal owner, which can be either a supply chain 
actor, or a public actor. Standard setting and monitoring compliance with those standards can 
be split; i.e., different actors can be responsible for each activity (Ponte and Gibbon, 2005; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). 
2.1.1. Types of quality management systems  
Based on the conceptualization of QMSs as is outlined above, and a literature review (e.g., 
Theuvsen and Spiller, 2007; Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005), QMSs can be 
distinguished along three dimensions: (1), the owner of (parts of) the system; (2), the scope of 
the system; (3), the scale of the system:  
 
Owner of system 
A general distinction can be made between public and private QMSs. In case of the former, 
the quality standard (and quality signal) is owned by a public actor(s). In case of the latter, the 
                                                           
15
 In the context of the thesis, quality signals used in business-to-consumer transactions are not considered as part 
of a QMS (see Section 6 in Chapter One).   
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standard (and signal) is owned by a private actor(s). Importantly, as is outlined above, 
standard setting and monitoring compliance with the standard may be split, but ultimately, the 
actor(s) setting the standard may be regarded as owner(s) of the system.  
Scope of the system 
This dimension refers to the extent to which a QMS is adopted along the different stages of 
the vertical supply chain. QMSs can be company-to-company or chain-wide. Chain-wide 
QMSs cover all main transactions within the supply chain, while company-to-company QMSs 
cover only a single transaction in the supply chain.  
 
Scale of system 
This dimension refers to the extent to which a QMS is adopted horizontally across one (or 
more) stage(s) of the supply chain; i.e., the market penetration of the system. A QMS may 
have a wide scope (i.e., it is adopted by all stages of the vertical supply chain), but a small 
scale (i.e., it is adopted only by a few actors in each stage of the supply chain).  
 
2.2. Contracts  
‘Contract’ refers to the agreements used to govern transactions; i.e., it refers to the manner in 
which transactions are organized (within the supply chain). Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE), most often associated with Williamson (2000; 1996; 1988; 1981) has been the 
dominant theory for analyzing contracting choices. Amongst others for this reason, a TCE 
perspective has been used in this study (see also Section 2 in Chapter One).  
TCE has been criticized for various reasons16, amongst others of (1), neglecting the social 
(Uzzi, 1996; Granovetter, 1985) and institutional (Coase, 1988; North, 1986) context in which 
transactions occur; (2), focusing mainly on risks related to opportunism and shirking 
behaviour (see Section 2.2.2) as the primary drivers of contract choices, thereby paying little 
attention to other types of drivers (Gulati and Singh, 1998); (3), failing to take into account 
the relation between company characteristics and contract choices (Leiblein and Miller, 2003).  
However, much of this criticism has focused on earlier versions of TCE (Rindfleisch and 
Heide, 1997). Recent TCE studies have started to address most of these points of criticism. 
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 Next to the three points of criticism mentioned in the present study, TCE has also often been criticized of 
being a ‘static’ framework, which makes it difficult for example to examine path dependency effects in contract 
choices (Foss and Foss, 2000; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996). However, Williamson (1996, 2000) has reacted 
strongly to this criticism, stating that inter-temporal issues are central to the TCE framework.  
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For example, Rooks et al. (2000) have examined how transactions are embedded within social 
relations, while Oxley (1999) has related aspects of the institutional environment (e.g., 
property rights regimes) to contract choices. Gulati and Singh (1998) have examined 
adaptation difficulties, next to opportunism and shirking, as drivers for contract choices. 
Furthermore, recent studies have started to address the criticism that TCE does not take into 
account the effect of company-specific attributes on contract choices, by incorporating 
company strategy in TCE models (Leiblein and Miller, 2003; Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 
2001; Ghosh and John, 1999). The present study builds on these later studies by using a TCE 
framework to relate contract choices within supply chains, to differences in the QMS 
strategy17 chosen within the supply chains (see Section 2.3).  
2.2.1. Types of contracts 
In the TCE framework, contracts are distinguished based on the extent to which actors 
coordinate or control various phases of the production process (Williamson, 1991). Work 
based on the TCE framework generally distinguishes between contracts which rely on more 
market forms for coordinating transactions and contracts which rely on more hierarchical 
forms of coordination. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Typology of contracts  
 
(based on Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005) 
 
Market types of contracts rely mainly on price and competition for the coordination of the 
transaction (Martinez and Zering, 2004; Williamson, 1991): 
• Different supply chain actors are autonomous parties; 
• The autonomy of the parties makes market types of contracts more efficient than 
hierarchies in adapting to price changes; 
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 QMS strategy refers here to the type of QMS chosen in the supply chain.  
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• The threat that buyers switch to other suppliers gives supply chain actors a strong 
incentive to adapt to price changes; 
• Compared with hierarchies, actors with market contracts have less control over their 
buyers or suppliers (e.g., less opportunity to monitor the other’s behavior and 
performance or to carry out punitive measures). 
Hierarchical types of contracts rely mainly on administrative control for the coordination of 
the transaction (Martinez and Zering, 2004; Williamson, 1991): 
• Different stages within the supply chain are not autonomous: in case of full 
integration, different stages are owned by a single actor; 
• Stronger control mechanisms make hierarchies more efficient than markets in adapting 
to changes which require a coordinated response (e.g., changing quality requirements) 
but less efficient in adapting to price changes (e.g., because of inflexibility of wages). 
In between the market and hierarchy polar forms, various intermediate forms of contracts 
exist, as is visualized in Figure 2.1. These types of contracts combine elements from both 
markets and hierarchical contract forms. The closer a contract is to one of the polar forms in 
Figure 2.1, the more closely the contract is expected to resemble that form. The typology of 
contracts shown in Figure 2.1 was used to classify the contracts found in the examined cases 
(see Section 3.2). Except for equity-based contracts, all types of contracts were found.  
 
2.2.2. Transaction attributes and contract choices 
According to TCE, transactions, which differ in their attributes, need to be aligned with 
specific contracts, which differ in their cost and aptitude, in an economically efficient manner 
(Williamson, 1981). Economic efficiency in this regard means that parties to a transaction 
should strive to minimize the cost of the transaction (Williamson, 2000), to the extent that 
value is maximized for both parties (compared to the next best alternative for each party; 
Ghosh and John, 1999). Three attributes of the transaction are important in this regard: level 
of asset specificity, level of performance measurement difficulty and level of uncertainty or 
adaptation difficulty (see Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Ghosh and John, 1999; Williamson, 
1991):  
• ‘Asset specificity’ refers to the extent to which the investments an actor makes to 
support a transaction ties the actor to the other party in the transaction. According to 
TCE, high levels of asset specificity means that the actor making these investments 
will seek more hierarchical types of contracts, with legally binding, contractual 
safeguards (i.e., formal contract, equity-based contract and vertical integration). This is 
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to reduce the risk of opportunism, which is the risk that the other party to the 
transaction will renegotiate the terms of the conditions, once investments are made 
(Williamson, 1988). 
• ‘Performance measurement difficulty’ refers to the extent to which parties in a 
transaction can measure the benefits and costs the other party brings to the transaction. 
If information is more difficult to measure it is likely that more hierarchical types of 
contracts are adopted to reduce the risk of shirking behavior; i.e., the risk that parties 
put in insufficient effort (Ghosh and John, 1999). 
• ‘Level of uncertainty’ refers to unanticipated changes in the wider context in which a 
transaction is embedded. These changes can lead to adaptation difficulties, as when the 
parties to the transaction fail to adapt to these changes. Depending on the type of 
changes, certain contracts are more suitable than others. For example, hierarchical 
types of contracts are more efficient than market contracts in adapting to changes 
which require a coordinated response amongst supply chain actors, such as changing 
quality requirements. Market types of contracts are more efficient than hierarchies in 
adapting to changes which favor autonomous adaptation of supply chain actors, such 
as price changes (Bijman, 2007; Gulati and Singh 1998; Williamson, 1991). 
Different types of QMSs affect the attributes of the transaction in different ways (Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). It is because of this reason that different types of QMSs need 
different types of contracts: unless parties to a transaction employ a contract which manages 
transaction risks resulting from the employed QMS – i.e., risks relating to asset specificity, 
performance measurement difficulty and uncertainty – a loss of value will occur, as supply 
chain actors may scale back investments and adapt less (Ghosh and John, 1999). 
 
2.3. Types of quality management systems and contracts 
Based on the review of the literature, it can be hypothesized that different types of QMSs are 
associated with different types of contracts. In particular, it is proposed here that the three 
dimensions of QMSs affect the need for certain types of contracts in the following manner. 
 
2.3.1. Relation between scope of QMS and contract choices 
As is outlined in Section 2.1.1, a distinction can be made between company-to-company 
QMSs and chain-wide QMSs. Based on the TCE framework, it can be argued that adaptation 
difficulties are more severe in supply chains with company-to-company QMSs, than in supply 
chains with chain-wide QMSs. 
Agri-food supply chains require a coordinated response between supply chain actors to 
produce the quality demanded by the market (Martinez and Zering, 2004). In cases with 
chain-wide QMSs, this coordination is achieved through the QMS which (implicitly) aligns 
activities (Wognum and Wever, 2008). In cases with company-to-company QMSs, no 
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coordinated chain-wide response is achieved as the various bi-lateral partnerships adapt 
autonomously to (changes in) quality demands. 
As autonomous adaptations to quality demands are less efficient then coordinated adaptations 
(Martinez and Zering, 2004), it can be argued that supply chains with company-to-company 
QMSs need additional mechanisms to achieve a coordinated chain-wide response. Given that 
stronger control mechanisms associated with hierarchies are more efficient in achieving a 
coordinated response (see Section 2.2.2), the following proposition can be formulated: 
 
Proposition 1: Supply chains with company-to-company QMSs need, when compared to 
supply chains with chain-wide QMSs, more hierarchical contracts (i.e., formal contracts, 
vertical integration) 
 
As is explained in Section 2.2.1, four types of contracts are examined in the study: spot 
market contracts, verbal agreements, formal contracts and vertical integration (no equity based 
contracts were used in the examined cases). For the purpose of examining the propositions, 
formal contracts and vertical integration are regarded as (more) hierarchical types of contracts. 
This is because these types of contracts are closest to the hierarchy polar form (see Section 
2.2.1). See Section 3.2 for the operationalisation of the various types of contracts. 
 
2.3.2. Relation between ownership of QMS and contract choices 
As is outlined in Section 2.1.1, a distinction can be made between public and private QMSs. 
Based on the TCE framework, it can be argued that risks related to asset specificity and 
performance measurement difficulty are larger in transactions undertaken in supply chains 
with private chain-wide QMSs than in chains with public chain-wide QMSs. 
In private QMSs, supply chain actors make specific investments amongst others in: (1), 
developing the QMS (e.g., investments by the standard owner in quality signals); (2), 
improving practices to meet new quality standards; (3), new quality measurement 
technologies (Martinez and Zering, 2004). In public QMSs, public actors provide (part of) the 
resources necessary for setting and monitoring compliance with standards in the supply chain 
(González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003). As a result, supply chain actors make fewer 
investments in specialized resources. Furthermore, supply chain actors can economize on the 
costs of monitoring other supply chain actors, as these activities are undertaken by public 
actors.  
Chapter Two 
35 
 
Given that the stronger control mechanisms associated with hierarchies are more efficient in 
dealing with risks related to asset specificity and performance measurement difficulty (Ghosh 
and John, 1999; Williamson, 1991; see also Section 2.2.2), the following proposition can be 
formulated:  
 
Proposition 2A: Supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs need, when compared to supply 
chains with public chain-wide QMSs, more hierarchical types of contracts (i.e., formal 
contracts, vertical integration) 
 
2.3.3. Relation between scale of QMS and contract choices 
As is outlined in Section 2.1.1, QMSs can be distinguished based on the extent to which they 
are adopted across one (or more) stage(s) of the supply chain. Based on the TCE framework, 
it can be argued that risks related to asset specificity and performance measurement difficulty 
are larger for transactions in supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs, adopted on a small 
scale, than for transactions in supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs, adopted on a 
larger scale. In this last situation, actors have a larger number of potential trading partners to 
choose from at each stage of the supply chain. Investments are therefore less specifically 
related to other supply chain actors (Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). Furthermore, 
large scale adaptation of QMSs makes outsourcing of monitoring activities to third-party 
certifying institutions more economical (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). In QMSs with a 
smaller scale, more specific investments need to be made to comply with the QMS 
requirements, because of fewer trading partners at each stage of the supply chain. 
Furthermore, due the lack of economies of scale, it might be difficult (or at least less 
economical) to outsource monitoring activities to third-party certifying institutions.  
Given that the stronger control mechanisms associated with hierarchies are more efficient in 
dealing with risks related to asset specificity and performance measurement difficulty (Ghosh 
and John, 1999; Williamson, 1991; see also Section 2.2.2), the following proposition can be 
formulated:  
 
Proposition 2B: Supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs that are adopted on a small 
scale need, when compared to supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs that are adopted 
on a larger scale, more hierarchical contracts (i.e., formal contracts, vertical integration) 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This section outlines the methodology used to examine the propositions developed in Section 
Two.   
3.1. Selection of cases 
The unit of analyses for the study was the vertical supply chain. More specifically, the study 
examined the various transactions within the supply chain (see Section 4.1 for an overview of 
the structure of the supply chain). To obtain the data necessary for characterizing EU pork 
supply chains, seven case studies were conducted in four different countries: Germany, Spain, 
Hungary and The Netherlands: 
• DE: (1), Farmers’ Cooperative (FC) owned QMS; (2), Retailer owned QMS. 
• ES: (3), Fresh meat supply chain; (4), PDO supply chain. 
• HU: (5), Fresh meat supply chain; (6), Specialty pig supply chain. 
• NL: (7), Fresh meat supply chain. 
Differences can be observed in QMSs within the different regions within the EU. Because of 
this reason, supply chains from countries in the different regions were included in the study. 
This made it possible to include QMSs with different scale, scope and ownership, which was 
necessary for the examination of the propositions. The cases were examined through 
collaboration with researchers from the selected countries (see Appendix A for the Case Study 
Protocol)18.  
3.2. Methods 
To gather data for each of the cases, in-depth interviews were conducted with scientific and 
industry experts, as well as with supply chain actors in each of the cases19. With regard to 
QMS aspects, the interviews focused on: (1), identifying which QMSs were used in the cases; 
i.e., by asking questions about the types of signals, standards and monitoring mechanisms 
used in each stage of the supply chain; (2), the scale, scope and ownership of these QMS (see 
                                                           
18
 The original case selection included also cases from China, South Africa and Greece. Cases from outside the 
EU were excluded from the analysis in order to provide for a relative homogenous context for the study. The 
Greek cases were excluded because the data were incomplete.  
19
 Although numerous researchers participated in the process of generating and categorizing data for the cases, 
contributions were mainly made by: Dr. Brinkmann and Dr. Ellebrecht (University of Bonn); Prof.dr. Várkonyi 
(Central Food Research Institute); Prof.dr. Briz and Dr. Peña (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid); Dr. Wognum 
(Wageningen University). These researchers have also helped to validate the cross-case analysis presented here. 
Furthermore, they have contributed to the second case study phase, together with Dr. Sauvée and N. 
Rakotonandraina (LaSalle Beauvais); and  Dr. Pozzobon (Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil). 
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Section 4.2 in Appendix A20). With regard to the contractual aspects, the interviews focused 
on the nature of the communication supporting the transaction, the duration of the transaction, 
the formality of the transaction, and the delineation of organizational boundaries (see Section 
4.1 in Appendix A). Previous research (e.g., Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005) has 
shown that these aspects are useful for distinguishing between the various types of contracts 
as shown in Figure 2.1.  
Obtained data were analyzed by a set of coding rules. The main coding rules for QMSs are 
outlined in Table 2.1 
 
TABLE 2.1 
 Coding rules for QMSs 
Element 
of QMS 
Rule 
Scope of 
QMS 
 
A QMS is regarded as company-to-company when it covers only bi-lateral 
partnerships. A QMS is regarded as chain-wide when it covers three or more stages 
in the supply chain. Furthermore, the QMS should cover at least the following three 
key stages in the chain: producer, slaughterhouse and processor*. 
Ownership of 
QMS 
 
A QMS is regarded as public when the quality standard is owned by a public actor, 
or the public actor provides (part of) the resources (e.g,. public certification) 
necessary for monitoring and signaling compliance with this standard. 
Scale of QMS A QMS is regarded as having a large scale, if more than 10% of the pigs produced in 
a country are produced under the QMS. All other QMSs are considered small scale.  
* Theoretically, other types of QMSs could exist (e.g., QMSs which cover just two stages). However, such 
QMSs were not found in the examined cases. 
 
No useful constructs were found in the literature for operationalising ‘scope’, ‘scale’ and 
‘ownership’ of QMSs. Therefore, the coding rules have been developed based on interviews 
with industry experts. The coding rules proved useful in the context of this study. For 
example, small and large scale QMSs could be clearly distinguished in the actual cases. On 
the one hand, systems like IKB and QS (see Section 4.4.2) covered more than 90% of the pig 
production in The Netherlands and Germany, respectively. On the other hand, small-scale 
systems used in German supply chains, as well as in the Hungarian specialty supply chain, 
covered 1% or less of the pig production in the respective countries.  
An overview of the main coding rules for contracts (based on a previous study by Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005) is presented in Table 2.2. Contracts have been classified in 
five groups, based on the typology of contracts shown in Figure 2.1, namely spot market 
contracts (M), verbal agreements (VA), formal contracts (C), equity-based contracts (EC) and 
vertical integration (VI). However, the results show that no equity-based contracts were used 
                                                           
20
 Also data generated through Section 4.3 of the Protocol were used to analyze the QMSs used in the cases.  
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in supply chain transactions. Therefore, only four groups have been distinguished in the final 
analysis: M, VA, C, VI. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
 Coding rules for contracts 
Contract Rule 
Spot market 
contract 
A contract (invoice) for instant exchange of goods or services. No commitment exists 
for future transactions. 
Verbal 
agreement 
Exchanges not formalized into written, legally enforceable contracts. A verbal 
commitment exists for future transactions. Performance or behavioral standards are 
unlikely to be specified, but if so, they are not formalized. 
Formal 
contract 
Legal enforceable, written contracts are used to govern the transaction. A written 
commitment exists for future transactions. Performance and behavioral standards are 
likely to be specified in the contract. 
Equity-based 
contract 
An actor owns stock (and has the accompanying shareholder voting rights), but less 
than 50%, of (one of) its suppliers/ buyers. 
Vertical 
integration  
An actor owns more than 50% of the stock (and has the accompanying shareholder 
voting rights) of (one of) its suppliers/buyers.  
 (adapted from Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005) 
 
4. BACKGROUND TO CASES 
This section gives a short background to the cases by describing elements common to all of 
the cases. The section describes the basic structure of the pork supply chain, as well as 
baseline EU quality standards.  
4.1. Supply chain structure 
The EU pork supply chain covers the following processes: Feed-production − Breeding − 
Farrowing − Finishing − Slaughtering − Processing − Retailing (see Figure 2.2). Farrowing 
and finishing can be performed by separate farms, but often they are combined into a single 
organization.  
 
FIGURE 2.2 
 Production flow in EU pork supply chains 
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4.2. Different levels of quality management systems 
In the EU pork industry, different levels of QMSs can be distinguished: (1), public baseline 
systems, (2), additional widely-accepted private systems adopted on top of public baseline 
systems, (3), additional systems, both public and private, used by a small amount of industry 
participants, adopted on top of widely-accepted private systems (or on top of public baseline 
systems in case no widely-accepted private systems exist in a country). This is visualized in 
Figure 2.3.  
 
FIGURE 2.3 
Different levels of QMSs in EU pork industry*  
 
(adapted from Trienekens and Zuurbier, 2008) 
 *The various quality management systems shown in Figure 2.3 are discussed in Sections 4.3-4.5. 
As is shown in Figure 2.3, and also explained earlier, systems can also be distinguished based 
on the scope of the system (i.e., company-to-company or chain-wide) in addition to a 
distinction based on ownership of the system and the scale by which the system is adopted 
across the industry. 
4.3. Baseline public systems: EU food law and pork industry 
The EU has developed a wide range of legislative demands with regard to food safety. In 
2002, the cornerstone of the new EU food law was laid through passage of Regulation 
178/2002. This regulation is often referred to as the ‘General Food Law’ (GFL). Its main 
objective is to secure a high level of protection of public health and consumer interests with 
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regard to food products. The GFL, active since January 2005, gives food (and animal feed) 
companies primary liability in the event of unsafe products. This necessitates implementation 
of monitoring systems at company level. Information from these systems should make it 
possible to determine the source of safety or quality risks in the supply chain. In addition to 
the general EU regulation 178/2002, EU hygiene regulations 825/2004, 853/2004 and 
854/2004 are particularly important for the pork industry. These demand implementation of 
self-regulation by food companies (Trienekens et al., 2008; Van Plaggenhoef, 2007).  
 
4.4. Large-scale private systems 
This section will focus on large-scale private QMSs that exist on top of public regulations for 
coordinating quality in agri-food supply chains. Small-scale systems are discussed in Section 
4.5.  
4.4.1. Company-to-company systems 
Relatively recently, supply chain actors have developed large-scale initiatives to commit their 
suppliers to strict QMSs. For example, large European retailers have developed 
comprehensive systems with regard to food safety, product and process management, and 
personnel hygiene. The systems were developed to help retailers fulfil legal obligations and 
protect consumers, but they now include more stringent demands for food safety and quality 
than required by law. Examples include BRC21, IFS22 and GFSI23. These three systems have 
been adopted on a large scale across the EU pork industry: BRC is required by (major) British 
retailers, IFS by (major) French, German and Italian retailers; GFSI by (major) Dutch and 
Belgium retailers (Trienekens et al.,2008; Van Plaggenhoef, 2007).  
In most of the examined cases, large-scale company-to-company systems are used (e.g., IFS 
in the German Farmer Cooperative supply chain; GFSI − i.e., Dutch HACCP code − in the 
Dutch fresh pork supply chain).  
4.4.2. Chain-wide systems 
In various EU countries, chain-wide QMSs are emerging that encompass most quality 
management processes in the pork supply chain. So far, Northern European countries like the 
                                                           
21
 British Retail Consortium Standard (BRC), originated from British retailers. Aims at processing/distribution 
stage of the chain. 
22
 International Food Standard (IFS), originated from German, French and Swiss retailers. Aims at 
processing/distribution stage of the chain. 
23
 Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) in particular was set-up with direct suppliers of retailers, such as food 
manufacturers, processors, and traders, in mind.  
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Netherlands (IKB24), Germany (QS25), and Denmark (QSG26) are up-front in implementing 
these kinds of systems. IKB, QS, QSG have been adopted on a large scale across the industry: 
all three systems cover more than 90% of the pigs produced in the respective countries 
(Trienekens et al., 2008). The IKB case, as an example of a large scale, private chain-wide 
system is discussed in Section 5.2. QS is briefly discussed in Section 5.3, as part of the two 
German cases examined in the study. QSG has not been examined in the study, as already two 
large-scale chain-wide QMSs (IKB and QS) were included in the case selection. QSG is 
briefly discussed in Section 6, as a possibly interesting case for further research.  
4.5. Small-scale public and private systems 
Apart from the large-scale private QMSs described above, there are also less widely adopted 
systems, often oriented towards regional or specialty products.  
4.5.1. Public chain-wide systems  
Regional systems like PDO (Products of Designated Origin) and PGI (Protected Geographical 
Indication) can be distinguished mainly in Southern European countries. Special attention is 
given in these countries to (further) development of regulations and standards to protect the 
brand names of these products (Trienekens et al., 2008). PDO and PGI systems tie products to 
a specific region. Because of this, the scale by which these systems can be adopted is limited 
by the (natural) boundaries of the region. PDO and PGI systems may be considered as chain-
wide QMSs. This is because quality standards are set across (large parts of) the supply chain 
while compliance with these standards is also monitored. PDO and PGI systems may also be 
considered public. Although specific PDO and PGI systems need not be necessarily directly 
under public ownership, public actors remain ultimately responsible for: (1) setting the quality 
standards; (2) monitoring compliance with the standards; (3) the credibility of the quality 
signals in these supply chains. Public actors may delegate (some of) these responsibilities to 
the regulatory council, the collective organization in which the supply chain actors are 
organized (Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). An example of a PDO system is 
discussed in Section 5.4.  
4.5.2. Private chain-wide and private company-to-company systems 
Also private actors develop small-scale, chain-wide QMSs mainly to assure the quality of 
regional or specialty products. Such systems can be found in most countries in Europe. An 
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 IKB: Integrated Chain Control. The chain-wide QMS used in The Netherlands.  
25
 QS: Quality and Security. The chain-wide QMS used in Germany. 
26
 QSG: The chain-wide QMS used in Denmark.  
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example of such a system, in this case a system owned by a farmer’s cooperative (FC) in 
Germany, is discussed in Section 5.3.  
Customer-specific quality demands, laid down in written documents, supported by monitoring 
mechanisms, and the signalling of compliance with the standard to the next stage in the supply 
chain, may be regarded as a small-scale private company-to-company system27. Customer-
specific quality demands could be found in most of the cases (see Section 5.1-5.4). It should 
be noted, however, that demands were not always formalized into written documents.   
 
5. RESULTS 
The results show that four main types of systems for coordinating quality management in EU 
pork supply chains can be identified: one public baseline QMS, two private chain-wide QMSs 
and one public chain-wide QMS. The four types of systems largely relate to contracts as 
predicted by the propositions developed in Section 2.3. The four systems are outlined in 
Section 5.1-5.4. Each section discusses one of the seven examined cases in more detail to 
illustrate the functioning of the systems.  
 
5.1. Public baseline QMS 
Supply chains with this type of system do not have a QMS covering the main stages in the 
supply chain. Without a chain-wide (private) quality policy, the actors adhere solely to the 
public baseline quality standards. Supply chain actors may set additional company-to-
company private standards. Supply chains with this type of system can be found in the fresh 
meat case in Spain (see Box 2.1) and the fresh pork meat case in Hungary.  
 
                                                           
27
 Depending on the size of the actor making the demands, some of these systems may be regarded as large scale.  
Chapter Two 
43 
 
BOX 2.1 
Fresh pork meat supply chain in Spain 
Contracts 
Most relations in the Spanish fresh pork meat chain have been formalized into written contracts. An 
important actor in this regard is the feed producer, who coordinates the upstream part of the supply 
chain.  
 
Quality management system  
The Spanish national government, as well as regional governments, set baseline quality standards for 
the sector. No chain-wide private quality standard is used; only company-to-company standards are 
set. An important standard setter in the supply chain is the feed company who, as is outlined above, 
coordinates the upstream part of the supply chain. In general, the private standards used in company-
to-company relations have a relatively small scope.  
 
Compliance with legislative requirements is monitored (for a large part) by the Regional Ministries of 
Agriculture. Monitoring of compliance with private standards is mostly undertaken by supply chain 
actors themselves (although also third-party certifying agencies monitor the larger supply chain 
actors). In the upstream part of the supply chain, monitoring activities are mostly undertaken by the 
feed producer 
 
With regard to the contracts used in these supply chains, mainly hierarchical types of contracts 
were used, especially formal contracts (see Figure 2.4). In the Spanish case, formal contracts 
are mainly used upstream in the chain, while formal contracts can be found in most stages in 
the Hungarian case. Overall, the relation between QMSs and contracts found in the two 
supply chains seems to follow the logic of proposition 1: the lack of a chain-wide QMS means 
that vertical coordination needs to be achieved by more hierarchical contracts.  
 
FIGURE 2.4 
Contracts in public baseline QMSs  
 
(M = market; VA = verbal agreement; C= formal contract; VI = vertical integration) 
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5.2. Private chain-wide QMS as industry standard 
Supply chains with this type of system have a private chain-wide QMS on top of public 
baseline standards. The chain-wide QMS has a very large scale. Actually, it is so widely 
adopted across the industry that it forms the industry standard. Supply chain actors may set 
additional private standards for the immediate linkages in the supply chain. These additional 
company-to-company standards are generally also widely adopted among the respective 
horizontal stages of the supply chain. These types of supply chains can be found, amongst 
others, in the fresh pork meat industry in The Netherlands (IKB), Germany (QS) and 
Denmark (QSG) (see Section 4.4.2). The Fresh pork meat supply chain in The Netherlands is 
one of the cases examined in this study (see Box 2.2), the fresh pork meat supply chain in 
Germany was not examined as a separate case, but QS is briefly discussed in Section 5.3. 
QSG has not been examined in the study, but is mentioned in Section 6, as a possibly 
interesting case for further research. 
 
BOX 2.2 
Fresh pork meat supply chain in The Netherlands 
Contracts 
Different contract types can be found at different stages in the supply chain. For example, while a 
formal contract governs the farrower-finisher transaction, market contracts can be found in farmer-
slaughterhouse transactions. Overall, formal contracts are relatively rare in the supply chain: even 
though most relations are long-term, the relations have often not been formalized into written 
contracts.  
 
Quality management system 
The Dutch government sets baseline quality standards for the sector, which exceed EU legislation in 
some regards. Additional standards are set by the private QMS IKB. More than 90% of the pigs 
produced in The Netherlands are IKB pigs. IKB is a chain-wide system: it sets requirements for each 
linkage in the supply chain. Supply chain actors (may) make demands on top of IKB requirements.  
 
Compliance with legislative requirements is monitored mainly by two public inspection agencies. 
Inspections are based on a risk-based system, meaning that companies performing very well on QMS 
aspects will receive fewer inspections than companies performing poorly. In addition, the Dutch 
accreditation council monitors third-party certifying institutions. Monitoring of compliance with 
private standards is mostly outsourced by supply chain actors to third-party certification institutes like 
Lloyds and SGS.  
 
IKB is signalled only in inter-company transactions. The major retailers have stopped using the IKB 
label to signal quality to the end-customer. Retailers use their house labels instead. 
 
In the Dutch pork meat supply chain, vertical integration and formal contracts between supply 
chain actors are relatively rare (see Figure 2.5); mostly verbal agreements and market 
contracts can be found. With this, the relation between QMSs and contracts follows the logic 
of proposition 1: vertical coordination is achieved by means of a chain-wide QMS (IKB), 
making more hierarchical coordination of supply chain transactions not necessary. 
Furthermore, the relation between QMSs and contracts follows the logic of proposition 2B: 
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chain-wide private QMSs do not need more hierarchical contracts if the QMS is adopted on a 
large scale in the industry.  
 
FIGURE 2.5  
Contracts in large scale, private chain-wide QMS  
 
 (M = market; VA = verbal agreement; C= formal contract; VI = vertical integration) 
5.3. Private chain-wide QMS (on top of industry standard) 
Supply chains with this type of system have adopted an additional private chain-wide QMS on 
top of an industry-wide and chain-wide private QMS. This additional private chain-wide 
quality system has a small scale; it is adopted by relatively few supply chain actors. These 
supply chains can be found in the two cases examined in Germany, namely, the supply chain 
coordinated by the farmer’s cooperative (FC; see Box 2.3) and the retailer-coordinated supply 
chain. Also, a private small-scale and chain-wide QMS exist in the specialty supply chain in 
Hungary. However, unlike the German supply chains, in the Hungarian supply chain the QMS 
is adopted on top of a public baseline QMS. 
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BOX 2.3 
German pork meat supply chain coordinated by a farmer’s cooperative 
Contracts 
Coordination in the supply chain is organized by the farmer’s cooperative (FC). Mostly long-term 
(exclusive), formal contracts govern the transactions between the supply chain actors.  
 
Quality management system  
The German and regional government set baseline quality standards for the sector. Additional 
standards are set by the private chain-wide QMS QS. Around 95% of the pigs produced in Germany 
are QS pigs. An additional chain-wide QMS is used on top of QS. This system is used on a small 
scale: around 0.9% of German pigs are produced under this system. Owner of the system is the FC. 
Additionally, larger supply chain actors have adopted horizontal quality standards like GMP+ and IFS, 
which are used on a large scale in the German industry. 
 
Compliance with legislative requirements is monitored by public inspection agencies including public 
veterinarians. Compliance with private standards is monitored by means of QS audits and inspections 
by farmer’s cooperative. Additionally, the larger supply chain actors are monitored by third-party 
certification institutes. 
 
Use of the system is signalled, by means of a label, in inter-company transactions, as well to end 
consumers. Other signals used in inter-company transactions are GMP+, IFS, ISO 9001. 
 
In both the German cases, as well as in the Hungarian case, long-term supply chain relations 
exist, which are, for a large part, formalized into written contracts (see Figure 2.6). The 
relation between the QMSs and contracts found in the cases follows the logic of propositions 
2B: to safeguard the specific investments made by supply chain actors to meet the additional 
requirements of the private, small-scale QMS, more hierarchical contracts are needed.  
 
FIGURE 2.6 
Contracts in small scale, private chain-wide QMSs  
 
(M = market; VA = verbal agreement; C= formal contract; VI = vertical integration) 
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5.4. Public chain-wide QMS  
Supply chains with this type of system have adopted a (voluntary) public chain-wide QMS on 
top of the baseline quality standards, set, signaled and enforced by the EU, the state, and other 
public actors. Mostly, these are regional systems e.g., PDO and PGI systems, which tie 
production to a specific region. This type of system is used in the Spanish PDO supply chain 
(see Box 2.4). 
  
BOX 2.4 
PDO supply chain in Spain 
Contracts 
Coordination in the supply chain is organized by the Control Board (the independent regulatory 
council responsible for setting standards and monitoring compliance with these standards). All supply 
chain actors are registered with this board. Contracts between the actors are mostly spot market or 
relational in nature.  
 
Quality management system  
PDO systems are protected by EU regulation. This protection is given only when certain strict 
conditions are met, e.g., the product’s characteristics must be linked to the specific geographical 
location. Furthermore, the PDO is subject to general regulation on meat production. The regional 
government is responsible for protecting the reputation of the PDO, as well as the supply chain actors 
using the quality signal. The regional government delegates this responsibility to the regulatory 
council, a legally independent entity in which the supply chain actors are organized. Supply chain 
actors who want to use the PDO label, have to be approved by the regulatory council. The Spanish 
PDO is used on a low-to-medium scale in the industry: around 1% of the dry-cured ham (and around 
10% of the Iberian cured ham) annually produced in Spain is produced under this label.  
 
Compliance with legislative requirements is monitored by public inspection agencies. The monitoring 
of compliance with the PDO requirements is carried out by an independent monitoring organization, 
as well as the regulatory council itself.  
 
The PDO label is signalled in inter-company transactions as well as to the end consumer.  
Other signals used in inter-company transactions are, amongst others: ISO 9001, ISO 14001.  
 
Section 5.3 has shown (see also proposition 2B) that private chain-wide QMSs need to be 
supported by more hierarchical contracts if the QMS is adopted only on a small scale within 
the industry. However, in the Spanish PDO supply chain, with its relatively low-scale QMS, 
exchange relations are not hierarchical, but mostly informal (i.e., verbal agreements) or 
market-like in nature (see Figure 2.7). This can be explained by the fact that in this supply 
chain, public actors provide (part of) the resources necessary for safeguarding the investments 
made by supply chain actors. Since supply chain actors can economize on the costs of 
monitoring other supply chain actors, less hierarchical contracts are sufficient (see also 
Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). With this, the relation between QMSs and contracts 
found in the Spanish PDO supply chain follows the logic of proposition 2A: public supported 
QMSs do not need hierarchical contracts between supply chain actors.  
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FIGURE 2.7 
Contracts in additional public chain-wide QMS  
 
(M = market; VA = verbal agreement; C= formal contract; VI = vertical integration) 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This chapter has given insight into the relation between QMSs and contracts in the context of 
the EU pork industry. In the study, first a conceptual analysis of the relation between QMSs 
and contracts was given, based on Transaction Cost Economic theory (see Sections 2.1-2.3). 
Three propositions have been developed about the relation between QMSs and contracts (see 
Sections 2.3.1-2.3.3). Case study results show that four main types of systems can be 
distinguished for coordinating quality management in EU pork supply chains: one public 
baseline QMS, two private chain-wide QMSs and one public chain-wide QMS. The four types 
of systems largely relate to contracts as predicted by the propositions (see Section 5). The 
patterns found between QMSs and contracts indicate that Transaction Cost Economic 
considerations help to explain QMSs choices. This supports the view that alignment between 
QMSs and contracts is important for the efficient coordination of quality management in 
(meat) supply chains. This should encourage researchers to focus on examining the relation 
between QMSs and contracts. 
The results presented in this chapter give (some) insight into what suitable contractual 
solutions are for the efficient coordination of quality management in (pork meat) supply 
chains. Further research is needed to examine whether the relations between QMSs and 
contracts found in this study also hold true for other types of supply chains, both within the 
(pork) meat industry, as well as in other (agri-food) supply chains.  
Other research directions could consist of investigation of relations between contracts choices 
with more specific quality management practices. For example, QMSs could also be 
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distinguished based on the (the extent to which) different types of monitoring mechanisms are 
used (e.g., on-site inspections, inspection of inputs, outputs or documentation). 
Furthermore, research could focus on the dynamics of QMS and contract choices. For 
example, to what extent do QMS practices and requirements change over time and to what 
extent do these changes affect contract choices? In the discussion of the Dutch case (see 
Section 5.2), it was mentioned that retailers have stopped signaling the QMS used in the 
supply chain (IKB) to the end-customer, to be able to source products also from outside The 
Netherlands (where IKB is not used). This suggests that changes in QMS practices do 
influence the relations between actors in the supply chain and highlights the importance of 
more in-depth research into this area.  
In addition, alignment between QMSs and contracts needs to be related to supply chain 
performance, both with regard to economic and food quality performance. In particular, such 
research should focus on comparing the performance of cases in which similar types of QMSs 
are supported by different types of contracts. In the European pork industry, for example, 
IKB, QS and QSG can all be regarded as similar types of QMSs (see Section 4.4.2). However, 
secondary data (Hobbs, Kerr and Klein, 1998) suggest that QSG is supported by more 
hierarchical types of Contracts, when compared to IKB and QS. If this is indeed the case, then 
other research could: (1), attempt to explain the differences; and (2), relate these differences to 
supply chain performance. This type of research should give (more) insights into what types 
of contracts and QMSs solutions are suitable for improving performance in different types of 
supply chains. 
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OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF SUPPLY CHAIN CONTRACTS: 
TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY OF UNDERLYING 
COORDINATION MECHANISMS28 
 
Besides the coordination of quality, supply chain actors also need to consider the coordination of 
other aspects of economic activity, like price setting. Much of this coordination takes place in the 
context of contracts between the actors. However, few studies examine the relation between the 
mechanisms used to coordinate these activities and the contracts in sufficient detail. As a result, 
studies often prescribe generic contracts to situations which require a specific mix of coordination 
mechanisms. This includes Study One (Chapter 2) in which only a limited range of contracts were 
considered. The present study aims to address this issue by: (1), developing a typology of 
coordination mechanisms used within contracts; (2), illustrating the value of the typology in an 
empirical context. Based on extant literature from a variety of disciplines, the typology integrates 
four types of coordination mechanisms: price, volume, quality and investment. To illustrate its value, 
case study research is presented from 8 pork supply chains. Three different types of supply chains 
are included in the case selection – commodity chains, proprietary brands and collective brands – to 
be able to examine a broad range of coordination mechanisms. An analysis of the cases by means of 
the typology allows for: (1), an in-depth examination of the contracts used; (2), establishing a link 
between the contracts and the larger supply chain contexts in which they are embedded. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much coordination of economic activity, like price setting or determination of quality specifications, 
takes place in the context of contracts between supply chain actors (Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). 
However, few studies examine the relation between the mechanisms used to coordinate these 
activities and contracts in sufficient detail (Crocker and Masten, 1991). For example, in a lot of 
studies on this subject, only generic contracts are examined (e.g., verbal arrangements, formal 
contracts, equity-contracts), in which the use of underlying coordination mechanisms, such as fixed 
forward or spot price mechanisms, is not specified (see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005; 
Ménard, 2004). As a result, frequently in such studies, it is unclear what exactly the contracts are 
supposed to coordinate (e.g., see Gellynck and Molnár, 2009). Furthermore, when coordination 
mechanisms are examined in a study, the focus is often on only one type of mechanism (e.g., use of 
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 The article on which this chapter is based has been submitted to “Supply Chain Management: An International 
Journal”. 
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forward price mechanisms), while the interactions with other types of coordination mechanisms (e.g., 
quality coordination through third-party certifying institutions) used within a contract (or required to 
support a transaction) are not specified (e.g., see Tomek and Peterson, 2001). 
However, some aspects of a contract between parties may be coordinated by more market forms of 
coordination and other aspects by more hierarchical forms of coordination. For example, a supply 
chain actor may include in a formal contract the quality specifications of the products to be delivered 
by its suppliers, but leave the price of the products to be determined by the spot market. Therefore, 
when contracts are analyzed, it is necessary to examine which underlying mechanisms are used 
instead of studying only the generic contracts (see also Grandori, 1997a). 
Studies which examine only generic contracts often fail to capture the complexity of problems which 
companies face in making contract related decisions. For this reason, scholars often prescribe ‘blunt’ 
contractual instruments (e.g., make, buy or hybrid) to situations which require a specific mix of 
coordination mechanisms (see Ménard, 2004; Barney and Lee, 2000; Williamson, 1991). To improve 
the practical relevance of research in this subject, more detailed conceptualizations are necessary 
which better capture what companies are actually doing. In the present study, an attempt is made to 
characterize the use of coordination mechanisms in supply chain contracts in more detail.  
The objectives of the paper are twofold. First, the objective is to develop an integrated typology of 
coordination mechanisms used within supply chain contracts. ‘Integrated’ in this context means that 
a broad range of different types of contractual coordination mechanisms are jointly considered in the 
study. More specifically, four types of coordination mechanisms are examined: price, volume, 
quality and investment mechanisms. Second, the objective is to illustrate the value of the typology by 
characterizing the coordination mechanisms used in ‘real-life’ contracts. Contracts are analyzed from 
eight different supply chains.  
The empirical part of the paper focuses on agri-food supply chains, more specifically pork supply 
chains. Pork supply chains are suitable for this type of research because of the variety of different 
types of contracts used, not only at different supply chain stages, but also across different types of 
supply chains. Three types of supply chains have been examined: collectively owned brands, 
proprietary owned brands and commodity supply chains. The diversity in supply chains studied 
allows for the examination of a wide variety of contracts, which is important for the typology’s 
applicability in different types of contexts.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the literature review of the 
study. Literature from institutional economics, contract theory, (corporate) finance and 
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organizational theory is used to develop a typology of four types of coordination mechanisms. 
Section three outlines the methodological approach taken to the study. A case study approach has 
been used to examine the eight supply chains. Section four gives an overview of the results of the 
study in terms of the contracts and coordination mechanisms used. Section five compares the results 
across the three types of supply chains.  Section six concludes the paper and outlines areas for further 
study. 
2. MODELING COORDINATION MECHANISMS WITHIN SUPPLY CHAIN 
CONTRACTS: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY 
Section 2.1 gives an overview of past and current contract typologies used by researchers, in order to 
shed light on why a new typology is required. The development of the typology is discussed in 
Section 2.2. The typology itself is presented in Section 2.3.  
 
2.1. Supply chain contracts  
Although not always clearly defined, the term ‘contract’ has various meanings, within economics 
and management literature (see Masten, 1999; Ménard, 1997; Klein, 1992; Cheung, 1983; 
Williamson, 1979; Macaulay, 1963). In its most narrow interpretation, a ‘contract’ refers strictly to 
those agreements which are implemented with the intention of creating legally enforceable rights and 
obligations for the parties involved in a transaction (Masten, 1999). In a more broad interpretation, a 
‘contract’ refers to the agreements used, enforceable by legal or other means (e.g., by the threat of 
relationship termination), to govern transactions (Klein, 1992). The present study uses the broader 
interpretation of the term ‘contract’.   
Table 3.1 (see below) gives an overview of several studies which use or present contract typologies. 
The table is adapted from Gellynck and Molnár (2009), who have undertaken a literature review of 
the contract typologies used within (mainly) agri-food studies. The table does not give an exhaustive 
overview of the different types of contract typologies used by (agri-food) researchers, but it does 
present some of the most widely used ones. 
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TABLE 3.1 
Literature review of contract typologies 
Author 
 
Main variables/criteria 
(values, if specified, shown in 
brackets) 
Typology 
 
 
Williamson 
(1991) 
- Enforcement mechanism  (price and 
competition, courts and arbitration, 
administrative control) 
- Incentive intensity (strong-weak) 
- Adaptation ability (strong-weak) 
 
 
Market 
 
 
 
Hybrid 
 
 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 
 
Webster Jr. 
(1992) 
- Length/frequency  
- Information required for transaction  
- Criteria for partner selection 
- Equity participation 
- Objective (adversarial, 
collaboration) 
 
 
Transactions 
 
 
Repeated 
transactions 
 
 
Long-term 
relations 
 
 
Partnerships 
 
 
Strategic 
alliances 
 
 
Network 
 
Vertical 
integration 
 
Raynaud, 
Sauvée and 
Valceschini 
 (2005) 
- Duration (short, long) 
- Formality (verbal, written) 
- Enforcement mechanism (courts, 
reputation, hierarchy) 
- Equity participation (no, yes) 
 
 
Spot market 
contract 
 
 
Relational contract 
 
 
Formal contract 
 
 
Equity based contract 
 
 
Vertical 
integration 
 
 
Schulze, 
Spiller and 
Theuvsen 
(2007) 
- Length/frequency 
- Number of suppliers/customers 
- Specifications (e.g., input control) 
- Enforcement (see Williamson) 
- Equity participation   
 
 
Spot market 
 
Long-term 
relationship 
 
 
Marketing 
contract 
 
Production 
contract 
 
Contract 
farming 
 
Vertical 
integration 
 
 
Gellynck 
and  
Molnár 
(2009) 
- Length (short, medium, long) 
- Formality (verbal, written) 
- Equity participation ( no, minority) 
- Intensity of contract (low-high) 
- Partner restrictions (no, yes) 
- Resource sharing (no, yes) 
 
 
Spot market 
 
 
 
Non-contractual 
relationship 
 
 
Contractual 
relationship 
 
 
Relation-based 
alliance 
 
 
Equity-based 
alliance 
 
 
Vertical 
integration 
 
(adapted from Gellynck and Molnár, 2009) 
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As is shown in Table 3.1, numerous variables are used to differentiate between contracts types 
in the examined studies, of which the most common are: length or frequency of transactions 
(which is used as a proxy for actors’ commitment to future transactions), formality of contract 
(verbal or written; i.e., a proxy for the enforceability of the contract), equity participation 
(which is used as a proxy for – property rights based – control) and type of enforcement 
mechanism (price and competition, court, administrative control). These variables help, 
amongst others, to determine the level of autonomy actors have in entering into a transaction 
and making decisions regarding key aspects of the transactions.  
All studies discussed in Table 3.1 consider markets and hierarchies as polar contract forms. In 
a market contract, the transaction parties are completely independent in their decision making. 
Thus, when a supplier does not meet the requirements, a buyer can switch to another supplier. 
In a hierarchical contract, this decision making autonomy is removed; i.e., in this case, the 
supplier (buyer) is not a separate actor, but is integrated into the buyer’s (supplier’s) company. 
In between these polar forms, various intermediate contract forms are distinguished (see also 
Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Buvik, 2002; Heide and John, 1990). Whereas in the two 
polar contract forms property rights are aligned with decision rights, in the intermediate 
contract forms this is generally not the case (Sauvée, 2002). At least one of the transaction 
parties will recede, by means of the contract, some autonomy in its decisions making, either 
by fixing some aspects of the transaction in advance (e.g., prices) or by allocating some 
decision rights (but not property rights29) to the counterparty to the transaction (e.g., with 
regard to the determination of the production process requirements used to make the 
exchanged good). 
The variables presented in Table 3.1 are useful for characterizing how transactions are 
coordinated by market and hierarchy polar contract forms. For example, markets rely on the 
enforcement mechanism of ‘price and competition’ to coordinate transactions, while 
hierarchies rely on ‘administrative control’ to coordinate transactions. However, these 
variables are less useful for establishing how coordination takes place within the intermediate 
contract forms. For example, the extent to which an agreement is formalized does not explain 
how price is coordinated in the contract or whether prices are coordinated differently in verbal 
arrangements.  
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 With the exception of equity based contracts.  
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Furthermore, the typologies of contract forms shown in the table do not explain if and how 
various types of coordination mechanisms can be combined within the same contract. 
Although for example Williamson’s (1991) use of the term ‘hybrid’ suggests that such a 
combination should be possible in the view of the author, he at the same time perceives the 
various contract types as discrete alternatives; i.e., with their own distinct and (largely) 
incompatible characteristics (see also Ménard, 1997). Other authors, like Raynaud, Sauvée 
and Valceschini (2005) and Webster Jr. (1992), assume that coordination becomes more 
hierarchical (or market-like) as one shifts from one contract type to the next. However, this 
insufficiently takes into account the possibility that some aspects of a transaction may be 
coordinated by more market forms and other aspects by more hierarchical forms of 
coordination.  
To give an example, even though an equity or other type of investment based contract exists 
between two actors – which is a contract form close to the pure ‘hierarchy’ type in the scheme 
of Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini (2005) – the actors may very well coordinate prices, 
volume and even quality by means of spot market arrangements. Is such a contract really a 
hierarchical type of contract? It is a relevant question, because the example given is not a 
hypothetical one. Farmers organized in a cooperative have an investment based contract30; 
each producer is a minority owner of its customer. However, frequently, farmers are not 
required to market their products through the cooperative (no commitment exists for future 
transactions), no price arrangements are made (spot prices are paid) and commodity products 
are accepted (spot market specifications are used).  
Other examples of ambiguity in the classification of contracts based on the typologies and 
variables shown in Table 3.1 could be given. However, the message should already be clear: 
these typologies may classify certain intermediate contract forms as more hierarchical 
(market-like), when in fact they largely rely on market (hierarchical) mechanisms to 
coordinate the transactions.  
Why do the typologies seem to ignore the link between contracts and underlying coordination 
mechanisms? In part, this is because most of the authors (implicitly) take Williamson’s (1991) 
view of contracts as discrete alternatives. From this perspective, different contract types fall 
under different forms of contract law, which strongly limits the different types of coordination 
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 Cooperatives have particular characteristics compared to equity based investment contracts, e.g., with regard to 
member voting rights and the transferability of members' stake in the cooperative (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). 
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mechanisms which can be used within a particular contract31 (Ménard, 1997). Subsequently, 
in this view, there is little to choose for transaction parties at coordination mechanisms level 
(and little need for researchers to study it); the choice of contract largely determines what 
types of coordination mechanisms can be used. However, this perspective only explains how 
contract level choices restrict transaction parties in the types of mechanisms they can use to 
resolve disputes and enforce compliance with contract provisions (e.g., arbitration, 
administrative control). It is unclear why contract level choices should affect transaction 
parties’ use of other types of coordination mechanisms.  
Another perspective, based on the work of Cheung (1983) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) 
amongst others, assumes that there is a continuum of contracts. From this point of view, there 
are little structural differences between contract types, which, if true, should give transaction 
parties larger freedom in combining various coordination mechanisms within a single 
contract. However this approach is not without its problems. While the ‘contracts as discrete’ 
perspective tends to over-emphasize the importance of contract level choices at the expense of 
coordination mechanism level choices, the ‘contract as continuum’ perspective makes contract 
level choices seem trivial (see Cheung, 1983). However, this is plainly not always the case. 
For example, whether or not a transaction takes place within a vertically integrated 
company32, which can put an elaborated command structure in place and can use non-price 
based incentive systems, can greatly affect the types of coordination mechanisms available to 
the transaction parties (Gulati and Singh, 1998).  
This paper attempts to take the middle ground between these two perspectives. While it is 
acknowledged that the choice of contract can restrict transaction parties in their choice of 
coordination mechanisms, it is assumed that these restrictions mainly apply to situations in 
which one of the two polar contract forms is chosen. The empirical part of the paper will show 
                                                          
31
 As Williamson (1991) explains, a court will hear a dispute between two separate companies engaged in a 
transaction, but will refuse to hear disputes between two parts of an integrated company about the same issue. An 
internal authority is in place within the latter which offers dispute resolution procedures outside the courtroom 
 (Gulati and Singh, 1998). 
32
 In particular, the debate between the two perspectives resolves around the issue of establishing company 
boundaries, which is difficult and futile according to Cheung (1983), while this is crucial according to 
Williamson (1991). However, both perspectives seem to focus on different types of companies. Williamson 
(1991) seems to have large, vertically integrated corporations in mind in his work, which functioning is arguably 
easier to contrast with market transactions. Cheung (1983; 1973) discusses mainly small partnership- like 
organizations consisting of two persons, in which case it is perhaps of less importance whether the partnership is 
considered to consist of one or two separate companies. 
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that even within these polar forms, actors have more freedom in combining various 
coordination mechanisms than is generally assumed within the literature.  
2.2 Development of typology 
The typology covers only contractual based coordination mechanisms, including: price, 
volume, quality and investment mechanisms (see Grandori, 1997a; for a discussion of non-
contractual mechanisms). Key aspects of transactions which need to be coordinated within 
contracts include: prices, volumes, quality specifications, timing of product delivery, as well 
as investments (and associated return/risk sharing) (see Wilson and Dahl, 2009; Ponte and 
Gibbon, 2005; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004; Hueth et al., 1999; Joskow, 1985). As price and 
volume mechanisms include aspects concerning the timing of product delivery, the paper 
covers these key aspects. Not included in the typology as a separate category are dispute 
resolution and enforcement mechanisms, which are considered as auxiliary mechanisms to 
facilitate the coordination of price, volume, quality and investments. Furthermore, as is 
explained above, the ability of transaction parties to use a particular enforcement mechanism 
within the transaction is largely determined by the contract type chosen.  
2.2.1. Introduction  
The typology has been developed in two steps: (1), determining variables (including values) 
by which coordination mechanisms can be distinguished; (2), differentiating between various 
types of coordination mechanisms based on these variables. Table 3.2 (see Section 2.3) gives 
an overview of the variables used in the study, while Table 3.3 (see Section 2.3) gives an 
overview of the types of coordination mechanisms distinguished in the study based on these 
variables. As is shown in Table 3.3, four categories of coordination mechanisms have been 
distinguished for each type of mechanism. The number of categories used is broad enough to 
make a valid differentiation between the mechanisms used within contracts, but small enough 
to be able to identify a manageable set of coordination mechanisms. 
During the development of the typology, it has been assumed that the coordination 
mechanisms are used within the context of ‘incomplete’ contracts’, i.e., contracts with gaps 
and omissions (Williamson, 2008; Schmitz, 2001; Hart and Moore, 1999; Grossman and Hart, 
1986). This incompleteness results from the incapacity of parties to a transaction to foresee all 
the contingencies and changes in the circumstances surrounding a transaction in advance 
(Brousseau and Fares, 2000) as well as the costs involved in setting-up and implementing 
contracts with extensive conditions (Klein, 1992; Williamson, 1991). This is an important 
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aspect of contracts to consider in the context of the typology, because it means that transaction 
parties may face a trade-off between implementing mechanisms which facilitate adaptation to 
changes (e.g., by including tolerance levels which allow for some deviation from contract 
conditions if market conditions change) and implementing mechanisms which prevent the 
transaction parties from using such changes as a pretext to exploit the counterparty to the 
transaction (e.g., mechanisms which prevent actors from renegotiating exchange conditions) 
(Masten, 1999; see also Mulherin, 1986; Masten and Crocker, 1985). Special attention has 
been paid to assure that the typology includes both types of mechanism and is sensitive to the 
difficulties actors have in balancing the use of these mechanisms. The empirical part of the 
paper will show some of the contractual solutions used by actors which facilitate adaptation, 
but which also prevent self-interested actors from exploiting the other party to the transaction.  
2.2.2. Price coordination mechanism  
As is shown in Table 3.2, three variables have been used to differentiate price coordination 
mechanisms in agri-food supply chains (based on Heyder, Theuvsen and Von Davier, 2010; 
Jang and Olson, 2010; Wilson and Dahl, 2009; Crocker and Masten, 1991; Goldberg and 
Erickson, 1987): which actor sets the price; for what period (duration); and based on what 
criteria? 
Prices can be set by the following actors: by centralized markets, by third-parties to the 
transaction, by the transaction parties (when a transaction takes place outside centralized 
markets) or within the company.  
The duration of the price arrangement may vary33. In a short-term arrangement, price is 
negotiated per transaction. When an agreement is reached about the price, it is valid for less 
than ten days34. If a medium or long-term duration is used for the arrangement, the price is 
determined for multiple transactions covering an extended period of time (a minimum of 10 
days) or a forward price is set for a single transaction (at least 10 days in advance). A price 
                                                          
33
 Contract duration is not necessarily a good predictor for relationship duration: short-term contracts can be 
renewed, while long-term contracts can be prematurely terminated (Zylbersztajn and Lazzarini, 2005). 
34
 In currency markets, short-term prices (spot arrangements) are usually valid for a period of two days, while 
medium/long-term prices (forwards/futures) usually have a longer duration. Here, 10 days is taken as the cut-off 
point between short and medium/long-term price arrangements. In pork chain transactions, because of the 
complications involved in the delivery of physical (e.g., live animals) rather than monetary assets, the convention 
is that short-term prices have a slightly longer duration (usually a week). In the cases examined in this study, in 
medium/long-term arrangements, prices were usually fixed for a period of at least six months. 
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arrangement may also be made for an indefinite term (as when no termination period is 
specified).  
Prices may be set according to various criteria, formulas or schemes. In the simplest case, 
only a base price is determined. This base price may be fixed or it may vary with market 
conditions. Prices paid may also include a bonus component (in the form of a premium or 
discount). The bonus component can also be fixed or variable. If it is fixed, the bonus is 
always paid (deducted) if certain product related criteria are met (e.g., fat percentage of the 
meat). Alternatively, the bonus is variable, in which case it usually depends on market 
conditions (i.e., no bonus when market prices are below a certain threshold). 
As is shown in Table 3.3, four types of price coordination mechanisms have been 
distinguished based on these variables: ‘spot price’, ‘reference market price’, ‘fixed forward 
price’ and ‘internal price’. In ‘spot price’ arrangements, prices are fixed for the short term. 
Price is determined either in a centralized market or bilaterally amongst transaction parties. 
Base price and possible bonuses are fixed but, because of the short duration of the 
arrangement, always reflect market conditions. When a ‘reference market price’ is used, the 
price of the transaction depends on the quoted price of a product traded on an agreed upon 
central market (which acts as a third-party price setter). For such transactions, the base price 
of the product is variable (depends on the reference market). Possible bonuses are usually 
fixed (i.e., a percentage above/below the quoted price) but can be variable. The duration of 
such arrangements is medium to long-term (otherwise spot prices would be used). In a ‘fixed 
forward’ arrangement, a fixed base price is determined for a medium to long duration. 
Variable or fixed bonus mechanisms may also be included in the arrangement. The base price, 
as well as the premium, is determined either in a centralized market or bilaterally between the 
transaction parties35. In ‘internal price’ coordination, prices are determined within the 
company. Although a vertically integrated company may emulate market price mechanisms 
for intra-company transactions (it may want to promote competition between its various 
parts), its hierarchical structure means that these criteria can be changed. 
                                                          
35
 Standardized fixed price contracts which are traded in a centralized market are called ‘future contracts’, while 
customized off-market fixed-price contracts (used in bilateral transactions) are called ‘forward contracts’. In this 
paper, only forward contracts are considered. 
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2.2.3. Volume coordination mechanism 
 Two variables have been used to differentiate volume coordination mechanisms (based on 
Wilson and Dahl, 2009; Bogetoft and Olesen, 2004; Goldberg and Erickson, 1987; Joskow, 
1985): what is the duration of the arrangement; and what are its volume specifications? 
With regard to duration, volume, like price, may be set for: (1), the short-term; i.e., negotiated 
per transaction (with volumes fixed for less than 10 days); (2), a medium to long-term period 
(with a minimum period of 10 days); or (3), the arrangement may be valid indefinitely.  
With regard to specifications: (1), to be delivered amounts may not be specified in the 
arrangement; (2), actors may be allowed to deliver amounts within a (broadly) defined range; 
(3), the arrangement may force actors to deliver specific amounts (with penalties if the 
arrangement is not kept). 
Four types of volume coordination mechanisms have been distinguished: ‘spot volume’, ‘fixed 
volume with deviations’, ‘fixed volume’ and ‘internal volume’. In ‘spot volume’ arrangements, 
amounts are fixed for the short-duration of the arrangement. In ‘fixed volume with deviations’, 
a range amount is established for a medium to long-term duration. In such arrangements, 
minimum and maximum deviations are allowed from the agreed-upon amount. In ‘fixed 
volume arrangements’, a fixed amount is agreed upon between the parties for either multiple 
transactions covering a medium to long-term period, or an amount is fixed for a single 
transaction in advance (at least 10 days). In ‘internal volume’ coordination, no specific 
arrangement is in place, as an integrated company has (some) flexibility in managing its 
internal production. For example, when intra-company demand is low, the supply-part of an 
integrated entity may deliver to external customers. 
2.2.4. Quality coordination mechanism 
 Two main quality coordination functions exist in the supply chain: setting quality standards 
and monitoring compliance with these standards (see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini 
(2005); González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada 2003; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001; Sporleder 
and Goldsmith, 2001). Based on these functions, the following variables are distinguished: 
which actor sets standards; and which actor monitors compliance. 
Quality standards can be set by one of the transaction parties, an internal actor (in case of an 
integrated company) or by another actor not directly involved in the selling (purchasing) of 
Study Two: Examining contractual coordination mechanisms 
61 
 
the exchanged goods. With regard to the latter, the standard setter is either a public actor (e.g., 
a regulator) or a private actor that facilitates the exchange as a third-party to the transaction 
(e.g., a certifying agency or a supply chain actor operating further downstream).  
Like standard setting, compliance monitoring can be done by a transaction party, an internal 
actor or by an actor not directly involved in the exchange. This may be a different actor than 
the standard setter.  
Four types of quality coordination mechanisms have been distinguished: ‘spot market 
specifications’, ‘third-party quality coordination’, ‘counterparty quality coordination’, and 
‘internal quality coordination’. When ‘spot market specifications’ are used, transaction 
parties do not set any (additional) standards themselves, but rely for quality coordination on 
legislation set by public actors which are also responsible for monitoring compliance with 
these standards. ‘Third-party quality coordination’ is used when both standard setting and 
compliance monitoring is outsourced to a third-party. ‘Counterparty quality coordination’ 
applies to transactions in which standard setting is done by a transaction party, who either 
monitors compliance with these standards by itself or outsources the activity to a third-party. 
‘Internal quality coordination’ occurs when multiple supply chain stages are integrated into a 
company that sets and monitors compliance with standards for those stages. 
2.2.5. Investment coordination mechanisms 
 A distinction is made in the study between two aspects of investment coordination: (1), type 
of investment coordination mechanism used; (2), source of investment (based on Williams, 
2009; Turvey, 2006; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Gow and Swinnen, 2001; Williamson 
1988).  
Two underlying variables are used to distinguish between types of investment coordination 
mechanism: what are the monetary benefits and risks associated with the investment; and 
what are the non-monetary benefits and risks involved. 
With regard to monetary benefits and risks, a distinction is made between investments which 
promise a fixed return (e.g., a two percent semi-annual return) and investments in which the 
return depends on the extent to which the company (project) in which the investment is made 
is a success (failure). With the former, the risk is that the company in which the investment is 
made is not able to keep its promise. With the latter, the risk is that no returns are available 
after fixed return claimholders have been satisfied ((which are generally paid first). 
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Non-monetary benefits and risks are related to the control rights associated with the 
investment. Investors may have control rights over the company if it is in operation and 
expected to continue to operate as a business entity in the (foreseeable) future (i.e., if the 
company is regarded as ‘going-concern’). Likewise, investors may have control rights over 
(the assets of) the company if it is bankrupt, in bankruptcy process or likely to be in the 
foreseeable future (i.e., if the company is regarded as in ‘liquidation’).  
Based on these variables, four types of investment mechanisms have been distinguished: ‘no 
(external) investments required for transaction’, ‘debt instruments’, ‘hybrid instruments’ and 
‘equity instruments’. Holders of ‘debt instrument’ are promised a fixed return on their 
investments. Furthermore, they have the right to push the company in liquidation if this 
promise is not kept and they have control rights over the assets of the company when it is in 
liquidation. ‘Equity’ investors have the right to residual returns and they have control rights of 
the company when it is in operation. Hybrid instruments, like convertible debt36, have 
characteristics of both debt and equity instruments, both with regard to monetary and non-
monetary return. For example, they may promise a fixed return to the instrument holder, who 
also has the right to convert its investment into an equity instrument.  
With regard to ‘source of investment’, four different types are distinguished: ‘capital 
markets’, ‘third-party to the transaction’, ‘party to the transaction’ and ‘internal capital 
allocation’. ‘Capital markets’ include both bond and equity markets. A ‘third-party to the 
transaction’ can be a financial intermediary or another actor not directly involved in the 
exchange, unlike when an investment is financed by a ‘party to the transaction’. ‘Internal 
capital allocation’ occurs when investments are financed by the company’s retained earnings.  
2.3. Integrated typology of contractual coordination mechanisms 
Table 3.2 summarizes the variables (and values) used for the development of the typology. 
 
                                                          
36
 Bonds which can be converted by the holder into a pre-determined number of shares. 
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TABLE 3.2 
Variables used to distinguish coordination mechanisms 
Type of  
mechanism 
Variables Values 
Price Which actor sets 
the price? 
Centralized 
markets 
Third-party 
(e.g., reference 
market) 
 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Intra-company 
(transaction in 
integrated 
company) 
What is the 
duration of the 
arrangement? 
Short-term 
(price valid <10 
days) 
Medium/long-term 
(price valid >=10 days)
 
Indefinitely 
(no termination 
date established) 
Based on what 
criteria is price 
determined? 
Base price variable 
 
Base price fixed 
No bonus component 
 
Variable bonus Fixed bonus 
Volume What is the 
duration of the 
arrangement? 
Short-term 
(volume valid 
<10 days) 
Medium/long-term 
(volume valid >=10 days) 
Indefinitely 
(no termination 
date established) 
What are the 
specifications of 
the arrangement? 
No amount 
specified 
Range amount 
(base volume but with allowable 
deviations from this base) 
Fixed amount 
Quality Which actor sets 
the standard? 
Public actor(s) Third-party 
( e.g., certifying 
agency) 
 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Intra-company 
(transaction in 
integrated 
company) 
Which actor 
monitors 
compliance? 
Public actor(s) Third-party 
(e.g., certifying 
agency) 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Intra-company 
(transaction in 
integrated 
company) 
Investment 
 
 
What monetary 
benefits/risks are 
involved? 
Fixed return 
(if company/project is going- 
concern; i.e., expected to continue 
to operate) 
Residual return/risk 
(after claims of fixed payment holders 
have been satisfied) 
What non-
monetary 
benefits/risks are 
involved? 
Control if company/project is in 
liquidation 
( i.e., when expected to be 
discontinued) 
Control if company/project is going-
concern 
( i.e., when expected to continue to 
operate) 
What is the source 
of the investment? 
Capital  
markets 
Third-party 
(e.g., bank) 
Party to the 
transaction 
Internal capital 
allocation 
 
 
 
Table 3.3 summarizes the coordination mechanisms which have been distinguished based on 
these variables.  
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TABLE 3.3 
Integrated typology of contractual coordination mechanisms 
  Market                                      <------------------------->                           Hierarchy             
Pr
ic
e 
Spot price 
- Price setting: 
centralized market or 
party(s) to transaction 
- Duration: short-term 
- Criteria: base price 
and bonus fixed*  
(fluctuates with market 
conditions, but fixed 
for the short duration 
of the arrangement) 
Reference market price   
(+ premium/discount)  
- Price setting: third-
party (quoted  price of 
reference market used) 
- Duration: 
medium/long-term 
- Criteria: base price 
variable (depends on 
market), bonus fixed or 
variable* 
Fixed forward price 
(+premium/discount) 
- Price setting: 
centralized market or 
party(s) to transaction 
- Duration: 
medium/long-term 
- Criteria: base price 
fixed, bonus fixed or 
variable* 
Internal price 
- Price setting: intra-
company 
- Duration: 
indefinitely 
- Criteria: base and 
bonus variable* 
(criteria can be 
changed)  
V
o
lu
m
e 
Spot volume 
- Duration: short-term 
- Specification: fixed 
amount  
(for the short duration 
of the arrangement)  
 
 Fixed volume with min./ 
max. deviations 
- Duration: 
medium/long-term  
- Specification: range 
amount 
 
 Fixed volume 
- Duration: 
medium/long-term 
- Specification: fixed 
amount 
 
Internal volume 
- Duration: 
indefinitely 
- Specification: no 
amount specified 
(depends on intra-
company demands) 
Qu
a
lit
y 
Spot market 
specifications  
- Standard setting: 
public actor 
- Monitoring: public 
actor   
Third-party quality 
coordination 
- Standard setting: third-
party (e.g., certifying 
agency) 
- Monitoring: third-party 
Counterparty quality 
coordination  
- Standard setting: 
party(s) to transaction 
- Monitoring: either 
by third-party or 
party(s) to transaction  
Internal quality 
coordination 
- Standard setting: 
intra-company 
- Monitoring: intra-
company 
 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
(so
u
rc
e) 
Capital markets 
Capital markets, like 
stock and bond 
markets, finance the 
investments 
Third-party  
Investments are financed 
by an actor(s) which is 
not a party to the 
transaction (e.g., 
financial intermediary) 
Party to the  
transaction  
Investments are 
financed by a party to 
the transaction; i.e., a 
supplier or buyer 
Internal capital 
allocation  
No investments are 
made by external 
actors, only intra-
company capital is 
used 
In
v
es
tm
en
t 
(ty
pe
) 
No (external) 
investments required 
for transaction 
Either there are no 
investments required, 
or they are financed 
within the company 
Debt  
- Monetary return/risk: 
fixed (if going-concern**)  
- Non-monetary 
benefit/risk: control over 
company in liquidation*** 
Hybrid  
- Monetary 
return/risk: 
conditional 
- Non-monetary 
benefit/risk: control 
conditional 
Equity 
- Monetary 
return/risk: residual   
- Non-monetary 
benefit/risks: control 
over company if 
going-concern** 
* If a bonus component is included in the arrangement. 
** If the company is expected to continue to operate. 
*** If the company is bankrupt, in bankruptcy process, or likely to be in the foreseeable future. 
 
In the empirical part of the paper, the value of the typology will be illustrated by 
characterizing pork supply chain transactions. Its value depends mainly on three 
characteristics. First, the extent to which the typology is ‘inclusive’, in the sense that it 
considers all main contracts and coordination mechanisms used within a particular supply 
chain context. Second, the extent to which the typology is applicable in various types of 
contexts. Third, the extent to which use of the typology can lead to new insights about 
contracting decisions and situations. For a discussion of this last point is referred to Section 6. 
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To address the first two issues, the study has grounded the typology in extant literature from a 
wide-range of disciplines (see above). The literature used includes both theoretical and 
empirical literature. The empirical literature used in the present study is based on studies 
conducted in various industries, both within and outside the agri-food sector. Furthermore, the 
respondents which provided information about the examined pork supply chain transactions 
were asked to mention whether other terms were included in the contract apart from those 
aspects which were specifically addressed in the interview topic list (see Section 3.3 and 
Appendix B). No such aspects were mentioned, which supports the notion that the typology is 
appropriate at least for the pork supply chains which have been examined37.  
Also, the objective during the typology’s development has been to ensure that it is flexible 
enough so that it can be adopted, with some alterations, in a wide range of different types of 
(supply chain) contexts. How has this flexibility been achieved? By basing the typology on an 
extensive set of variables (see Table 3.2). Other researchers can use these variables to arrive at 
similar, but slightly different alterations of the typology presented in Table 3.3. For example, 
the variables used in the study allow for the examination of option-like features in contracts38, 
even though the typology does not include a separate category for contracts with embedded 
options. The same applies to non-linear pricing mechanisms39, which can be studied using the 
variables shown in Table 3.2, although they are not considered as a separate category in Table 
3.3. Furthermore, the variables can be used to develop more fine-grained categories40. In 
short, other researchers may wish to create additional categories in order to make the typology 
more suitable for the context which they examine or more in line with their research interests. 
Obviously, no typology and underlying variables can be universally applicable. The 
delineation of the study’s empirical domain (see Section 3.1) and theoretical sampling of the 
cases (see section 3.2) signifies to what other types of contexts the typology may (not) be 
generalized.  
 
                                                          
37
 Although it could also indicate a certain weariness in the respondents during long-winded interviews.  
38
 For example, a base price fixed, range volume amount contract (see Table 3.2) gives an option to the seller on 
whether it wants to market the deviations in its production from the agreed-upon base volume to the counterparty 
in the contract. When the market price is lower than the base price, it will sell the deviations to the counterparty. 
When the market price is higher than the base price, it will sell the deviations in the open market. Such a contract 
would be categorized as a fixed forward price/fixed volume with min./max. deviations contract in Table 3.3. 
39
 An example of non-linear pricing is to give (certain) volume discount to suppliers (customers). Such a discount 
can be considered as a bonus component of the price used in the transaction (see Table 3.2).  
40
 For example, a study may split-up the four categories of price mechanisms to examine in more detail the bonus 
components used in price arrangements. 
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3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A case study approach has been taken to examining the contracts used in pork supply chain 
transactions (see Section 6 in Chapter One). Such an approach was deemed most appropriate 
considering that the study attempted to obtain in-depth insights into the ‘real-life’ contracts 
used by actors, as well as the supply chain context in which the contracts are embedded. 
 
3.1. Domain 
In order to establish the generalisability of typology to other contexts, it is important to clearly 
delineate the (empirical) domain in which the research takes place (Gibbert, Ruigrok and 
Wicki, 2008). Mainly two characteristics of pork supply chains are important in this regard: 
(1), the sequential linkages between actors; (2), the ‘perishable’ nature of products.   
With regard to the former, although the typology has not been developed specifically with 
sequential supply chains in mind, researchers should take into account that the typology has 
only been empirically examined within this particular context. In supply chains with other 
types of linkages between actors, like reciprocal (e.g., construction activities), other types of 
coordination mechanisms than those included within the typology may be used. Researchers 
that apply the typology to other contexts should be careful that they do not exclude aspects of 
contracts or coordination mechanisms which are common to the industry examined.  
With regard to the latter, ‘perishability’ leads to storage constraints41, which increases the 
costs of non-contractual coordination mechanisms, like inventory buffers, and encourages the 
use of contractual coordination mechanisms, like forward contracts (Ziggers and Trienekens, 
1999). Studies which examine other types of contexts should take into account what the 
importance is of non-contractual coordination mechanisms (Grandori, 1997a).  
Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the typology has been developed specifically for the 
analysis of contracts governing transactions in which ‘real’ products are exchanged. The 
typology should not be used, without a more extensive examination of relevant literature, for 
the analysis of contracts governing the exchange of purely financial products or claims (e.g., 
interest rate options, credit default swaps etc.). Additionally, the study has focused on the 
(customized) contracts used to govern transactions between supply chain actors. Although 
aspects of the coordination of a transaction may be outsourced to a third-party, the study has 
not considered any side transactions which may exist between supply chain actors and third-
                                                          
41
 For example, the ‘inventory’ of producers consists of live animals which have to be maintained and fed. 
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parties (e.g., hedging through financial intermediaries). As a result of this, for example 
exchange traded contracts, like futures, have not been examined.   
3.2. Selection of cases 
Eight cases have been studied (see Table 3.4 below). Three different types of cases have been 
examined: commodity chains, collectively owned brands and proprietary owned brands. By 
selecting different cases, which are likely to have different contracts and coordination 
mechanisms, results could be contrasted across different contexts. Furthermore, by selecting 
multiple examples for each of these different types of cases, it was possible to compare results 
also within more similar contexts (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Commodity chains are those cases in which no brands are used to differentiate products in the 
consumer market. Three commodity cases have been examined: a Brazilian chain, a Danish 
chain and a Dutch chain. Collective brands are those cases in which the brand is jointly owned 
by various supply chain actors. Three collective brands cases have been examined: a PDO 
case (from Spain), a PGI42 case (from France), and a Regional brand case43 (from Spain). 
Proprietary brands are those cases in which the brand is owned by one of the supply chain 
actors. Two Spanish proprietary brand cases have been examined: a processor owned brand 
and a retailer owned brand. The study has focused on the contracts used by the brand 
associations and brand members (collective brands), the integrated meat companies and their 
supply chain partners (commodity chains) and the brand owners and certified brand suppliers 
(proprietary brands) (see Table 3.4).   
 Branded cases have been selected mainly from Southern European countries, were branded 
pork products traditionally have a large market share. Commodity cases have been selected 
from some of the world’s largest pork exporting countries. Pork, as an export product, is 
usually a commodity: carcasses and meat parts are distributed to foreign processors who need 
raw material to prepare meat products for their domestic markets. Also a case has been 
selected from a major pork production country from outside Europe to further improve the 
applicability of the typology in different types of contexts.   
 
                                                          
42
 Product Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) are brands which signal to 
consumers the region in which food products have been made. The brands are protected by EU regulation, which 
requires a clear link between final product characteristics and the location of the production system. Also, the EU 
requires collective ownership of the brands, usually through an association. Membership of the association 
should be made open to anyone who meets certain well-defined characteristics (Trienekens et al., 2008).  
43
 Although not regulated by EU legislation, the brand is owned by an association with open-membership.  
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TABLE 3.4 
Selected Cases 
 
Type of 
brand 
 
 
 
Case 
Case 
characteristics 
Background Production and 
procurement 
Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
Proprietary 
brand 
 
Retailer 
owned 
brand 
(ES) 
Brand is owned by a large 
supermarket company.ǂ 
Fresh meat products, made 
from regular pigs, are sold 
under the brand. 
Brand owner works with 
limited number of large and 
medium size suppliers 
within Spain (6-10 partners 
per stage). 
Nationwide distribution of 
brand products through the 
proprietary supermarkets 
of the company. 
 
Processor 
owned 
brand 
(ES) 
Brand is owned by a 
medium sized company. 
Dry-cured ham products, 
made from a special breed, 
are sold under the brand. 
Brand owner works with 
limited number of suppliers 
of various sizes (1-4 main 
partners per stage). 
Distribution of brand 
products in more than 100 
supermarkets, butchers and 
small shops in Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Collective 
Brand 
 
 
PDO 
Brand 
(ES) 
Brand is owned by a large 
association made-up of 
producers and processors. 
Dry-cured ham products, 
made from Iberian pigs, 
are sold under brand. 
Production is tied to region 
specified in PDO 
application. Producers and 
processors of various sizes 
participate in the brand. 
Producers outnumber 
processors by around 30:1. 
Nationwide distribution of 
brand products through a 
variety of outlets. Less 
than 10% export (mainly to 
other EU countries). 
 
 
PGI 
Brand 
(FR) 
Brand is owned by a large 
association made-up of 
producers and processors. 
Dry-cured ham products, 
made from the regular pig, 
are sold under the brand. 
Production is tied to region 
specified in PGI application. 
Producers and processors of 
all sizes participate in the 
brand. Producers outnumber 
processors by around 40:1. 
Nationwide distribution of 
brand products through a 
variety of outlets. Less 
than 10% export. 
 
 
Regional 
Brand 
(ES) 
Brand is owned by a 
medium size association 
made-up of producers, 
wholesalers, restaurants 
and butchers. Roasted 
suckling piglets are sold 
under the brand. 
Brand ties production to 
specific region. Around 
60% of the members are 
producers, 10% wholesalers 
and 30% retailers (either 
restaurants or butchers). 
Mainly local distribution; 
i.e., brand products are 
marketed for more than 
90% in the region in which 
they have been produced. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Commodity 
chain 
 
Brazilian 
Case 
(BR) 
Large meat company 
connects a few medium-to-
large size pig producing 
companies with multiple 
(large) retail outlets. 
Potentially statewide, but 
meat company (integrated 
slaughtering and processing) 
procures from small number 
of (mainly) large pig 
suppliers.* 
Various regions in Brazil 
served through multiple 
retailers. Export also 
important (e.g., Russia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong).** 
 
Danish 
Case 
(DK) 
Large meat company 
connects many micro-sized 
pig producing companies 
with multiple (large) retail 
outlets.*** 
Nationwide procurement by 
meat company (integrated 
slaughtering and processing) 
of its pig inputs.**** 
Nationwide distribution 
through multiple retailers. 
Export oriented however 
(e.g., Germany, UK, 
Japan).** 
 
Dutch 
Case 
(NL) 
Large meat company 
connects many micro-sized 
pig producing companies 
with multiple (large) retail 
outlets.*** 
Nationwide procurement by 
meat company (integrated 
slaughtering and processing) 
of its pig inputs.**** 
Nationwide distribution 
through multiple retailers. 
Export oriented however 
(e.g., Germany, Italy, 
UK).** 
ǂ The following criteria were used to determine the size of the organizations mentioned in the table (based on 
Gellynck and Molnár, 2009). Note that with regard to the brand associations, their size is determined based on 
the number of members they have and not the number of employees of the association.  Micro: <10 employees 
(members); Small: < 50 employees (members); Medium: < 250 employees (members); Large: > 250 employees 
(members). 
* The meat company had two main suppliers of pigs, next to fewer than 20 smaller suppliers. One of the two 
main suppliers had capacity for several ten thousands of finishing pig places. 
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** The focus in the study has been on the national operations of the meat companies operating in commodity 
chains. 
*** The Dutch and Danish pork industry are quite similar in this regard: a limited number of large 
slaughterhouses procure pigs from thousands of micro sized pig producing companies. The latter are not only 
micro-sized in terms of the number of employees, but also in terms of their output relative to the slaughterhouses. 
For example, in The Netherlands, in 2005 16 slaughterhouses operated and around 8500 companies with 
finishing pig places. The mentioned slaughterhouses all processed a minimum of 100.000 pigs annually per 
company, while the average Dutch farm had a capacity of 640 finishing pig places (PVE, 2005). 
**** The focus of the study has been on the procurement of pigs produced under the (national) large scale 
quality management system of the country (IKB for The Dutch case and QSG for the Danish case). 
 
3.3. Methods  
Data was generated for the cases primarily through semi-structured interviews with supply 
chain companies about their contracts (see Appendix B) and open interviews with (brand) 
associations to provide background information about the cases44. A total of 38 interviews 
were held, 33 of which with representatives of the different supply chain companies and 5 
with representatives of the various associations. With regard to the supply chain companies, 
the study obtained insights into 33 of their contracts, covering the main transactions in each of 
the cases (see previous section). With regard to the associations, the brands all provided the 
requested information. The interviews were more or less evenly distributed across the various 
cases45: 15 interviews were held in the commodity chain cases (6 in the BR case, 5 in the NL 
case and 4 in the DK case), 14 interviews in the collective brand cases (5 in the PDO case, 5 
in the PGI case and 4 in the Regional case) and 9 interviews in the proprietary brand cases (5 
in the Processor case and 4 in the Retailer case).  
Besides the semi-structured interviews, insights about the cases were also obtained means of 
site-visits, use of secondary data sources and open interviews with industry experts. The site-
visits were used to identify operating procedures in the cases (e.g., how compliance with 
quality standards is achieved). Secondary data and expert sources were used to triangulate 
data obtained through other sources (e.g., what types of contracts are commonly used in the 
supply chain). 
                                                           
44
 The interviews with the associations and other brand owners focused on the history of the brand, the 
distribution channels for the brand, the types of quality standards and compliance mechanisms they use, and the 
conditions they set for actor to participate in the brand. Aspects of Appendix B were also used however; to 
confirm or dispel data gathered through the company interviews. 
45
 Note that a different number of companies operate in the various cases because of the presence of vertically 
integrated entities. Furthermore, note that the interview numbers do not include instances in which multiple 
respondents within the same company were consulted (except for companies covering multiple supply chain 
stages) and are therefore a conservative reflection of the total number of interviews held.   
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3.4. Operationalisation and analysis 
To gather data about contracts (Sections A and D in Appendix B), the interviews focused on: 
the length or frequency of transactions (a proxy for actors’ commitment to future transactions; 
see Gellynck and Molnár, 2009), the formality of contracts (verbal or written; see Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005), financial participation (which is used as a proxy for control; 
see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992), and the main type of enforcement mechanism available to 
the transaction parties (e.g., price and competition, court, or authority; see Williamson, 1991). 
Obtained data was organized based on the categorization presented in Table 3.5.  
 
TABLE 3.5 
Coding rules for contracts 
Contract type Coding rule 
Spot market 
contract 
A contract (invoice) for instant exchange of goods or services. No commitment exists for 
future transactions. 
Verbal  
agreement  
Exchanges not formalized into written, legally enforceable contracts. A verbal commitment 
exists for future transactions. Performance or behavioral standards are unlikely to be 
specified, but if so, they are not formalized. 
Formal contract Legally enforceable, written contracts are used to govern the transaction. A written 
commitment exists for future transactions. Performance and behavioral standards are likely 
to be specified in the contract.  
Investment based 
contract 
A contract in which a supply chain actor has made a minority investment (equity, hybrid or 
debt) in (a project of) one of its suppliers/buyers. A minority investment means, for 
example, that an actor owns stock, but less than 50% of one of its suppliers/buyers.  
Vertical 
integration  
A supply chain actor owns more than 50% of the stock, and has the accompanying 
shareholder voting rights, of (one of) its suppliers/buyers.  
 (adapted from Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005) 
To gather data about the underlying coordination mechanisms used (Sections A and D in 
Appendix B), the study focused on generating data about the price (e.g., scheme for ex-ante 
price agreement), volume (e.g., use of minimum volume requirements), quality (e.g., 
requirements of production practices, type of monitoring organization) and investment 
coordination mechanisms (e.g., credit provisions) used in the transactions. Obtained data was 
organized based on the categorization presented in Table 3.3 (Section 2.3). The following 
rules or decisions were used in the coding process.  
First, with regard to quality coordination mechanism, agri-food supply chain actors frequently 
participate in multiple quality standards. This means that they are also confronted with 
multiple standard setters and monitoring institutions. In those instances, the standard most 
difficult to comply with (in the perception of the supply chain actors) has been considered for 
the purpose of the analysis presented in Sections 4-5.  
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Second, in a number of instances, multiple sources and mechanisms were used to finance an 
investment. In those instances, the study has included the various sources and mechanisms in 
the analysis. Other researchers may want to focus on the extent to which the different types of 
sources and mechanisms have been used, rather than the fact that they have been used.  
Third, because the focus of the study is on how actors use investment mechanisms to govern a 
transaction – and not on actors’ access to financing or their capital structure – secondary 
investment sources and mechanisms were not considered. For example, consider a scenario in 
which a company vertically integrates with its suppliers, but finances its purchase of the 
supplier’s equity by means of a bank loan. Under the established coding rule, the investment 
source would be the ‘party to the transaction’ (i.e., the company, and not the bank) and the 
investment mechanism ‘equity’ (i.e., not the loan). In this example, it should be clear that 
equity is the mechanism used to establish control over the transaction and that the company 
who is integrating is the one who is doing this. Related to this, the study has focused only on 
investments made to support a specific transaction; i.e., investments made to support the 
general operations of the companies have not been considered.  
Fourth, almost all transactions involved delayed payment; i.e., actors did not have to pay 
invoices immediately, but were allowed to pay within a certain period, usually 30-40 days. 
This type of late payment was not considered as a loan (i.e., not counted as use of debt)46.  
4. DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS 
Table 3.6 gives an overview of the various types of coordination mechanisms used within 
supply chain contracts.  
                                                           
46
 Note that, as a result of this coding rule, as well as the previous rule, the study likely understates the use of 
‘debt’ within the examined pork supply chain transactions (see Sections 4-5).  
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TABLE 3.6 
Contracts and underlying coordination mechanismsǂ 
TYPE OF CONTRACT
TYPE OF COORDINATION MECHANISM
Vertical integration
(in 6 transactions)
Investment contract
(in 3 transactions)
Formal contract
(in 12 transactions)
Verbal agreement
(in 6 transactions)
Spot market contract
(in 6 transactions)
Price Internal 4/6 - - - -
Fixed forward 2/6 1/3 3/12 1/6 -
Reference market - - 4/12 3/6 2/6
Spot price - 2/3 5/12 2/6 4/6
Volume Internal 6/6 - - - -
Fixed volume - 1/3 3/12 1/6 -
Fixed volume + dev. - 1/3 3/12 2/6 -
Spot volume - 1/3 6/12 3/6 6/6
Quality Internal 4/6 - - - -
Counterparty - 1/3 6/12 - 1/6
Third-party 2/6 1/3 5/12 4/6 4/6
Spot spec. - 1/3 1/12 2/6 1/6
Investment 
(type)* Equity 6/7 1/4 - - -
Hybrid 1/7 2/4 2/13 4/6 3/6
Debt - 1/4 1/13 - -
No (ext.) investment - - 10/13 2/6 3/6
Investment 
(sourcе)* Internal - - 5/13 - -
Party to transaction 4/7 4/4 - - -
Third-party 3/7 - 3/13 4/6 3/6
Capital markets - - - - -
No investment - 5/13 2/6 3/6
 
 *In some transactions, multiple investment types and sources were used. As a result, the number of investment 
types and sources used within the contracts does not sum up to the total number of transactions in which the 
contracts have been used.  ǂ The bold marked numbers in the table represent the most frequently used type of 
coordination mechanisms within each of the contract types.  
The most frequently used are formal contracts (12x). Together with vertical integration and 
investment contracts, they account for almost two-thirds of the total number of contracts used 
(21 out of 33 contracts). This suggests that, when only the results at contract level are 
analyzed, the examined transactions seem quite hierarchically coordinated. However, when 
also the coordination mechanisms underlying these contracts are examined, a more complete 
picture emerges of how transactions are coordinated. As is shown in Table 3.6, actors have a 
lot of freedom in combining various sets of coordination mechanisms within a single type of 
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contract. Even within the two polar contract forms, spot market contracts and vertical 
integration, some differentiation can be made when the underlying coordination mechanisms 
are examined.  
With regard to the spot market contracts, which were classified as such when parties to the 
transaction were not committed to subsequent future transactions, some differences were 
found in the types of price, quality and investment coordination mechanisms used. For 
example, in two contracts, price was coordinated by means of a reference market, rather than 
a spot price mechanism. In various spot market contracts, quality was coordinated by a third-
party certifying institution. This happened amongst others in transactions in several of the 
collective brand cases. Although participants in these cases have to comply with standards 
above spot market specifications, the large number of actors participating in the brand makes 
it possible that actors switch back and forth between suppliers and customers without 
committing themselves to further transactions with any specific actor.    
With regard to vertical integration, which was classified as such when one actor had more 
than 50% equity ownership of another supply chain stage, some differences have been 
identified in the types of price and quality coordination mechanisms used. With regard to 
prices47, some of the vertically integrated companies were limited, by statue, in influencing 
the prices paid for intra-company transactions. With regard to quality, some of the vertically 
integrated companies which participated in the branded cases gave, by means of contractual 
arrangements, a third-party a key role in coordinating quality for intra-company transactions 
(e.g., by monitoring compliance with quality standards). 
The three types of intermediate contract forms (verbal arrangement, formal contracts and 
investment contract) distinguished in the study show, unsurprisingly, much more diversity 
with regard to the types of underlying coordination mechanism used. Verbal arrangements 
frequently rely on third-party actors, like associations, for coordinating aspects of the 
transaction. In some transactions, this third-party actor only coordinates quality, in other 
instances the third-party may also coordinate investments and even prices. Formal contracts 
show the most diversity with regard to the types of underlying coordination mechanisms used. 
                                                           
47
 For example, one of the companies, an integrated slaughterhouse-processor, has two major shareholder blocks: 
a farmers’ cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm). The cooperative wants high carcass prices ‘paid’ by 
the processor to the slaughterhouse, because it increases the prices the farmers receive for their pigs. The IOF 
wants low prices, because it increases the total profits of the company, as the company will have lower input 
costs. A fixed price agreement between the two parts of the companies limits the ability of the two blocks of 
shareholders to influence prices for their own benefit. 
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In some formal contracts, prices and volumes are completely fixed. In other formal contracts, 
frequently between retailers and meat companies, only agreements about quality are included 
in the contract (e.g., a requirement for a specific quality certificate) while prices and volume 
are determined by market conditions. Investment contracts may involve minority equity 
investments in supply chain partners, like when a feed producer contracts external farmers to 
take care of its pigs or hybrid investments through a pooled investment vehicle, like a 
cooperative. In an investment contract, the investor is a party to the transaction, and detailed 
agreements are made about how risk and returns of the investments are divided amongst the 
parties. As is also alluded to in Section 2, this does not necessarily mean that a specific 
agreement is made about prices or volumes for future transactions, as some investment 
contracts use spot price and volume mechanisms.   
 
5. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ACROSS SUPPLY CHAIN TYPES 
Table 3.7 (shown below) gives an overview of the differences in the arrangements used in the 
three types of supply chains. As is shown in the table, formal contracts and vertical integration 
are the dominant type of contracts used in proprietary brands and commodity chains, while 
spot market contracts and verbal agreements are the dominant types of contracts used in 
collective brands. The results show that transactions which look hierarchically coordinated 
when examined at contract level, may be more market-like coordinated when the underlying 
coordination mechanisms are examined (and vice versa). This is particular true for commodity 
chains, which embed market types of coordination mechanisms within the hierarchical 
contracts they employ, and for actors operating in the collective brand chains, which can use 
market types of contracts between them because some coordination functions are outsourced 
to a third-party central to all other actors in the supply chain. 
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TABLE 3.7  
Contracts and underlying coordination mechanisms 
TYPE OF BRAND
Category Specific type 
selected
Proprietary brands
(10 transactions 
across 2 cases)
Collective brands
(11 transactions 
across 3 cases)
Commodity chains
(12 transactions 
across 3 cases)
Total
(33 transactions 
across 8 cases)
Contract Vertical integration 3/10 - 3/12 6/33
Investment contract 1/10 - 2/12 3/33
Formal contract 6/10 2/11 4/12 12/33
Verbal agreement - 4/11 2/12 6/33
Spot market contract - 5/11 1/12 6/33
Price Internal 3/10 - 1/12 4/33
Fixed forward 4/10 1/11 2/12 7/33
Reference market 2/10 6/11 1/12 9/33
Spot price 1/10 4/11 8/12 13/33
Volume Internal 3/10 - 3/12 6/33
Fixed volume 3/10 1/11 1/12 5/33
Fixed volume + dev. 3/10 2/11 1/12 6/33
Spot volume 1/10 8/11 7/12 16/33
Quality Internal 1/10 - 3/12 4/33
Counterparty 6/10 1/11 1/12 8/33
Third-party 3/10 9/11 4/12 16/33
Spot spec. - 1/11 4/12 5/33
Investment 
(type)* Equity 4/13 - 3/12 7/36
Hybrid 1/13 9/11 2/12 12/36
Debt 2/13 - - 2/36
No (ext.) investment 6/13 2/11 7/12 15/36
Investment 
(sourcе)* Internal 5/13 - - 5/36
Party to transaction 4/13 - 4/12 8/36
Third-party 3/13 9/11 1/12 13/36
Capital markets - - - -
No investment 1/13 2/11 7/12 10/36
 
 * In some transactions, multiple investment types and sources were used. As a result, the number of investment 
types and sources used within the contracts does not sum up to the total number of transactions in which the 
contracts have been used. ǂ The bold marked numbers in the table represent the most frequently used type of 
contract or coordination mechanisms within each of the brand types. 
 
5.1. General structure 
In the commodity chains, hierarchical types of contracts are used in order to formalize 
exchanges, and are generally not used to commit oneself to future transactions to another 
party. In the (rare) instances that such commitments are made, the conditions of the exchange, 
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particularly with regard to price and volume are left open, as largely spot price and volume 
coordination mechanisms are used. The exception is quality coordination, which is frequently 
conducted by third-parties, rather than left to spot market specifications. These third-parties 
are often (vertically organized48) associations which represent the interests of (most of) the 
supply chain actors49. The associations set (voluntary) quality standards which are adopted by 
a large amount of actors. Because of their large adoption, which allows actors to switch 
between suppliers (buyers), the standards facilitate market-like transactions between the 
actors. Figure 3.1 shows the analysis of the contracts and coordination mechanisms used 
within the Dutch case, as an example of how coordination is achieved within commodity 
supply chains50. 
 
                                                           
48
 A vertically organized association refers to those associations which have members from various supply chain 
stages (e.g., producers and meat companies are member). A horizontally organized association refers to those 
associations which have members only from a single supply chain stage (e.g., only producers are member). 
49
 Or certifying institutions contracted by these associations. 
50
 Note that actors can participate in various supply chains at the same time (Camps, 2005). For example, the 
meat company examined in the Brazilian case also markets parts of its production as branded goods in the 
domestic market. Whenever applicable, the study focuses only on the participation of the actors in one of their 
supply chains (in this case, the participation of the meat company in the commodity supply chain). Therefore, the 
figures represented in this section are a simplification; i.e., in reality multiple supply chains overlap.  
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FIGURE 3.1  
Example of the analysis of contracts and coordination mechanisms used within 
commodity chains 
 
(T= transaction; T1= feed producer-farmer; T2= farmer-slaughterhouse; T3= slaughterhouse-
processor; T4= processor-retailer) 
* IKB is a quality management system covering multiple stages in the Dutch supply chain (see Section 5.2 in 
Chapter Two). Participation in the system is voluntary, but widespread. Actors participating have to sign a 
contract which includes the following elements: (a) compliance with standards; (b) participation in scheme for 
one year.  
** Processing and slaughterhouse stage are part of an integrated meat company. 
In the collective brand chains, third-parties have an even more active role. Besides quality, 
also investments and even price setting responsibilities may be outsourced to the associations 
which own the brands. These associations finance investments in brand development and 
quality coordination, by levying fees on transactions conducted amongst the actors 
participating in the brand. Price setting is done, not by actually determining price levels, but 
by selecting reference markets for transactions conducted amongst actors participating in the 
brand. Figure 3.2 shows the analysis of the contracts and coordination mechanisms used 
within the PGI case, as an example of how coordination is achieved within collective brands. 
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FIGURE 3.2  
Example of the analysis of contracts and coordination mechanisms used within collective 
brands 
 
(T= transaction; T1= feed producer-farmer; T2= farmer-slaughterhouse; T3= slaughterhouse-
processor; T4= processor-retailer) 
* The formal contract between the PGI association and the supply chain actors that are members of the 
association (producers and processors) include the following elements: (a) compliance with standards; (b) 
determination of premium above reference market price (i.e., the financial incentive to participate); (c) 
participation in scheme; (d) levy on transactions to support investments in brand development. 
** Note that associations combine characteristics of both equity and debt; i.e., they are hybrid mechanisms (see 
Section 2.2.5 and Section 5.5).  
While both the commodity supply chains and the collective branded cases are characterized 
by an external administrative organization which undertakes some key coordination functions 
(i.e., the associations), in the proprietary brands these coordination functions are undertaken 
by the supply chain actor who is the brand owner. This brand owner enters into hierarchical 
types of contracts with most other supply chain actors. Unlike the previous types of supply 
chains, the proprietary branded chains largely do employ hierarchical types of coordination 
mechanisms (e.g., fixed forward prices and volumes, counterparty quality coordination) 
within the largely hierarchical types of contracts that they use. Figure 3.3 shows the analysis 
of the contracts and coordination mechanisms used within the Processor brand case, as an 
example of how coordination is achieved within proprietary brands. 
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FIGURE 3.3  
Example of the analysis of contracts and coordination mechanisms used within 
proprietary brands 
 
(T= transaction; T1= feed producer-farmer/processor; T2= farms integrated into processor; 
T3= slaughterhouse-processor; T4= processor-retailer) 
 
* Besides the company owned farms, the processor also sources pigs from 4 other main suppliers. The Processor 
has fixed price and volume contracts with these suppliers and coordinates their feed inputs. 
 
5.2. Use of price coordination mechanisms  
In both the proprietary brand and collective brand cases, the actors use mainly ex-ante price 
arrangements, like fixed forward prices or reference market prices (see Table 3.7).  This 
contrasts with commodity chains, were spot prices are the main coordination mechanisms 
used (in 8 out of 12 transactions). In the proprietary brands, prices were completely fixed in 
most transactions (7 out of 10 transactions), either by means of fixed forward prices, or by 
internal price coordination. In collective brand cases, mainly reference market prices were 
used (in 6 out of 11 transactions).  
The use of ex-ante price arrangements within the branded supply chains limits the scope for 
counterparties to renegotiate exchange conditions, at least with regard to prices. Preventing 
such renegotiation by counterparties is particular important in branded supply chains because 
Chapter Three 
 
80 
 
of the limited number of (potential) trading partners at each stage of the supply chain; i.e., it is 
more difficult to switch to another buyer (supplier) (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999).  
Furthermore, the high use of reference market prices in the collective brands suggests that 
there is also a need to manage price uncertainty in these cases. The use of these mechanisms 
limits the scope for counterparties to renegotiate conditions like in fixed forward contracts, 
but, unlike fixed forward contracts, prevents the contract price from moving out of line with 
spot market prices. Fixing prices (in a uncertain price environment) can be risky, as spot 
market prices may move out of line with the agreed upon forward price when products are 
finally delivered.  
5.3. Use of volume coordination mechanisms 
As is shown in Table 3.7, proprietary brands use mainly fixed volume contracts or internal 
mechanisms (in case of vertical integration) to coordinate volume in the supply chain (in 6 out 
of 10 transactions). These ex-ante volume arrangements, like their price coordination 
counterparts, limit the scope of actors to renegotiate transaction volumes. In the commodity 
chains, where it is easier to find suppliers (buyers) than in the branded cases, mainly spot 
volume mechanisms are used (in 7 out of 12 transactions). In collective brands, like 
commodity chains, mainly spot volume arrangements are used (in 8 out of 11 transactions). 
Actors operating in collective brands have already put mechanisms in place which limit the 
scope for counterparties to renegotiate prices (see Section 5.2) and apparently do not require 
similar mechanisms with regard to volumes.   
5.4. Use of quality coordination mechanisms  
As is shown in Table 3.7, quality in proprietary brands is coordinated mainly by 
counterparties (in 6 out of 10 transactions). In collective brands, quality coordination is 
largely outsourced to third-parties; i.e. the associations which hold the brand property rights 
(in 9 out of 11 transactions). Commodity chains use a combination of third-parties (both 
certifying institutions and associations; in 4 out of 12 transactions) and spot market 
specifications (in 4 out of 12 transactions) to coordinate quality.  
Branded supply chains require more hierarchical quality coordination mechanisms when 
compared to commodity chains, because they set additional requirements or standards for the 
supply chain actors to help differentiate the products sold under the brand. Compliance with 
these standards needs to be monitored. Furthermore, proprietary brands may need to be more 
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actively involved in the coordination of quality (i.e., by means of counterparty monitoring) 
when compared to the collective brands (which rely on third-party monitoring). This is 
because their standards are generally more unique to help differentiate their products. 
Collective brands have more accessible standards in order to keep and expand membership of 
the association.  
In cases where standards are unique to a specific transaction or sets of transactions, 
outsourcing the quality coordination function to a third-party certifying institution may not be 
economical. This is because the third-party can ‘use’ the competences it needs to acquire for 
monitoring compliance with these standards only for a limited number of transactions (i.e., 
only for those transactions within the branded chain). In the collective brands, outsourcing the 
quality coordination function to a third-party may be more economical when compared to the 
proprietary brands. Not only do multiple actors operate in the supply chain for which third-
party certifying agents could use their acquired monitoring capabilities, the certifiers could 
also use these capabilities to monitor transactions outside the branded supply chain because 
the standards are less differentiated.  
5.5. Use of investment coordination mechanisms  
Across both the proprietary brand and commodity cases, most transactions did not require 
external investments. In the proprietary brand cases, this is because most of such investments 
were financed with internal capital (in 5 out of 6 transactions for which no external capital 
was required). In the commodity cases, this is because most transactions did not require 
investments at all (7 out of 12 transactions). For those transactions for which external 
investments were required, both the proprietary brand and commodity chain actors used 
mainly equity mechanisms. Proprietary brands used equity in 4 transactions and commodity 
chains in 3 transactions. Equity mechanisms were mainly used when a company vertically 
integrated with its supplier or customer (i.e., the when the investment source was a party to 
the transaction). In the collective brand cases, most transactions required external investments 
(in 9 out of 11 transactions). These investments were made through the associations which 
owned the brand (i.e., through a third-party source). Associations, as is explained below, can 
be regarded as a hybrid investment mechanism. 
What are the particular characteristics of the investment mechanisms used in the proprietary 
brand and commodity brand cases? The main difference between the proprietary brands and 
the collective brands is the distribution of brand ownership (or property) rights, which is 
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tightly held in the former, and widely distributed in the latter. Associations, which combine 
characteristics of both equity and debt mechanisms, may be a particularly suitable mechanism 
to govern collective brands. Like equity mechanisms, they give the members control over the 
brand and brand organization while it is still in operation. Like debt mechanisms, they remove 
the availability of free cash flows available to the management of the associations. This is 
because revenues flow directly through the brand participants, which sell their products 
themselves. Furthermore, unlike equity mechanisms, which are used in the proprietary brands, 
association guarantees the continuation of the brand as a collective entity, by preventing 
concentration of ownership and control. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The paper has aimed to develop a comprehensive and detailed typology for studying supply 
chain contracts. This has been achieved by modeling the coordination mechanisms used 
within supply chain contracts. The typology integrates four types of coordination 
mechanisms: price, volume, quality and investments. The value of the typology has been 
illustrated by characterizing transactions in three types of pork supply chains: proprietary 
brands, collective brands and commodity chains. Eight supply chains were examined from 
five major pork producing countries (Brazil, Denmark, France, Spain and The Netherlands).  
6.1. Towards an in-depth examination of contracts 
The results show the importance of looking at contracts in a more detailed level: transactions 
which look hierarchical when examined at contract level are largely conducted in a market-
like manner when the underlying coordination mechanisms are examined (and vice-versa). 
For example, some hierarchical types of contracts are used in order to formalize exchanges, 
and not to commit the actors to future transactions. In these contracts, the conditions of the 
exchange, particularly with regard to price and volume are left open, as largely spot price and 
volume coordination mechanisms are used. Amongst others retailers use such contracts with 
meat companies, which only specify some quality requirements, to create a list of preferred 
suppliers. From this list, the product category or purchase managers of the individual 
supermarket stores can select their own specific supplier, depending on local needs.  
The reason why some contracts look more hierarchical when examined at coordination 
mechanisms level (and vice-versa), is that companies have more freedom in combining 
various types of coordination mechanisms within a single type of contract than is generally 
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assumed within the literature. For example, within some formal contracts, prices and volumes 
may be completely fixed while in other formal contracts, prices and volumes are completely 
determined by market conditions. Investment contracts may involve minority equity 
investments in supply chain partners or hybrid investments through a pooled investment 
vehicle, like a horizontally organized cooperative or a vertically organized association. 
Although one would expect extensive conditions in investment contracts, this was often not 
the case in the examined transactions where key aspects, like prices or volumes, were not 
agreed upon in the contract. In a vertically integrated company, prices between two parts of 
the integrated company may be fixed rather than decided by an internal authority. The large 
variety within different types of contracts can only be fully understood when the underlying 
coordination mechanisms are examined.  
Furthermore, by examining contracts in more detail, it was possible to identify some of the 
ingenious contractual solutions used by supply chain actors. For example, the use of reference 
market price contracts in proprietary brands allows transaction parties to implement 
mechanisms which facilitate adaptation to changing circumstances, but also prevent one of the 
parties from exploiting this flexibility. This is because the price in such contracts depends on 
the quoted price of a product traded on an agreed upon central market. This limits the scope 
for counterparties to renegotiate conditions, by removing their ability to influence the contract 
price, but also prevents the contract price from moving out of line with spot market prices.  
Additionally, the use of the typology sheds light on some of the unintended consequences or 
adverse implications of contracts. For example, in one of the cases, an investment based 
contract is in place between the cooperative slaughterhouse and its pig producer members. 
The objective of the contract is to assure that the slaughterhouse receives a steady supply of 
pigs. By entering into the contract, the producers promise to deliver a minimum percentage of 
their output to the slaughterhouse. However, the contract covers only the production of 
finishing pigs (i.e., those pigs ready to be slaughtered). As a result, producers which produce 
both piglets and finishing pigs may choose to sell their piglets to traders which are not tied to 
the slaughterhouse, rather than fattening the piglets themselves51. This happens when the 
producers are dissatisfied with the prices offered by the slaughterhouse. Thus, the contract 
gives the slaughterhouse some flexibility in raising prices when it already has sufficient pig 
inputs and demand for its pig meat is low (as its members will deliver their pigs to other 
                                                           
51
 Subsequently, the traders market the piglets to finishing farms which are not tied to the slaughterhouse.  
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actors). However, it also means the slaughterhouse may be outbidded by competing 
slaughterhouses when demand for pig meat (and thus pig inputs) is high. In other words, the 
contracts may fail to assure a steady supply of pigs, particularly since a significant part of the 
members of the cooperative produce both piglets and finishing pigs.    
6.2. Linking contracts and coordination mechanisms to their supply chain context 
Besides facilitating a more in-depth examination of contracts, the developed typology also 
allows for a better linking of contracts with the supply chain contexts in which they are 
embedded. This is important because this context is frequently ignored by contracting studies, 
which often only examine bilateral transactions (Wever et al., 2012). The typology helps 
researchers in addressing this issue, by allowing for a more fine-grained examination of the 
role of third-parties to the transaction. For example, is the third-party an actor external to the 
supply chain (e.g., a certifying institution) or is it another (lead) supply chain actor? Does the 
third-party coordinate quality (e.g., an association) or does it facilitate investments (e.g., a 
bank)? How active is the third-party; i.e., does it only coordinate quality (e.g., a second-tier 
customer) or is it also active in setting prices and quality (e.g., an association)? What supply 
chain stages are covered by its activities? In helping researchers answering these types of 
questions, the typology can thus be used to study triadic relationships (and larger structures) 
next to dyadic relationships (see also Choi and Wu, 2009).  
The empirical results give an indication of the importance of studying triads. Companies, 
particularly in collective brands and commodity supply chains, outsource quality, price and 
even some investment coordination functions to third-parties. These third parties allow supply 
chain actors to focus on their core competences rather than on controlling other supply chain 
stages. For example, in one of the collective brand cases, the vertically organized association 
which holds the property rights of the brand acts as a third-party to each transaction: 
• The association coordinates prices, not by setting a fixed price, but by stipulating that 
the supply chain actors use reference market price mechanisms in their contracts.  
• The association sets and monitors compliance with quality standards. This standardizes 
quality across the supply chain and allows for actors to easily switch back and forth 
between suppliers without worrying about the quality of the products they procure.  
• The association functions as an investment vehicle by pooling the costs and risks of 
making investments in brand development. This reduces the size of the investments 
required by each individual actor, and reduces barriers to entry for actors wanting to 
participate in a supply chain producing differentiated products.  
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6.3. Theoretical implications and areas for further research 
Further studies should focus on examining the conditions under which coordination 
mechanisms, and combinations of coordination mechanisms, are used within contracts. For 
example, under what type of conditions should fixed price contracts be used in combination 
with third-party quality coordination? Preferably, such a study would be conducted in a 
different setting (e.g., the telecommunications industry). As is explained in Section 3, 
researchers that apply the typology to other contexts should be careful that they do not 
exclude aspects of contracts or coordination mechanisms which are common to the particular 
context under study. 
Additionally, studies could use the typology to specify existing contract theory. For example, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) – which is the most frequently used theory across 
numerous disciplines to examine contracting decisions – provides a perspective on the 
conditions which affect the usage of contracts. However, TCE prescribes generic contractual 
solutions (e.g., make, buy or hybrid) to managers and provides only limited guidance on the 
conditions which affect the use of coordination mechanisms underlying these contracts. The 
typology developed in this paper can add value: by relating the various conditions (e.g., asset 
specificity) which affect contracting decisions within the TCE framework also to the use of 
the coordination mechanisms (e.g., fixed price coordination mechanisms) underlying the 
contracts.  
For example, within the TCE framework, asset specificity and uncertainty are two important 
drivers of contracting decisions (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2). However, few studies (see 
Grover and Malhotra, 1997) have linked these conditions to, for example, the use of specific 
price coordination mechanisms. This is important, as the use of certain price mechanisms (and 
other types of mechanisms) may be more beneficial under some conditions. From a TCE 
perspective, the results of the study suggest that supply chain actors use price coordination 
mechanisms to manage their exposure to both asset specificity and price uncertainty risks. On 
the one hand, actors use ex-ante price arrangements as a safeguard against the opportunistic 
behavior associated with the specific investments they have made to support their 
participation in a brand. That could be an explanation for the higher use of such arrangements 
in branded chains when compared to commodity chains, where such investments are not 
required. On the other hand, the use of reference market prices in collective brands suggests 
that there is also a need to manage price uncertainty in some of the branded chains.  
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Furthermore, the typology could be used to combine different theoretical frameworks. 
Relatively recently, researchers have started to link various contracting theories. In particular, 
researchers have often attempted to combine TCE and the Resource Based View (RBV) (see 
McIvor, 2009; Leiblein, 2003; Barney and Lee 2000). While TCE offers a perspective mainly 
on how actors can use contracts to minimize the risk of exploitation by the counterparty to the 
transaction, RBV argues that contracts should (also) be used to manage and develop a 
company’s portfolio of unique resources or capabilities. In brief, core competences should be 
brought inside the company, while no-core competences can be outsourced.  
Studies could use the typology to establish additional linkages between the two frameworks. 
For example, the frameworks can be combined to explain under what conditions outsourcing 
quality coordination to a third-party coordinator is likely to be beneficial. From a TCE 
perspective, the level of performance measurement difficulties (see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2) 
in supply chain transactions is likely to affect quality coordination mechanism choices. 
Branded supply chains set higher requirements for actors to help differentiate the products 
marketed under the brand, which should lead to more performance measurement difficulties 
when compared to non-branded supply chains. To reduce these difficulties, additional 
monitoring mechanisms are required. This could be a (TCE based) explanation for the 
additional quality coordination mechanisms used in the branded cases compared to the 
commodity chains 
Furthermore, from a RBV perspective, quality coordination of ‘unique’ standards may be 
more difficult to outsource to a third-party than coordination of more generic standards. The 
development of such standards, as well as the monitoring of compliance with the standards, 
may require ‘tacit’ knowledge of certain operating procedures (see Barney and Lee, 2000); 
i.e., knowledge and skills, like the visual inspection of the color of dry-cured hams, which 
cannot easily be written down and thus cannot easily be transferred to a third-party. This 
could be a (RBV based) explanation for the more hierarchical quality coordination 
mechanisms (internal and counterparty) used in the proprietary brands when compared to the 
collective brands (third-party).  
Finally, researchers should use the typology to examine interdependencies between 
contracting decisions at various stages in the supply chain. Frequently, contracting studies, 
including most of the TCE literature (see Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006; Grover and 
Malhotra, 2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), ignore such interdependencies. However, 
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contracting decisions downstream in the supply chain (e.g., use of variable price contracts), 
may affect what a suitable contracting decision is the upstream part of the supply chain (e.g., 
use of fixed price contract) and vice-versa. As is explained in the next study in more detail, 
studies which do not take such interdependencies in account are likely to understate the 
transaction risks to which supply chain actors are exposed. Subsequently, the 
recommendations of such studies on how to manage contract decision making situations are 
limited at best, and at worst, can increase the transaction risks to which the actors are exposed.  
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SUPPLY CHAIN-WIDE CONSEQUENCES OF 
TRANSACTION RISKS AND THEIR CONTRACTUAL 
SOLUTIONS: TOWARDS AN EXTENDED TRANSACTION 
COST ECONOMICS FRAMEWORK52 
 
Study Two (Chapter Three) has examined differences in contracting decisions across various 
types of supply chains. This has given some insight into the link between contracts and the 
larger supply chain context in which they are used. However, the conducted analysis has been 
largely descriptive in nature. Researchers who study contracting decisions often do so only in 
the context of bilateral transactions. As a result, a robust framework for examining such 
decisions in a wider supply chain context is lacking. Study Three aims to address this issue, 
by laying the foundations for such a framework. These foundations are grounded in TCE 
theory. The reasons for using TCE rather than another theory for analyzing contracting 
decisions have been outlined in Chapter One (Section 1.2). 
The present study first provides justification for moving TCE’s unit of analysis beyond the 
dyad. Subsequently, various models are constructed which examine: (1), how actors’ usage of 
contracts to manage their exposure to supply (demand) side transaction risks can affect their 
exposure to demand (supply) side transaction risks; (2), how actors’ risk exposure can also 
depend on transactions further upstream (downstream) in the supply chain in which they are 
not directly involved. The models show that when actors follow the recommendations from 
the traditional TCE framework regarding the use of contracts, it may increase rather than 
decrease their exposure to transaction risks. However, when actors take into account 
simultaneously both supply and demand side transactions when making their contract 
decisions, as is recommended in this study, a reduction in exposure to transaction risks is 
more likely. The study offers managers various strategies for taking a supply chain-wide 
approach to reduce transaction risk exposure.  
Note that the present study focuses on a sub-set of the supply chain types examined in Study 
Two: i.e., on differentiated supply chains. As is explained in Section 1 of this chapter in more 
detail, interdependencies between contracting decisions are more likely to arise in 
differentiated supply chains. 
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 The article on which this chapter is based has been published as “Wever, M., Wognum, P.M., Trienekens, J.H. 
and S.W.F. Omta. ‘Supply Chain-Wide Consequences of Transaction Risks and their Contractual Solutions: 
Towards an Extended Transaction Cost Economics Framework’, Journal of Supply Chain Management, January 
2012, (48:1), pp. 73-91.” 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Supply chain actors are exposed to risks in supply and demand side transactions. How supply 
chain actors can simultaneously manage their exposure to both supply and demand side risks 
is a topic which has been insufficiently examined, particularly within the transaction cost 
economics (TCE) literature (Sanchez 2003). TCE studies, both theoretical (e.g., Williamson 
2008, 2002) and empirical (e.g., Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997), 
often only examine transaction risks in bilateral exchanges. These studies neglect the wider 
supply chain context in which these transactions take place (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999). 
Studies which fail to take into account this context may prescribe contractual solutions which 
seem optimal for reducing exposure to transaction risks in bilateral transactions. But, these 
solutions may be suboptimal for the supply chain as a whole (see Choi and Wu, 2009 and 
Agrell, Lindroth and Norrman, 2004 for some non-TCE related studies on this subject).  
For example, in an agri-food supply chain, a processor may vertically integrate with its 
supplier to reduce exposure to performance measurement risks; i.e., as when the company has 
difficulties in assessing supplier performance. Vertical integration reduces performance 
measurement risks as the processor now makes its own supply of inputs. However, as is 
explained later in the paper in more detail, this might also leave the processor with a more 
fixed volume of inputs supplied53. If the company has no agreement with its customer(s) in 
which demand for its products is also fixed, for example by means of a forward contract 
which stipulates the amount and price of future deliveries, it may be exposed to additional 
demand side transaction risks related to overproduction. This is because vertical integration 
upstream removes some of the freedom the company has in adjusting its production to 
changes in downstream demand.  
The scenario described above, where a company should not view its supply and demand side 
contract use in isolation, is likely to become more common (Omta, Trienekens and Beers, 
2001). This is because of the trend towards increased interdependencies within supply chains, 
amongst others to meet the demand of consumers for more high-quality products (Kaynak and 
Hartley, 2008). However, based on the current state of the TCE literature (see Geyskens, 
Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006) it is not possible to state under which conditions the benefits for 
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 For example, if the inputs are non-commodity products, it may be difficult to sell them in the open market. 
Also, because of fixed costs, it may be costly to stop producing at the supplier level. Thus, the processor may 
have to procure a minimum amount of inputs from its internal supplier, regardless of the demand for its products. 
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the company of vertical integration upstream outweigh the disadvantages of increased 
exposure to demand side volume uncertainty. To improve the practical relevance of research 
in this subject, a more supply chain-wide approach is necessary.  
This paper aims to contribute to a shift within the TCE literature from a focus on bilateral 
transactions, to examining transactions within a supply chain context. More specifically, the 
objectives of the paper are threefold. First, the objective of the paper is to identify the main 
conditions under which supply and demand side transactions are interdependent. ‘Conditions’ 
refers to the attributes of the transaction (e.g., level of asset specificity), which are considered 
as the main drivers behind the contract decisions of organizations within the TCE framework 
(Joskow, 1987). Transactions are regarded as ‘interdependent’ when supply chain actors’ 
exposure to supply (demand) side transaction risks affects their ability to manage exposure to 
demand (supply) side transaction risks (Voß and Schneidereit, 2002). Second, the objective of 
the paper is to examine what the interdependence between transactions means for supply 
chain actors’ total exposure to transaction risks. Interdependencies may lead to negative 
‘transaction externalities’, as when the use of a supply side contract not only affects the 
(supply side) risk exposure of the parties involved in the transaction, but its effects spill over 
into increased demand side transaction risk or increased risk elsewhere in the supply chain54
. 
This may increase actors’ ‘total exposure’ to transaction risks, which refers to the sum of 
supply and demand side transaction risks, as well as possible negative transaction 
externalities55. Third, the objective of the paper is to explore the differences between the 
traditional TCE framework and a TCE framework with a supply chain-wide orientation, with 
regard to their analysis of contracts and risks. The difference between the two frameworks is 
                                                           
54
 More generally, an ‘externality’ can be regarded as a cost (benefit) incurred by an actor who is not a party to 
the transaction or economic activity causing the cost (benefit) (based on Scitovsky, 1954). In other words, a spill-
over from activities undertaken in the context of a (bilateral) transaction to a third-party. Although formal 
definitions of ‘externality’ often consider just two parties (e.g., Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962), actual 
examples of externality almost always consider (implicitly) at least three actors (Arrow, 1969; Coase, 1960). 
Note that the focus here is on spill-overs from one transaction to the next and that one actor can participate in 
both transactions (operating as both buyer and supplier). See Roberts and Key (2005) for an analysis of 
‘horizontal’, industry wide externalities as opposed to the ‘vertical’ supply chain externalities examined here.  
55
 Cheung (1970, p.56) has criticized the concept of ‘externality’, arguing that no meaningful distinction can be 
made between an externality and the type of economic activity underlying it: “What, then, is an 
externality…Every economic action has effects.” However, considering that not all economic action spills-over 
to affect a party not participating in a transaction, this distinction is not difficult in practice. For example, the 
‘economic activity’ of a car trader is to market cars to consumer. An ‘externality’ arises when another actor(s) 
than the trader and consumer are affected by their transaction. For example, when the consumer become aware it 
has bought a ‘defect’ car and other traders (in ‘good’ quality cars) cannot (profitably) market their cars anymore 
because consumers have lost faith in this particular market (see Akerlof, 1970).  
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that the former does not explicitly consider the interdependence between supply and demand 
side transactions (because it unbundles the supply chain into separate transactions; Nickerson, 
Hamilton and Wada, 2001) while this is explicitly modeled within the latter.  
The paper addresses this topic in the context of a supply chain with sequential linkages 
between actors which produce differentiated products; i.e., a non-commodity supply chain. In 
such a supply chain, interdependencies can arise between transactions, as the quality of the 
final product depends on practices in the preceding stages of the supply chain (Raynaud, 
Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). Additionally, when differentiation takes place (vertically) 
across the supply chain, the number of potential trading partners at each stage is likely to be 
limited (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999). This can also increase interdependencies within the 
supply chain. Furthermore, the paper focuses on supply chains where temporal factors 
encourage the use of contractual solutions, like forward contracts, to reduce transaction risk 
exposure. For example, in agri-food supply chains, some products (e.g., vegetables) are 
perishable, which leads to storage constraints and increases the costs of using non-contractual 
solutions, like inventory buffers (Ziggers and Trienekens, 1999). Likewise, in the apparel 
industry, actors that keep large inventory buffers face the risk that their inventory becomes 
obsolete as consumer preferences (demands) change (Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon, 2005). 
In these types of supply chains, besides costs related to under-production, there can also be 
high costs related to over-production, as actors have a low tolerance level for fluctuations in 
output levels (i.e., limited volume flexibility; Jack and Raturi, 2003; Koste and Malhotra, 
1999). As is explained in the paper, actors which face such constraints, and which take part in 
differentiated supply chains, are vulnerable to risks related to transaction interdependence.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the traditional TCE 
framework is discussed, and an overview of the TCE literature is given. In Section 3, five 
models are developed which: (a), provide justification for moving the TCE framework beyond 
the dyad; and (b), explain the implications of the shift towards an extended TCE framework 
for the (optimal) use of supply chain contracts. Section 4 concludes the paper and discusses its 
implications for the TCE literature, supply chain management (SCM) literature and managers.    
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2. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
 
2.1. Introduction to Transaction Costs Economics 
In the context of SCM studies, TCE has often been used to examine organizations’ 
outsourcing decisions: what activities should be kept in-house, and what activities should be 
conducted outside company boundaries (e.g., McIvor, 2009; Ellram, Tate and Billington, 
2008). More generally, TCE examines the comparative advantage of alternative types of 
contracts for governing buyer-supplier transactions (Williamson, 2002). According to TCE, a 
transaction will occur either in the market (market contract) or within the organization 
(hierarchical contract or vertical integration) (Arnold, 2000; Williamson, 1985).  
Market contracts rely on price and competition to coordinate transactions (Williamson, 1991). 
When a supplier does not meet the requirements, a buyer can switch to another supplier. 
Hierarchical contracts coordinate transactions by means of administrative control with 
associated monitoring rights and capabilities (Williamson, 1991). In this case, the supplier is 
not an autonomous actor, but is integrated into the buyer’s company. Subsequent extensions 
of the TCE framework (e.g., Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Buvik, 2002; Heide and John, 
1990) also distinguish between various types of intermediate contract forms, like formal 
contracts or verbal agreements with preferred suppliers. Which type of contract is most 
suitable for governing a transaction depends on the characteristics or attributes of the 
transaction, which affect the relative costs of the contracts (Williamson, 2000).  
In the TCE framework, transactions take place in a context where the actors are limited by 
their own bounded rationality and are subject to the strategic behavior of other actors 
(Williamson, 1988). Bounded rationality is the assumption that human behavior is 
intentionally rational, but constrained by the capacity to process and communicate 
information (Simon, 1957). Because of these constraints, actors cannot specify all the changes 
in the circumstances surrounding a transaction in advance (Williamson, 1991). Actors 
entering into a transaction run the risk that the circumstances change (e.g., demand for a 
product falls) after the parties have agreed upon exchange conditions (e.g., after a large order 
is placed). Furthermore, because of bounded rationality, complete contracts cannot be drafted, 
and complex contracts will include gaps and omissions (Williamson, 2008). These gaps offer 
the counterparty to the transaction an opportunity to engage in (self-interested) strategic 
behavior (Williamson, 2000). Strategic behavior refers to the attempts by actors to exploit the 
counterparty to the transaction, amongst others by renegotiating the conditions of the 
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exchange (i.e., opportunism) or by falsely claiming compliance with exchange conditions – 
i.e., shirking (Ghosh and John, 1999). Risks associated with strategic behavior are largest 
when contracts are inappropriately aligned with transaction attributes (Williamson, 2002).   
According to TCE, transactions, which differ in their attributes, need to be aligned with 
specific contracts, which differ in their cost and aptitude, in an economically efficient manner 
(Williamson, 1985). Economic efficiency in this regard means that parties to a transaction 
should strive to minimize the costs of the transaction (Williamson, 2000), to the extent that 
value is maximized for both parties compared to the next best alternative for each party 
(Ghosh and John, 1999). Within the TCE framework, there are three attributes of transactions 
which are important in this regard: level of asset specificity (Williamson, 1988), level of 
performance measurement difficulty (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Williamson, 1985; Barzel, 
1982; Akerlof, 1970) and level of uncertainty (Williamson, 1991). The first two attributes 
affect the exposure of actors to risks associated with strategic behavior by counterparties. The 
third attribute affects the exposure of actors to risks associated with changes in transaction 
circumstances56.  
• ‘Level of asset specificity’ refers to the extent to which the investments an actor makes to 
support a transaction, ties the actor to the other party to the transaction. Assets are 
specific if their value decreases when they are used outside the transaction for which they 
were acquired. This exposes the actor making the investments to the risk of opportunistic 
behavior. This is the risk that the counterparty to the transaction will renegotiate terms 
once investments are made (Klein, Crawford and Alchian 1978).  
 
• ‘Level of performance measurement difficulty’ refers to the extent to which the parties to 
a transaction can measure the benefits and costs the other party brings to the transaction. 
Performance measurement difficulties occur when one of the parties is better informed 
about the value of the exchanged goods or services. This exposes the uninformed party to 
the risk of shirking behavior. This is the risk that the counterparty to the transaction puts 
in insufficient effort (Ghosh and John 1999; Frazier 1999). 
 
• ‘Level of uncertainty’ refers to unanticipated changes in the environment in which the 
transaction is embedded. These changes can expose the transaction parties to the risk of 
maladaptation; i.e., the risk of a failure to adapt to environmental changes (Gulati and 
Singh 1998). Williamson (1991) makes a distinction between changes for which 
                                                           
56
 The TCE framework used in this paper is representative of how TCE is frequently conceptualized in extant 
studies (Ghosh and John, 1999; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006). Given 
the depth and breadth in TCE studies, some authors may use (slightly) different iterations of the framework. For 
example, some authors (Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984) also distinguish the ‘frequency’ by which actors 
transact with each other as a transaction attribute. However, studies are ambiguous about its effect on contract 
choice (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). This paper ‘controls’ for ‘frequency’ by studying only situations which 
involve recurring transactions.      
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autonomous adaptation of the transaction parties is sufficient (e.g., price uncertainty), and 
those which require a coordinated response (e.g., the adoption of new technologies).  
 
When supply chain actors are exposed to transaction risks, they can employ various types of 
contracts in order to reduce their exposure to these risks. A contract is regarded as an 
efficient mechanism within the TCE framework if the direct costs of implementing it are 
lower than the opportunity costs of continued exposure to the transaction risk (or of 
implementing alternative contracts) (Masten, Meehan Jr. and Snyder 1991). These costs can 
occur before (as when potential suppliers are screened) and after implementation (as when 
performance of a contracted supplier has to be monitored) (Dyer 1997).   
Market types of contracts have a relative cost advantage over hierarchical types of contracts 
when the transaction is characterized by low risk of strategic behavior (Williamson 1991). 
With market contracts, actors do not incur the set-up and administrative costs associated with 
hierarchical contracts (Arnold 2000). Hierarchical types of contracts have a relative cost 
advantage when the transaction is characterized by high risk of strategic behavior because 
they offer the actors more suitable mechanisms for managing these risks (Heide and John 
1990). Hierarchical contracts can reduce risks associated with opportunistic behavior by 
implementing legally binding safeguards, which reduce the ability of counterparties to 
renegotiate conditions once specific investments are made (Williamson 1991). Furthermore, 
such contracts may reduce the risk of shirking behavior, by increasing the ability of actors to 
monitor the behavior and performance of counterparties (Williamson, 1985). When making 
their contract decisions, actors also need to take into account the environment in which the 
contract is embedded. For example, although the implementation of a hierarchical contract 
with extensive conditions may reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior, it may also increase 
the risk of maladaptation if actors operate in an environment with high levels of uncertainty 
(Artz and Brush, 2000). 
2.2. Criticism of Transaction Cost Economics 
Section 2.2 in Chapter One has explained that much criticism of TCE has focused on earlier 
studies and that recent TCE studies have started to address most of these points of criticism57. 
However, some criticisms of TCE remain unaddressed.  
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 For example, with regard to a neglect of the institutional context in which transactions occur (see Oxley, 
1999). 
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First, more TCE studies should examine the relation between different types of transaction 
risks (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006). Supply chain actors may be exposed to 
multiple transaction risks at the same time (e.g., to both shirking behavior and maladaptation). 
This may impede actors in minimizing their transaction risk exposure, if conflicting 
contractual solutions are required to manage these risks (Barney and Lee, 2000).  
Second, even though Williamson (2000) may explicitly conceptualize TCE as a dynamic 
framework, most studies examine the process of reducing exposure to transaction risks as a 
static process (Dyer, 1997). Studying the process as dynamic is necessary if the consequences 
of contractual choices are to be better understood (Nooteboom, 2004).  
Third, the relation between contracts and transaction risks is often examined only in the 
context of bilateral exchanges (Sanchez, 2000). This is because the TCE framework 
unbundles the supply chain into dyads (Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada, 2001), and examines 
only the interdependencies which exist between the parties within each dyad (Williamson, 
2008; 2002; 1991). Such an approach cannot examine the consequences of decisions made 
within each dyad for other supply chain transactions (Agrell, Lindroth and Norrman, 2004). 
For that, possible interdependencies between transactions need to be taken into account (Choi 
and Wu, 2009). Although there are a few studies on this subject, their contributions are 
limited because: (a), only two-stage supply chains (buyer-supplier relations) have been 
modeled (e.g., Roberts and Key, 2005); (b), a limited set of conditions under which 
interdependencies can occur have been studied (e.g., Sanchez, 2003); and (c), a small range of 
contracts to manage interdependencies have been examined (e.g., make or buy) (Barney and 
Lee, 2000).  
This paper aims to examine transactions in a supply chain context, and therefore focuses 
mainly on the last of the three above mentioned criticisms. However, the paper also addresses 
the first two points because they are related to the issue of transaction interdependence. 
Transaction interdependence occurs when actors’ exposure to supply (demand) side 
transaction risks affects their ability to manage exposure to demand (supply) side transaction 
risks. To examine under which conditions this interdependence is likely to arise, the relation 
between multiple transaction risks has to be taken into account. To study the consequences of 
this interdependence for actors’ total transaction risk exposure, a dynamic conceptualization is 
required. In the next section, five models are developed about transaction interdependence 
within the context of a dynamic three-stage supply chain.  
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3. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: TOWARDS A SUPPLY 
CHAIN-WIDE FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Interdependency: A Myriad of Perspectives 
Although TCE studies have focused largely on the interdependencies which arise within 
dyads, other theoretical perspectives have also examined interdependencies across dyads. For 
example, within social exchange theory scholars have examined how dyads are embedded 
within larger networks, which arise when multiple dyads are linked together (Emerson, 1976). 
Interdependencies occur when the behavior of actors making up a dyad, and the outcomes of 
their behavior, also depend on the behavior of other network actors (Molm, 1994).  
Scholars from various fields, amongst others organizational sociology (Grandori and Soda, 
1995; Granovetter, 1985), industrial marketing (Håkansson and Wootz, 1979; Ford, 1980) and 
communication science (e.g., Rogers and Kincaid, 1981) have explored the concept of 
interdependence in the context of economic exchanges or business networks. Several studies 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kumar and van Dissel, 1996) have taken Thompson’s (1967) 
conceptualization of various types of intra-organization task interdependencies and have 
applied it to examine interdependencies between organizations. Furthermore, researchers have 
used various interdependency related concepts from social network theory – e.g., the strength 
of actors’ connections, the centrality of actors within networks – to examine issues like the 
diffusion of innovations (Granovetter, 1973), access to capital (Uzzi, 1999), interlocking 
directorates (Burt, 1980) and industrial districts (Lazerson and Lorenzoni, 1999). 
In the SCM literature, the focus is beginning to expand to the path through a series of 
connected companies, rather than on stand-alone dyads (Borgatti and Li, 2009; Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000). Various interdependencies have been studied in supply chains which extend 
beyond the dyad, one of the most well-known example of which is the bullwhip effect – the 
increase in demand order variability for upstream stages due to decreasing insight into (final) 
demand information (Dooley et al., 2010; Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang, 1997). 
Interdependencies have also been examined in the context of quality management practices, 
where collaboration is often necessary to assure final product quality (Kaynak and Hartley, 
2008; Foster Jr., 2008). 
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The topics examined and insights generated which are mentioned above could not have been 
achieved without shifting the unit of analyses beyond the dyad. The present paper aims to 
contribute to such a shift within the TCE literature, by building on elements of the traditional 
TCE framework to develop a supply chain-wide TCE framework. In the traditional TCE 
framework, the unit of analysis is the ‘transaction’ and the focus is on the ‘contract’ used to 
govern the ‘transaction’ (Williamson, 1991). The extended TCE framework views the supply 
chain as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999) and takes the ‘interdependence 
between transactions’ as the unit of analysis. 
Compared to social network and SCM studies, the paper has a more specific orientation on 
interdependencies related to the use of contracts. For example, social network studies focus 
mostly on how transactions are embedded in social relations (e.g., Galaskiewicz, 2011; Uzzi, 
1996), and less on how transactions at various locations within networks affect each other 
through their contractual properties. SCM studies have examined the topic of ‘contracts’ 
mostly in the context of buyer-supplier relations, largely relying on the traditional TCE 
framework for guidance (Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2008; Cai and Yang, 2008).   
3.2. Exposure to Multiple Transaction Risks 
Exposure to multiple transaction risks occurs when a transaction has high levels of attributes 
of more than one type, e.g., high levels of asset specificity and high levels of performance 
measurement difficulty. Transaction attributes can be positively related, and therefore 
situations involving exposure to multiple transaction risks should not be uncommon. For 
example, asset specificity related risks arise amongst others when a company develops a 
brand, which may require specific investment by the brand owner in reputational capital; i.e., 
in promoting the brand and assuring the continuing reputation of the brand. Specific 
investments may also be required by suppliers of the brand owner, in order to be able to 
comply with additional quality requirements of the brand. Besides increasing asset specificity 
risks, the investments can also result in performance measurement difficulties as the brand 
owner may have difficulties in monitoring whether suppliers comply with requirements. 
An actor may also be exposed to multiple transactions risks in separate transactions; e.g., to 
asset specificity related risks in its supply side transaction and volume uncertainty risks in its 
demand side transaction. Such situations can lead to the interdependency between transactions 
because they may require conflicting contractual solutions to reduce the different types of 
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transaction risk exposure. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the different combinations of 
transaction risks which are most likely to lead to interdependency. 
 
TABLE 4.1  
Exposure to Multiple Transaction Risks 
 High Asset Specificity Low Asset Specificity 
Performance Measurement Difficulty Performance Measurement Difficulty 
High Low High Low 
High  volume 
uncertainty 
1.             
                 ? 
2. 
                  ? 
3.  
                ? 
4.  Market types of 
contracts 
 
Low  volume 
uncertainty 
5. Hierarchical types 
of contracts 
6. Hierarchical types 
of contracts 
7. Hierarchical types 
of contracts 
8. Market types of 
contracts 
 
Note: the ‘?’ in Boxes 1, 2, and 3 represents potential ambiguities in existing TCE theory. 
 
The dark shaded areas in Table 4.1 give an overview of the instances in which a supply chain 
actor is exposed to multiple transaction risks. For example, in a transaction characterized by 
high levels of asset specificity and performance measurement difficulty (see Box 5 in Table 
4.1), the supply chain actor would be exposed simultaneously to the risk of opportunism and 
the risk of shirking behavior. The question marks in Table 4.1 indicate situations in which the 
recommendations of TCE theory about what type of contracts are most efficient are 
ambiguous. In three out of four situations (see Box 1-3) in which supply chain actors are 
exposed to multiple transaction risks, it is unclear what type of contract is most efficient. All 
of these situations involve a combination of a high level of volume uncertainty and a high 
level of asset specificity or performance measurement difficulty. Volume uncertainty requires 
autonomous adaptation of the parties to the transaction, for which market types of contracts 
are more suitable (Williamson, 1991), while asset specificity and performance measurement 
related risks require the control mechanisms of hierarchical types of contracts (Williamson, 
1991). Because these three situations require conflicting contractual solutions to reduce the 
different types of transaction risk exposure, they may lead to interdependency between 
transactions. The situations are discussed in the subsequent sections in more detail. Models 1-
3 discuss a situation similar to Box 2 in Table 4.1, while Models 4-5 discuss situations similar 
to Box 1 and Box 3.  
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3.3. Managing Multiple Transaction Risks in the Context of Interdependent 
Transactions 
Models 1-3 discuss a situation in which a supply chain actor is exposed to high levels of asset 
specificity and volume uncertainty. The situation is discussed in the context of two 
sequentially structured transactions: (1), between a supplier and focal actor; and (2), between 
the focal actor and customer. The models could apply amongst others to situations in which 
supply chain actors attempt to upgrade their production from commodity-oriented towards 
production for a differentiated or high-end market. These types of upgrades occur in a variety 
of industries58 (e.g., apparel, footwear, horticulture, fruit, meat) (Gereffi, Humphrey and 
Sturgeon, 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002). Differentiation often requires specific 
investments by the supply chain actors wanting to participate in such markets. For example, a 
slaughterhouse which wishes to produce organic meat instead of regular meat needs to make 
adjustments to its slaughtering process (e.g., separate slaughter lines for organic animals need 
to be developed), but also needs to procure organically produced animals. Therefore, farmers 
wishing to market their animals to this slaughterhouse would need to invest in their stables to 
make them suitable for organic production (e.g., the animals would need to have more space). 
As an example of multiple transaction risks in a two-stage supply chain: 
• The relation between a supplier and focal actor is characterized by high levels of asset 
specificity. The supplier needs to adjust its production process, to be able to meet the 
specific quality requirements of the focal actor. However, to achieve that, the supplier 
needs to make significant investments in its production process, which will be adjusted in 
such a way that it is specialized in producing for the focal actor. The supplier can market 
its now differentiated products to other actors, but not without incurring a loss. To refer 
to the previous example, organic producers may market their organic animals in the 
regular market, but then they will not receive compensation for the extra costs they 
incurred in producing organic products.  
 
• To limit the risk of opportunistic behavior by the focal actor, the supplier wants a long-
term formal contract, in which the focal actor guarantees to purchase the total output of 
the supplier (with a min. and max. output) according to a fixed price. For example, if 
there is only one organic slaughterhouse in the proximity of the producer, it may be at 
risk of not getting a fair price from the slaughterhouse after it has made the investments 
in its stable, if no contract is in place between the two parties.  
 
• Although this contract is necessary to assure a supply of products, the focal actor is at the 
same time exposed to demand side volume uncertainty. Demand can be both higher and 
                                                           
58
 Of the industries mentioned, examples from the meat industry will be used throughout the section to give more 
concrete illustrations to the models. For the sake of clarity, examples from a single industry will mainly be used. 
To address consumer food safety and animal welfare concerns, a growing number of actors in the meat industry 
attempt to differentiate their products. This can increase supply chain interdependencies and associated risks. 
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lower than expected, in part because of costs associated with keeping inventory. These 
costs include storage costs, but can also include costs associated with decay in the value 
of the products stored in case of perishable products.  
 
• It is assumed that this demand side uncertainty cannot be solved by contractual design, 
because customers do not want to enter into a contract in which volume is included. The 
relation with the customer of the focal actor is considered exogenous to this model. 
     
FIGURE 4.1  
Interdependency between Supply Side Asset Specificity  
and Demand Side Volume Uncertainty 
 
 (S= supplier; X= focal actor; FC= formal contract; dashed arrows indicate the flow of products 
between actors) 
 
Model 1 (Figure 4.1) shows the relation between asset specificity and volume uncertainty: 
• In box 1, a combination of high supply side asset specificity and high demand side 
volume uncertainty exists. To give its supplier an incentive to invest in quality 
improvements, the focal actor would need to implement the formal contract to show it 
has no opportunistic intentions.  
 
• However, in a case of high demand uncertainty, it is not clear whether the direct costs of 
implementing the contract are lower than the opportunity costs of over- or under-
production.  This is because a fixed volume of inputs combined with a variable demand 
for the output of the company means the focal actor runs the risk of over- or under-
production. Note that the focal actor is unlikely going to revolve this trade-off by 
contracting multiple suppliers or by vertically integrating into the supply stage of the 
chain. This may reduce the risk of under-production, but will increase the risk of over-
production as the fixed volume of inputs supplied will be even larger.  
 
• In box 2, a combination of high supply side asset specificity and low demand side 
uncertainty exists. In this situation, the focal actor can implement a formal contract with 
its supplier in which the volume is fixed, because the focal actor can predict demand for 
its products. In the absence of demand side risks, supply side decisions can be optimized.  
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3.4. Managing Transaction Interdependency in a Dynamic Context 
Continuing with the example from above, this section explains how contract implementation 
may expose supply chain actors to other types of transaction risks. Model 2, displayed in 
Figure 4.2, once more shows the relation between supply side asset specificity and demand 
side volume uncertainty. A dynamic analysis is presented to demonstrate the consequences of 
contractual choices. The starting-point for the discussion is the same as is outlined above: the 
focal actor wants to give incentives to its supplier to make specific investments. However, it is 
assumed that the focal actor is, initially, not exposed to demand side volume uncertainty. This 
is because the focal actor has, before specific investments are made, a market relation with its 
supplier. This allows the actor to adjust the volume of its inputs in case the demand for its 
outputs changes.  
 
FIGURE 4.2  
Dynamic Analysis of Interdependency between Supply Side 
Asset Specificity and Demand Side Volume Uncertainty 
 
 (S= supplier; X= focal actor; M= market contract; FC= formal contract; dashed arrows indicate product 
flow) 
 
The arrow in Model 2 (Figure 4.2) indicates the effect of contract usage on the transaction 
attributes: 
• In box 4, the focal actor and its supplier are not exposed to any risks at Time 1 (T1). 
However, to protect the specific investments which the supplier needs to make, this actor 
wants a formal contract, in which the focal actor guarantees to purchase the total output 
of its production, according to a fixed price. The focal actor will enter into this contract, 
if the opportunity cost of a failure to invest in productive assets is lower than the 
opportunity cost of maladaptation. 
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• Assuming that this condition is met, the contract will be implemented. Subsequently, 
specific investments are made at T2. The arrow, which points from box 4 to box 1, shows 
how the implementation of the contract facilitates these investments.  
 
• However, the arrow also shows that the use of the formal contract could increase the 
focal actor’s exposure to demand side volume uncertainty. By implementing a contract 
with a fixed volume of inputs, the actor is arguably more exposed to demand side 
uncertainty than before the implementation of the contract. Such a contract removes the 
freedom the focal actor has in adjusting its production to changes in demand. For 
example, a slaughterhouse which has a spot market relation with its supplier(s), can 
choose to procure fewer animals if demand for meat falls. On the other hand, if it 
guarantees to its supplier(s) to purchase a fixed amount of their animals, it will be stuck 
with an excess supply of inputs when demand for meat falls.  
 
3.5. Managing Transaction Interdependency in a Three-Stage Supply Chain 
Continuing with the example from above, this section includes the demand side transaction 
more explicitly in the analysis. This time, the focal actor can manipulate its relations with both 
its supplier and customer. Two types of transactions are examined: the supplier-focal actor 
transaction as well as the focal actor-customer transaction. Again, specific investments have 
to be made at the supply side of the focal actor and no initial exposure exists to high demand 
side volume uncertainty. Market relations exist for both examined transactions at T1. 
Model 3 (Figure 4.3) visualizes the transactions between supplier-focal actor and focal actor-
customer: 
• At T2 in box 1, the focal actor has implemented a formal contract with its supplier, with 
the same fixed volume and price agreements as described in the previous examples. 
Although the use of this contract facilitates supply side specific investments, it could 
also increase the focal actor’s exposure to demand side volume uncertainty.  
 
• To reduce its exposure to demand side volume uncertainty, the focal actor could enter 
into a formal contract, with a fixed volume and price agreement with its customer. By 
implementing such arrangements with both suppliers and customers, it can facilitate 
supply side specific investments and reduce demand side volume uncertainty at the same 
time. This is shown at T3, in box 2. To refer to the previous example, the slaughterhouse 
would be relatively immune to changes in market demand if it has a fixed supply of 
animals combined with a guaranteed retail outlet for its meat.  
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FIGURE 4.3 
Three-Stage Analysis of Interdependency between Supply Side  
Asset Specificity and Demand Side Volume Uncertainty  
 
 (S= supplier; X= focal actor; C= customer; M= market contract; FC= formal contract; dashed arrows 
indicate product flow) 
 
3.6. Managing Transaction Interdependency Resulting from Performance Measurement 
Difficulty 
Participating in differentiated markets may require not only specific investments by supply 
chain actors, but can also lead to performance measurement difficulties as buyers (suppliers) 
cannot easily distinguish between differentiated and commodity inputs (outputs). For 
example, the slaughterhouse may not be able to easily identify the difference between organic 
and non-organically produced animals. Such issues can be of particular concern when a 
supply chain actor(s) produces both commodity and differentiated goods (e.g., as when the 
farmer produces both organic and non-organic animals). Models 4 and 5 describe 
interdependencies resulting from performance measurement difficulties.  
The focal actor may face difficulties in establishing whether the supplier complies with its 
quality requirements because some attributes of the products delivered by the supplier may be 
difficult or costly to measure (Darby and Karni, 1973; Akerlof, 1970). To the extent that the 
focal actor is unable to monitor compliance, and the supplier incurs costs in achieving 
compliance, the supplier has an incentive to shirk and to not comply. For example, the 
slaughterhouse may have difficulties in monitoring whether certain welfare requirements are 
met during production, such as requirements that animals should not remain tied or boxed in a 
small space.    
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Compliance is not all or nothing. A supplier may include non-compliant products in a batch 
with a majority of compliant products (e.g., as when the farmer delivers a batch of organic 
animals which include non-organic animals). It may be too costly for the focal actor to inspect 
all of the delivered products, and so it examines only a random sample of products (i.e., 
sampling) (Barzel, 1982). Thus, if a batch of delivered products contains variability in product 
quality, this variability may be undetected by the focal actor (Jang and Olson, 2010).  
Apart from the supplier, the buyer can also have an incentive to shirk on the agreed upon 
quality requirements. The focal actor can shirk by falsely claiming some products do not meet 
the requirements, and pay a lower price for those products than agreed upon in the contract. 
For example, the slaughterhouse may claim that not all of the delivered animals meet the 
requirements it has set for organic production (e.g., the slaughterhouse may assert that 
residues of antibiotics were found in some animals), even if it uses all of the animals for 
organic meat production. The supplier may be particularly vulnerable to shirking when 
compliance monitoring takes place at sites of the focal actor. The supplier may lack the 
resources to evaluate the products at its own sites, or product quality can only be determined 
in latter supply chain stages (Hueth et al., 1999). For instance, meat quality can best be 
established after slaughter and is thus determined in the slaughterhouse rather than the farm.  
Demand side volume uncertainty risks at the side of the focal actor may further amplify 
performance measurement difficulty risks for the supplier. This is shown in Model 4 (Figure 
4.4) and explains as follows: 
• The focal actor delivers products to customers in two markets: a high-end and a low-end 
market. Products intended for the high-end market can be delivered to customers in the 
low-end market, but not vice-versa (e.g., organic meat can be sold as regular meat, but 
not vice-versa). Products delivered by the supplier are used as inputs for making 
products for the high-end markets, if the inputs meet the requirement. If not, the inputs 
are used for products delivered to the low-end market.  
 
• A formal contract is in place between the supplier and focal actor in which the latter 
guarantees to purchase a fixed amount of products of the former according to a fixed 
price. The contract price is higher than the low-end market price, but is only paid if 
products meet the requirements. Otherwise, the low-end market price is paid.  
 
• Evaluation is done at the sites of the focal actor, by the focal actor, after delivery.  The 
supplier can be present at the site where evaluation takes place, but can only monitor the 
focal actor by means of ‘sampling’; i.e., it is too costly for the supplier to monitor the 
focal actor’s evaluation of all products. 
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• The focal actor has market contracts with its customers, both in the high-end and low-
end market. Demand in the high-end market is highly uncertain, and can be both higher 
and lower than the focal actor’s expectations. 
 
FIGURE 4.4 
Interdependency between Supplier’s Performance Measurement  
Difficulty and Focal Actor’s Demand Side Volume Uncertainty  
 
(S= supplier; X= focal actor; CL= customer low-end market; CH= customer high-end market; M= 
market contract; FC= formal contract; FC*= formal contract with additional monitoring rights; dashed 
arrows indicate product flow) 
 
• When demand is higher than expected, as is the case in Box 1 at T1a in Model 4 (Figure 
4.4), the focal actor has little reason to shirk. It does not have enough inputs to meet 
demand, and possibly needs to give incentives to the supplier for delivering additional 
inputs. Disapproving a large amount of the supplier’s products is unlikely to achieve 
that. 
 
• When demand is lower than expected, as is the case in Box 2 at T1b, the focal actor has 
an incentive to shirk, as it will not want to pay the contract price for high-end inputs 
which it can only sell in the low-end market. The focal actor can shirk by claiming for 
example that only 70% of the inputs delivered by the supplier meet the requirements, 
while it uses 80% of the inputs for production to the high-end market.  
 
• Note that the extent to which the focal actor can shirk is constrained by various factors, 
amongst others by the difference between the contract price and the low-end market 
price, as well as supplier monitoring costs. With a large difference between the contract 
price and the low-end market price, the supplier is likely to increase the frequency of 
‘sampling’, because the relative costs of doing so have decreased. For example, if the 
price for regular animals drops and/or the price for organic animals increases, the 
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farmer has a stronger incentive to monitor whether the slaughterhouse correctly 
evaluates its animals as organic. 
 
• Apart from increasing the frequency of monitoring when the supplier suspects 
excessive shirking takes place, it may also insist on additional monitoring rights in the 
contract. For example, the supplier may want the right to unannounced inspections at 
the focal actor’s sites. Additional monitoring rights can reduce performance 
measurement difficulties, and thus reduce the opportunity for the focal actor to shirk, as 
is visualized by the arrow from T1b in Box 2 to T2 in Box 459. 
 
3.7. Employing Third-Parties to Manage Transaction Interdependency 
Besides the simultaneous manipulation of supply and demand side contracts, actors may also 
rely on third-party agencies to manage transaction interdependence. Third-parties are often 
used to reduce performance measurement difficulties. For example, in the financial sector, 
credit rating agencies monitor the creditworthiness of organizations (countries) and assign a 
rating which signifies the default risk associated with an organization’s debt (White, 2009). In 
the agri-food sector, certifying institutions monitor the compliance of organizations with food 
safety requirements (Sporleder and Goldsmith, 2001). Although this topic has been examined 
within TCE studies, these studies focus on how third-parties affect buyer-supplier relations. 
However, the use of third-parties may have effects beyond the dyad (Wever et al., 2010). 
Besides issues between the supplier and focal actor, performance measurement difficulties 
may also arise between the focal actor and its (high-end) customers. This may be particularly 
problematic for the customer, as it can be exposed not only to the risk that the focal actor 
shirks, but also that the supplier of the focal actor shirks (its second-tier supplier). This is 
because it may have to rely on the focal actor for the monitoring of the supplier (at least when 
no third-party agency is involved, as is explained below) (Fawcett and Magnan, 2002). To the 
extent that it is difficult or costly for the customer to monitor the focal actor, the latter may 
have no incentive to monitor its supplier. In the meat example, retail customers may be 
exposed not only to the risk that the slaughterhouse intentionally shirks by selling them non-
organic meat as organic meat, but also that the slaughterhouse fails to effectively monitor the 
farmers, which may deliver non-organic animals as organic ones. The risk of shirking can be 
particularly high when both the farmer and slaughterhouse produce organic as well as non-
organic products.  
                                                           
59
 The contract with additional monitoring rights will also be in place if demand is subsequently higher than 
expected. When shirking risk is reduced because of persistent changes in demand uncertainty, the supplier may 
choose to give up the additional monitoring rights. More likely, it will choose not to enforce those rights.   
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Model 5, displayed in Figure 4.5, shows two different strategies the customer may employ to 
resolve these difficulties.  
 
FIGURE 4.5 
Second-Tier Performance Measurement Difficulty and  
the Role of Third-Parties 
 
(S= supplier; X= focal actor; C= customer; FC= formal contract; FC*= formal contract with 
additional monitoring rights; TP= third-party monitoring agency; the angular arrows indicate the 
monitoring rights of the actors; dashed arrows indicate product flow)  
 
• As is shown in box 3 of Model 5 (Figure 4.5), even when the actors have sufficient 
rights to monitor counterparties, performance measurement difficulties may persist at 
the customer’s side. Compliance with some requirements, particularly production 
process requirements (e.g., whether or not animal welfare requirements are constantly 
met), can only be established by monitoring the behavior of the actor claiming 
compliance (Hueth et al. 1999). If such requirements apply, and the customer does not 
monitor the second-tier supplier itself, it has to rely on the focal actor.  
 
• A closer monitoring of the focal actor by the customer could force the former to monitor 
its supplier more closely. If it does not, the customer may notice. However, the customer 
is unlikely to be able to evaluate the focal actor’s monitoring activities when these 
activities take place at the sites of the second-tier supplier. For example, a retailer may 
be unable to monitor the slaughterhouse’s audits of the locations of different producers, 
particularly if the retailer has a large number of second-tier suppliers. To the extent that 
the focal actor can profit from shirking by the second-tier supplier (see Model 4), it 
cannot be relied upon by the customer for monitoring on its behalf.  
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• Of course, the customer could decide to monitor (some of) its second-tier suppliers 
directly. As is shown in the upper side of Box 4 at T2a, the focal actor would need 
additional monitoring rights for this. To obtain these rights, it may to have to implement 
a direct contractual relation with its second-tier supplier. 
 
• An alternative solution is for the customer (and other actors) to employ a third-party 
who monitors on its (their) behalf. As is shown at the lower side in Box 4 at T2b, a third-
party requires less monitoring rights, and thus potentially less monitoring activities to 
achieve compliance. To the extent that the actors can rely on the third-party for 
monitoring, they no longer need to monitor each other. 
  
This example has shown the importance of monitoring by the customer (final actor) in the 
supply chain. If the customer has insufficient capability to monitor the other supply chain 
stages, then the other actors may have little incentive to perform or monitor their suppliers. A 
third-party agency may reduce such performance measurement difficulties, if the supply chain 
actors can rely on its judgment. Important aspects in this regard are the independence and 
competence of the third-party (Albersmeier et al., 2009; White, 2009).  
 
3.8. Contrasting the Traditional and Supply Chain-Wide TCE Frameworks 
Based on the developed models, various differences between the traditional TCE framework, 
which does not explicitly consider the interdependence between transactions, and a supply 
chain-wide TCE framework which explicitly models this, are discussed.  
The first model, which considers a static two stage supply chain, shows that supply chain 
actors can be forced to make a trade-off between minimizing exposure to supply or demand 
side risks when transactions are interdependent. An analysis according to the traditional TCE 
framework would not identify this trade-off, as this interdependency is not recognized.  
The second model, which considers a dynamic two stage supply chain, shows that the 
implementation of a contract to reduce exposure to a supply (demand) side transaction risk 
can have adverse consequences, by increasing exposure to demand (supply) side transaction 
risks. An analysis according to the traditional TCE framework would discount the increase in 
demand (supply) side risk which can occur when supply chain actors implement contracts in 
supply (demand) side transactions under conditions of transaction interdependency.  
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The third model, which considers a dynamic three stage supply chain, shows that supply chain 
actors can limit these negative ‘transaction externalities’60, by manipulating both supply and 
demand side transactions simultaneously. An analysis according to the traditional TCE 
framework would recommend a different set of contracts than those recommended by the 
supply chain-wide framework. A contractual solution presented by the traditional TCE 
framework will not take into account externalities arising from transaction interdependency. 
Instead, the solution will be focused on optimizing the two sets of bilateral transactions.  
The fourth model examines how the exposure of supply chain actors to transaction risks can 
depend on transactions in which they are not directly involved. The model shows that an 
actor’s exposure to the risk of shirking can depend on uncertainty in the volume demand of its 
second-tier customer. An analysis according to the traditional TCE framework would not take 
into account that an actor’s risk exposure can depend on how transactions further downstream 
(upstream) in the supply chain are managed.  
The fifth model examines the role of third-parties in managing transaction interdependencies. 
The model shows that third-parties can facilitate in monitoring the performance of second-tier 
suppliers. An analysis according to the traditional TCE framework would provide a 
contractual solution which would require additional monitoring by the final actor in the supply 
chain. The traditional TCE framework would not be able to explain how insufficient 
monitoring by this actor can amplify transaction risks elsewhere in the supply chain; i.e., by 
reducing the incentives of the other actors to monitor each other. 
                                                           
60
 Only ‘transaction externalities’ in the context of the supply chain are considered in this paper; e.g., a spillover 
of supply (demand) side risks to the demand (supply) side transaction or elsewhere in the supply chain.  
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TABLE 4.2 
Comparison between Traditional and Supply Chain-Wide TCE Framework 
 Supply Chain-Wide TCE Analysis Traditional TCE Analysis 
Model 1: static two stage supply 
chain involving the focal actor 
and its supplier.  
 
Situation: the focal actor is 
exposed to supply side asset 
specificity and demand side 
volume uncertainty. 
 
 
- Interdependency exists under the examined 
conditions. This interdependency may force 
supply chain actors to choose between 
optimizing supply or demand side transactions.  
 
- In the situation modeled, the focal actor has to 
decide whether the opportunity cost of a failure 
to invest in supply side productive assets is 
lower than the opportunity cost of demand side 
maladaptation. 
- Trade-off between optimizing supply 
or demand side transactions does not 
arise as the interdependency between 
the two transactions is not recognized. 
 
 
Model 2: dynamic two stage 
supply chain involving the focal 
actor and its supplier.  
 
Situation: similar to Model 1 at 
T1. At T2, the consequences of 
the focal actor’s supply side 
contract usage for its exposure 
to transaction risk are also 
analyzed.  
- Manipulation of supply (demand) side 
transactions may have adverse consequences 
by increasing supply chain actors’ exposure to 
risks in other transactions. 
 
 - In the situation modeled, the focal actor’s use 
of a fixed volume contract in its supply side 
transaction increases its exposure to volume 
uncertainty in its demand side transaction. 
- An analysis according to the 
traditional TCE framework would 
discount the risk that the focal actor 
takes in the situation, as it would 
consider only the role of the contract 
in reducing exposure to supply side 
transaction risk. 
 
Model 3: dynamic three stage 
supply chain involving the focal 
actor, its supplier and customer.  
 
Situation: similar to Models 1 
and 2 at T1. At T2 and T3, the 
consequences of the focal actor’s 
supply and demand side contract 
usage for its exposure to 
transaction risk are also 
analyzed.   
-  Supply chain actors can limit negative 
‘transaction externalities’, by manipulating 
both supply and demand side relations 
simultaneously.  
 
- In the situation modeled, the focal actor has to 
implement fixed volume contracts in both 
supply and demand side transactions to balance 
supply and demand side exposure to volume 
uncertainty.  
 
- The traditional TCE framework 
would focus on reducing risk exposure 
for each transaction separately.  
 
- Such an analysis would recommend 
a different set of contracts: the fixed 
volume contract in the supply side 
transaction reduces the risk of 
opportunistic behavior, while the 
market contract in the demand side 
transaction reduces the risk of 
maladaptation. 
Model 4: dynamic three stage 
supply chain involving the 
supplier, focal actor and 
customer.  
 
Situation: the supplier has 
demand side performance 
measurement difficulties while 
the focal actor is exposed to 
demand side volume uncertainty.  
- The risk exposure of actors can depend on 
transactions in which they are not involved. 
 
- In the situation modeled, the supplier’s 
exposure to shirking risk depends on the focal 
actor-customer transaction. Demand side 
volume uncertainty for the focal actor increases 
the risk for the supplier that the focal actor will 
shirk on their agreement.  
- An analysis according to the 
traditional TCE framework would not 
take into account that the supplier’s 
risk exposure can change, depending 
on how transactions further 
downstream (upstream) in the supply 
chain are managed.  
Model 5: dynamic three stage 
supply chain involving the 
supplier, focal actor and 
customer. 
 
Situation: the customer is 
exposed to difficulties in 
measuring the performance of 
its supplier (the focal actor) and 
second-tier supplier (the 
supplier).  
- Insufficient monitoring by the final actor in 
the supply chain can amplify transaction risks. 
Third-parties may reduce risk exposure.   
 
- In the situation modeled, the customer relies 
on the focal actor to monitor the supplier. This 
means it is vulnerable to shirking by both 
actors. A third-party can reduce risk exposure 
for the customer and may also reduce the 
monitoring activities required to achieve this.  
- An analysis according to the 
traditional TCE framework would 
recommend contracts with additional 
monitoring rights for the customer, 
which would require it to also 
undertake more monitoring activities.  
 
 
 
Study Three: Examining Transactions Within a Supply Chain Context 
111 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has contrasted the traditional TCE framework with a new supply chain-wide TCE 
framework by means of five theoretical models. The difference between the two is that the 
latter recognizes the interdependence between supply chain transactions, while this is not 
explicitly considered by the former. This topic has been examined in the context of sequential 
supply chains producing differentiated products. The paper has furthermore focused on supply 
chains where temporal factors encouraged the use of contracts to manage transaction risks.  
 
4.1. Implications for Transaction Cost Economic Literature 
 In contrasting the two frameworks, this paper has made some important contributions to TCE 
theory.  
First, it has modeled how contract choices in supply (demand) side transactions can affect 
actors’ exposure to risks in other transactions; i.e., how transactions can be interdependent 
under some conditions. Model 1 has shown that exposure to multiple transaction risks can 
lead to transaction interdependency. This is because such situations can require conflicting 
contractual solutions to reduce exposure to the different types of risks.  
Second, it has specified the main conditions under which the interdependence between 
transactions is expected to occur. An overview has been given of the different combinations of 
transaction risks which are most likely to lead to interdependency (see Table 4.1). Three 
detailed examples of transaction interdependency have been discussed: (1), supply side 
specific investments which amplify demand side risk of volume uncertainty (Models 1-3); (2), 
demand side risk of shirking which is amplified because of uncertain volume demand of 
second-tier customers (Model 4); and (3), supply side risk of shirking resulting from 
difficulties in monitoring the performance of second-tier suppliers (Model 5).   
Third, it has shown that, as a result of these interdependencies, actors may be forced to choose 
between optimizing their supply or demand side transactions, which can result in negative 
transaction externalities. Model 2 has illustrated some of the limitations of a separate 
optimization of supply and demand side transactions. Formal contracts, with fixed prices and 
volumes, may minimize risks associated with opportunistic behavior by suppliers. But, if no 
similar contracts are put in place at an actor’s demand side, than the rigidity of these contracts 
may expose it to maladaptation risks in transactions with customers. Model 4 and Model 5 
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have furthermore shown that negative transaction externalities may also result from 
transactions in which an actor is not directly involved.  
Fourth, it has shown that supply chain actors may reduce the impact of these externalities by 
manipulating supply and demand side transactions simultaneously (Model 3) or by 
outsourcing some coordination functions (e.g., compliance monitoring) to a third-party 
(Model 5). Employing third parties may be the preferred option when externalities arise from 
transactions in which an actor is not directly involved (Model 4 and Model 5). 
Fifth, it has highlighted some of the shortcomings of the traditional TCE framework:  
• It discounts or fails to make explicit some transaction risks, as negative  externalities 
arising from transaction interdependency are not recognized (Models 1-5);  
 
• It is therefore not able to offer any solutions to deal with these risks (like the third-
party in Model 5), but instead offers contractual solutions which minimize supply 
chain actors’ exposure only to bilateral transaction risks (Models 1-2);  
 
• If negative externalities are large, the bilateral solutions offered by the traditional TCE 
framework can increase actors’ total exposure to transaction risks (Models 1-2), or can 
lead to a failure to implement alternative solutions which minimize risk exposure 
further than can be achieved by bilateral optimization (Models 3-5). 
 
4.2. Implications for Supply Chain Management Literature 
The SCM literature has shifted in the 1990s from a focus on logistics management to a 
broader perspective on the integration and management of business processes (Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000). Amongst others, this shift has resulted in a rich body of literature on a wide 
range of tools which practitioners may use to interface with their supply chain: (collaborative) 
inventory management systems (Barrat and Oke, 2007; Sahin and Robinson Jr., 2005), quality 
management systems (Kaynak and Hartley, 2008; Foster Jr., 2008), product tracking and other 
types of information systems (Cooper and Tracey, 2005; Kumar and van Dissel, 1996).  
A potential limitation of the TCE framework in the context of SCM studies is its narrow focus 
on contracts as the main tool for supply chain management. This also applies to the present 
study which assumes amongst others that non-contractual solutions (e.g., inventory buffers) 
are costly. SCM studies could relax this assumption and examine how the use of other types 
of SCM tools affects the implications of the models presented in this study.  
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Despite its limitation(s), the traditional TCE framework has been used within SCM studies to 
examine a range of issues, including: channel integration (Frazier, 1999), outsourcing 
(Wallenburg, 2009; Ellram, Tate and Billington, 2008), global sourcing (Kamann and van 
Nieulande, 2010; Ettlie and Sethuraman, 2002), coordination mechanism choices (Xu and 
Beamon, 2006), and foreign entry mode choices (Chen, 2010). The extended TCE framework 
has potentially an even wider application within SCM studies, as researchers can use it to 
examine the role of contracts in managing interdependencies which extend beyond the dyad. 
For example, studies could examine how contracts can reduce upstream volume uncertainty 
risks resulting from downstream ‘shortage gaming’; i.e., the ‘over-ordering’ by customers 
when supply of a product is expected to be rationed (Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang, 1997).  
4.3. Managerial Implications 
The study offers various strategies to managers for dealing with the risks which arise from 
transaction interdependence. Its main implication is that the use of contracts which impair the 
flexibility of the supply chain actors (e.g., fixed prices) or which lead to imbalances in the 
supply chain (e.g., contracts with asymmetric pay-offs) should be limited. Actors should 
consider outsourcing those aspects of supply chain coordination which are most exposed to 
opportunism and shirking, and which affects multiple stages, to a supply chain coordinator. 
This can be a passive entity, as when prices are set by a reference market, or an active third-
party to each transaction, like monitoring agencies and associations. This is explained below.  
First, actors should attempt to balance supply and demand side contracts to reduce imbalances 
in exposure to price or volume uncertainty. These imbalances, which can lead to 
maladaptation, are likely to arise when actors have made specific investments in only parts of 
the chain and have used contracts with fixed prices or volumes to reduce the risk of 
opportunistic behavior for those transactions (see Models 1-3). In these cases, supply chain 
actors might consider using contracts with ‘reference market prices’, where the contract price 
is based on the quoted price of a similar product exchanged in the open market. On the one 
hand, such contracts are a safeguard against opportunistic behavior, as they limit the ability of 
transaction parties to renegotiate prices. On the other hand, the use of reference market prices 
allows the contract price to move in line with current market prices, and thus reduces risks 
associated with maladaptation. Reference market price contracts are common in the financial 
sector (e.g., variable interest rate mortgages), but they could also be useful in other contexts.  
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Second, actors should consider sharing the costs of making investments in assets which are 
specific and are used across the supply chain (e.g., in measurement technology) or for which 
the benefits and risks of its use flow across company boundaries (e.g., in brand development). 
Sharing these costs, and some of the benefits, can reduce exposure to opportunistic and 
shirking behavior. For example, most supply chain actors stand to benefit if they spend fewer 
resources on monitoring each other (Models 4-5). They can achieve this by jointly contracting 
with a third-party monitoring agency. Unfortunately, it is more common for the actor 
receiving the certification to contract with the third-party, but this may compromise the 
independency of that entity (see White, 2009).    
Third, (second-tier) suppliers can be given less of an incentive to act opportunistically or to 
shirk, by tying their profits to the performance of the final product in the supply chain. In 
some agri-food chains, this is achieved by jointly holding the property rights of the consumer 
brand under which products are marketed, by means of vertically organized associations 
(Ménard and Valceschini, 2005). The associations function as pooled investment vehicles, 
which reduce the size and specificity of the investments made by each individual actor.  
4.4. Implications for Further Research 
Further studies should also attempt to model transaction interdependence in different contexts. 
For example, studies could model supply chains with reciprocal linkages in the production 
process (e.g., construction activities) or where temporal factors are less important (e.g., non-
perishable products). More importantly, studies should also attempt to examine this topic 
empirically. A case study approach can be used to compare the perspectives of multiple actors 
operating in the same supply chain. Such an approach should focus on comparing the 
contracts used within the supply chain and on identifying (perceived) interdependencies.  
Alternatively, a more quantitative approach could compare ‘contract use’ across supply 
chains. For example, researchers could test the proposition that interdependency between 
transactions occurs. This could be examined by comparing the supply side contracts used by 
two different groups of actors: (1), actors exposed to both supply side asset specificity and 
demand side volume uncertainty; and (2), actors exposed only to supply side asset specificity. 
The assumptions of the supply chain-wide TCE framework would be supported when the two 
groups use different types of supply side contracts, as actors in the first group attempt to 
balance supply and demand side contracts. The traditional TCE framework’s assumptions 
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would be supported if both groups use the same type of supply side contract, as actors in the 
first group alter only demand side contracts to manage exposure to demand side risks.  
Additionally, further research could also take contextual variables, like company size, into 
account. Such studies could paint a more complete picture of the transaction risk exposure of 
large actors, and under which conditions these risks are transferred to other actors in the 
supply chain through the interdependency of transactions. This should help counterparties of 
large actors, as well as policy makers, to better understand what risk is borne by these actors, 
and the extent to which they themselves are (indirectly) exposed to these risks. An inability of 
a large actor to carry risk can have systematic consequences, but these consequences will be 
amplified when there is a strong interdependency between transactions.
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MANAGING TRANSACTION RISKS IN INTERDEPENDENT 
SUPPLY CHAINS: AN EXTENDED TRANSACTION COST 
ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE61 
Study Three has moved TCE’s unit of analysis beyond the dyad. In doing so, an important 
contribution has been made towards the study of risk management in a supply chain context. 
Amongst others, Study Three has outlined various general strategies that actors can use to 
simultaneously manage their supply and demand side transaction risk exposure. Study Four 
builds on the previous study, by discussing several TCE based risk management strategies that 
actors can use in the supply chain. While Study Three has focused mainly on the strategies 
that actors can use to minimize or eliminate transaction risks in the supply chain, this study 
considers a broader range of strategies when risk minimization is not possible. Furthermore, 
compared to the previous study, the present study more explicitly considers risks resulting 
from non-sequential interdependencies in the supply chain.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has shown how risks can be transferred in the interdependent 
business networks, supply chains and economies which exist today. Insufficient monitoring by 
mortgage providers of the creditworthiness of borrowers in the American housing economy 
has contributed to the bankruptcy of banks and other financial institutions in Europe (see Van 
Hengel and Knot, 2011; Jacobs, 2009). Inadequate monitoring activities were undertaken 
because the mortgage providers had little incentive that the borrowers repaid their loans; they 
had (largely) repackaged and resold the rights to receive the loan repayments to other 
investors (see Den Butter, 2011; Haldane, 2008).  
Besides crippling the world economy, the crisis has also drawn renewed attention to those 
economic and managerial disciplines, like institutional economics, which examine transaction 
risks resulting from conflicts of interests between transaction parties. In particular Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE), which examines the different types of inter-organizational contract 
forms that can resolve such conflicts, has received additional interest.  
However, many TCE studies focus mainly on transaction risks, as well as their resolutions, in 
individual transactions (see previous chapter). Such approaches ignore the consequences of a 
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failure to adequately manage risk in a transaction for the wider business network or supply 
chain in which the transaction takes place.  
The present study aims to address this issue by examining: (1), how risks arise within the 
supply chain as a result of interdependencies between the various transactions making up the 
supply chain; and (2), what types of TCE based risk management strategies actors can use to 
manage their exposure to these risks. Furthermore, the study explores whether the risk 
management strategies which are suitable to use when only an individual transaction is 
considered, are still appropriate when the larger supply chain context is taken into account. 
Two aspects of the TCE framework should be mentioned at the outset of this study. First, 
TCE is based on the assumption that exposure to most transaction risks should be minimized 
(cost allowing). This is because the main risks which are analyzed within the TCE framework 
result from the strategic, self-interested behavior by one of the parties to the transaction and 
generally have little or no upside potential (unlike exposure to some risks62). Second, although 
actors may use a wide variety of risks management strategies, TCE focuses almost exclusively 
on contractual based strategies. 
The remainder of the study is outlined as follows. Section 2 gives a TCE based overview of 
the different types of risks to which actors are exposed in bilateral transactions and what types 
of contracting strategies are suitable to manage these risks. Section 3 shifts the focus beyond 
the dyad, by examining how different types of interdependencies can arise between 
transactions in the supply chain. The section discusses how such interdependencies can 
expose the actors to additional risks. Section 4 discusses several TCE based contracting 
strategies which actors can employ for managing their transaction risk exposure under such 
circumstances. Section 5 discusses the main findings of the study and outlines areas for further 
research.  
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 For example, investing in shares of companies is risky, but has unlimited upside potential. Exposure to such 
risks can yield great benefits (unlike the main risks which are examined in the TCE framework, which have a 
large downside potential). In general, risk management should not be about the elimination of risks, as is it 
difficult or not impossible to manage a company without taking risks, but about determining an appropriate level 
of risk exposure (Chance, Grant and Marsland, 2007).  
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2. A TCE PERSPECTIVE ON RISK  
 ‘Risk’ can be defined as the possibility of a harmful event (e.g., a cost or a loss) (see Hallikas 
et al., 2004; Chiles and McMackin, 1996). In this study, the focus is on ‘transaction risks63’; 
i.e., possible harmful events resulting from the participation of an actor in transactions with 
other actors. The use of the term ‘possible’ indicates that there is uncertainty about the event. 
Uncertainty may exist about two different aspects of the event (see Hallikas et al., 2004). 
First, it may exist about the nature of the event (e.g., about the extent of the loss). Second, it 
may exist about the frequency by which the event occurs (e.g., how often does the loss occur).  
Based on this conceptualization of risk, three generic (non-mutually exclusive) options which 
actors have to manage their risk exposure can be distinguished: (1), ‘get to know’ the odds; 
i.e., obtaining information to reduce uncertainty about the (expected) frequency or nature of 
the event (see Van der Vorst and Beulens, 2002; Baird and Thomas, 1985); (2), ‘manipulate’ 
the odds; i.e., affect the probability that an event occurs or affects the actor (see Neiger, 
Rotaru and Churilov, 2007; Heyder, Theuvsen and Von Davier, 2007); (3), minimize the 
impact when the event does occur (see Tomlin, 2006; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). As is 
explained below, TCE is mainly focused on the second of these three options. As a result, the 
study largely limits itself to examining the various strategies actors can take to (attempt to) 
change the probability that an event occurs; i.e., strategies to minimize, alter, transfer or share 
risk exposure (see Section 2.2 and Section 4). 
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 2.1 gives an introduction to 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) literature and a description of the situations in which risks 
arise within the TCE framework. Section 2.2 discusses several TCE based solutions for 
resolving these situations and reframes these solutions as risk management strategies 
(discussed in more detail in Section 4). Section 2.3 examines the relation between transaction 
risk and transaction cost within the TCE framework, and how this relation is expected to 
affect actors contracting choices. 
2.1. Types of risk studied in the Transaction Cost Economic framework  
The TCE framework offers a perspective on how transaction risks arise and what actors can 
do to manage their exposure to such risks by means of contracts. The main risks which are 
examined within the TCE framework are related to strategic behavior by a party to the 
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  Two broad categories of ‘risk’ can be distinguished: business and financial risk (Turvey, 2005). Business risk 
results from the operations of the company, while financial risk results from the employed capital structure (i.e., 
the level of debt). Transaction risks are a subset of ‘bu
Study Four: Managing Transaction Risks in Interdependent Supply Chains 
119 
 
transaction (Williamson, 1988). Strategic behavior refers to the attempts made by actors to 
exploit their counterparty, amongst others by renegotiating the conditions of the exchange 
(i.e., the risk of opportunism; Joskow, 1987) or by falsely claiming compliance with exchange 
conditions (i.e., the risk of shirking; Ghosh and John, 1999). Strategic behavior is possible 
because contracts always include gaps and omissions (Williamson, 2008), which result from 
human constraints in information processing capabilities (Simon, 1957). Furthermore, because 
of these constraints, actors cannot specify all the changes in the circumstances surrounding a 
transaction in advance (Williamson, 1991). Actors entering into a transaction are exposed to 
the risk that they cannot adapt exchange conditions when circumstances change (i.e., the risk 
of maladaptation).   
Risks associated with opportunism are largest when a transaction is characterized by high 
levels of asset specificity, which refers to the extent to which the investments an actor makes 
to support a transaction ties the actor to the other party to the transaction (Williamson, 1988). 
Assets are considered to be specific when their value decreases if they are used outside the 
transaction for which they were acquired (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Risks 
associated with shirking are largest when a transaction is characterized by high levels of 
performance measurement difficulty, which refers to the extent to which the transaction 
parties can measure the benefits and costs the other party brings to the transaction (Frazier, 
1999; Ghosh and John, 1999). Performance measurement difficulty occurs when one party is 
better informed about the value of the exchanged goods or services (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). Risks associated with maladaptation are largest when the transaction is characterized 
by high levels of uncertainty. Uncertainty refers here to unanticipated changes in the 
environment in which the transaction is embedded. 
2.2. Contracts as risk management tools in the Transaction Cost Economic framework 
This section discusses some of the main contracting strategies distinguished within the TCE 
framework64  from a risk management perspective. Contracts are usually viewed in the TCE 
framework as a tool to reduce transaction costs (see Williamson, 1985). However, it is 
arguably more useful to view contracts as a tool to manage transaction risks. While contracts 
should be employed in such a way that transaction costs are minimized, their function is to 
help actors manage their transaction risk exposure. There are different ways in which 
contracts can facilitate in this regard. 
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 See, for example, Ménard (2004) for a more exhaustive discussion.  
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First, actors can use contracts to minimize or reduce their exposure to transaction risks. For 
example, the risk of opportunism may be reduced by implementing hierarchical types of 
contracts, with legally binding safeguards, which reduce the ability of counterparties to 
renegotiate conditions once specific investments are made (Williamson, 1991). Furthermore, 
such contracts may reduce the risk of shirking, by increasing actors’ ability to monitor 
counterparty performance (Williamson, 1985).  
Second, in the examples given in the previous paragraph, contracts are used to limit the 
prospects for counterparties to act opportunistically or to shirk. However, contracts can also 
be used to give counterparties an incentive not to act in such a way. One way to do this is to 
share exposure to a risk (and associated benefits) (Ménard, 2004; Chung, 1991). The key 
aspect of this strategy is to make transaction parties mutually dependent on each other, 
primarily by reducing any asymmetry which exists between the parties in terms of the 
specificity of the investments required to support the transaction (Cai and Yang, 2008). For 
example, when both parties to a transaction have made specific investments, both actors have 
committed themselves to the transaction and thus have a stake in its success65. Subsequently, 
although both parties may have the chance to act opportunistically, they have an incentive not 
to act in this manner because they share the risk that the investments turns out to be 
unproductive as a result. For this reason, such contracting strategies are discussed within the 
context of the TCE framework as a form of ‘exchange of hostages’ (see Williamson, 1983) 
and such contracts as ‘self-enforcing’ (Klein, 2000). When transaction parties both have made 
the same level of commitment (investment) and have the same stake in a successful outcome, 
risk sharing in such circumstances lead to risk reduction (i.e., of opportunism in this case).   
Third, besides risk reduction or risk sharing, contracts may also be used to alter the risk 
exposure of actors. For example, consider a contract with extensive conditions, which may 
be required to reduce the risk of opportunism or shirking (see above). Note that such a 
contract cannot specify all changes in the circumstances surrounding a transaction in advance 
(see Williamson, 1983; Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Subsequently, although the 
implementation of a contract with extensive conditions may reduce the risk of opportunism, 
it may also increase the risk of maladaptation if actors operate in a highly uncertain 
environment (Artz and Brush, 2000). If such a contract is nonetheless employed, the actors 
have altered their risk exposure; i.e., they have swapped exposure to asset specificity related 
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 When only one of the two transaction parties has made (more) specific investments there would be asymmetry 
in the specificity of the investments required to support the transaction.  
Study Four: Managing Transaction Risks in Interdependent Supply Chains 
121 
 
risks for exposure to uncertainty related risks. However, how actors should manage such 
situations, which involve exposure to multiple transactions risks, is not entirely clear from 
TCE literature (Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006). This is because when actors are 
exposed to multiple transaction risks at the same time, TCE gives conflicting contractual 
solutions to manage the different types of risk exposures (Barney and Lee, 2000). Under such 
circumstances, an actor may be forced to choose to which risk it wants to be exposed to.  
Fourth, besides the above mentioned strategies, a frequently discussed contracting strategy 
outside TCE literature is the transfer of risk from one transaction party to the other (see 
Heyder, Theuvsen, and Von Davier, 2010; Jacobs, 2004). Within TCE literature, this strategy 
has received less attention, probably because most TCE studies consider actors to be risk 
neutral (Rindfleish and Heide, 1997). This means that transaction parties are considered to 
have the same level of risk preference (aversion) (Williamson, 1988) and, presumably, risk 
management competences. Subsequently, a key motive for transferring risk – a different level 
of risk preference amongst the transaction parties – is not taken into account within the TCE 
framework66 (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). However, also within the TCE framework actors 
do have a motive to transfer or absorb risk in some situations; i.e., when multiple risks arise 
in a transaction. In such situations, absorbing the risk exposure of the counterparty to the 
transaction may reduce an actor’s own exposure to another risk. For example, to refer the 
situation described in the previous paragraph, an actor may absorb the price uncertainty risk 
of its counterparty in order to encourage it to make specific investments (i.e., in order to 
reduce its own asset specificity related risks). This is further discussed in Section 4. 
2.3. Transaction Cost Economics or Transaction Risk Economics? 
Although it may seem obvious that actors should employ contracting strategies which 
minimize their transaction risk exposure, usage of different types of contracts also leads to 
different costs. This section discusses the relation between transaction risks and costs within 
the TCE framework. More specifically, the section addresses the question of whether 
transaction parties should minimize their transaction risk exposure or their transaction costs. 
To help address this question, Figure 5.1 visualizes the relation between TCE’s key concepts.  
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 With different levels of risk aversion, a strong economic reason exists for the transfer of risk from one 
transaction party to another (see Chung, 1991). The TCE framework, which assumes risk neutrality, has 
difficulty addressing two questions: (1), why would a buyer (supplier) want to absorb the risk exposure of its 
supplier (buyer)?; and related to this, (2), why would a buyer (supplier) want to pay its supplier (buyer) to 
absorb a risk? 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Relations between concepts within the Transaction Cost Economic framework 
 
The figure shows that the three attributes of the transaction lead to certain transaction risks. 
Appropriate use of contracts (see Section 2.2) can reduce the transaction risk exposure of 
actors and thus their transaction costs. However, the implementation of contracts is not 
without costs (Dyer, 1997). A contract is only regarded as an efficient mechanism within the 
TCE framework, if the costs of implementing it are lower than the costs of not implementing 
the contract (or of implementing alternative contracts; Masten, Meehan Jr. and Snyder, 1991). 
In other words, a contract is regarded as efficient when the costs of implementing it are lower 
than the costs of continued exposure to the risk.  
To elaborate on this, transaction costs may arise in the form of direct or opportunity costs 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Masten, Meehan Jr. and Snyder, 1991). Direct costs are the 
costs associated with implementing the contract and undertaking the transaction. For example, 
the costs incurred by actors in communicating and negotiating quality requirements with their 
suppliers. Communicating these requirements can reduce the risk of maladaptation by 
suppliers. Opportunity costs are, within the TCE framework, the costs resulting from the 
failure of an actor to adequately manage its exposure to transaction risks. For example, a 
failure by an actor to make investments in brand development, or to (timely) adapt to 
changing quality requirements, can reduce its profits. In the first example, costs associated 
with asset specificity related risks materialize; i.e., under-investments in productive assets67. 
In the second example, costs associated with uncertainly related risks materialize; i.e., 
maladaptation. 
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 For example, because the risk of opportunistic behavior by potential brand suppliers has not been addressed, 
the company is unwilling to further invest in the brand.  
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Both types of costs may occur before (ex-ante), or after (ex-post) actors have agreed to enter 
into a transaction (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). For example, an actor may incur direct costs 
in: (1), seeking a suitable supplier (ex-ante costs); and (2), measuring the performance of this 
supplier (ex-post cost).  Opportunity costs may result from: (1), the failure to identify suitable 
suppliers (e.g., ex-ante costs resulting from use of inadequate performance measurement 
technology); (2), productivity losses through effort adjustment of suppliers (e.g., ex-post costs 
resulting from a failure to reduce the risk of shirking). Tables 5.1A and 5.1B give an overview 
of the various types of costs distinguished within the TCE framework. As is explained above, 
rather than reducing either direct costs or opportunity costs resulting from a failure to 
minimize risk, actors should attempt to reduce both.  
TABLE 5.1a 
Types of direct costs within the TCE framework 
Types of direct 
transaction costs 
Sources of direct costs* 
Asset specificity  
related safeguards 
Performance 
measurement difficulty 
related safeguards 
Uncertainty related 
safeguards 
 
Ex-ante 
costs 
1. Costs of crafting and 
implementing (contractual) 
safeguards for specific 
investments (e.g., 
investments in brand 
names). 
3. Screening and selection 
costs (e.g., producer’s 
evaluation of carcass 
pricing programs) 
5. Coordination costs 
(e.g., costs of 
communication new 
quality requirements) 
Ex-post 
costs 
2. Cost of enforcing 
compliance with agreed 
upon exchange conditions 
(e.g., legal costs). 
4. Measurement costs 
(e.g. slaughterhouse’s 
measurement of pork 
quality) 
6. Coordination costs 
(e.g., costs of changing 
price labels in 
supermarkets) 
 
 
TABLE 5.1b 
Types of opportunity costs within the TCE framework 
Types of 
opportunity 
costs  
Sources of opportunity costs*  
Asset specificity  
related risks 
Performance 
measurement difficulty 
related risks 
Uncertainty 
related risks 
Ex-ante 
costs 
7. Failure to invest in 
productive assets (e.g., 
under investments in 
measurement 
technologies) 
9. Failure to identify 
suitable partners 
(e.g., producer does not 
obtain the best available 
price) 
11. Maladaptation 
(e.g., failure to adapt to 
changing quality 
requirements) 
Ex-post 
costs 
8. Opportunistic behavior 
(e.g., slaughterhouse 
changes exchange 
conditions once the 
producer has made specific 
investments in genetics) 
10. Productivity losses 
through effort adjustment 
(e.g., producers of high 
quality pork will shift to 
low quality production if 
their efforts are not 
identified and rewarded) 
12. Maladaptation 
(e.g., over-production) 
(adapted from Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997) 
* Note that most (empirical) TCE studies focus on the attributes of the transaction (e.g., asset specificity, which 
is a precondition for opportunism to arise) rather than the actual risks (e.g., opportunism). One reason for this 
Chapter Five 
124 
 
could be that respondents (e.g., companies participating in interviews) are more comfortable talking about 
whether or not they have had to make specific investments, than whether their customer (supplier) has cheated on 
them. 
 
3. RISK IN A SUPPLY CHAIN CONTEXT 
The previous section has discussed the management of transaction risks by means of 
contracts. A TCE lens was used to frame this discussion. However, TCE has been developed 
and used mainly to examine the management of transaction risks within the context of dyadic 
relations. Therefore, TCE based risk management solutions insufficiently take into account 
‘interdependencies’ which exists between contracting decisions at various stages in the supply 
chain. As is explained in the previous chapter, the risks to which actors are exposed may 
depend on the various transactions in which they participate as well as on transactions in the 
supply chain in which they do not participate. As a result of these interdependencies, 
contracting decisions at one stage in the supply chain may have negative transaction 
‘externalities’; e.g., the effect of a contract implemented in a company’s supply side could 
spill over into increased demand side risk for the company, or increased risk elsewhere in the 
supply chain (Wever et al., 2012; see Agrell et al., 2004; and Carlton, 1979 for some non-TCE 
studies on this subject).   
The present section, as well Section 4, attempts to address this issue by examining the 
management of transaction risks in a supply chain context. While this section focuses on how 
different types of interdependencies in the supply chain can affect the risk exposure of actors, 
Section 4 focuses on the strategies which actors can use to manage their exposure to these 
risks.  
3.1. Interdependencies  
A supply chain (or networks) is made up of two or more dyads which are linked together68. 
‘Interdependencies’ occur when the behavior of the actors making up the dyad, and the 
outcomes of their behavior, depend also on the behavior of the (some of the) other actors 
within the supply chain (see Molm, 1994). Interdependencies may be distinguished based on 
the ‘type’ (see Thompson, 1967) and the ‘channel’ (see Borgatti and Li, 2009) through which 
the linkage between the actors is established.  
With regard to ‘type’, numerous studies (e.g., Grandori, 2005; Gulati and Singh, 1998; Kumar 
and Van Dissel, 1996) have taken Thompson’s (1967) and Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig 
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 As is explained in Section 6 in Chapter One, a supply chain is considered to consist of three or more actors.  
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Jr. (1976) conceptualization of various types of intra-firm task interdependencies – 
independent tasks, sequential work flows or reciprocal workflows69 – and applied it to 
examine interdependencies between organizations: 
• ‘Independent tasks’ are also called pooled interdependencies (Thompson, 1967). This 
type of interdependency refers to situations in which actors can operate more or less 
completely autonomous from each other and are only (loosely) linked because they 
use the same pool of resources. For example, all pig producers use the same type of 
feed inputs. Therefore, they are all affected when demand for pig feed increases (i.e., 
increased input costs). 
•  ‘Sequential interdependency’ refers to instances in which actors are more directly 
linked. Serial linkages exist between the actors in this form of interdependency: the 
output of actor A forms the input of actor B, who’s outputs forms the input for actor C 
(Grandori, 1997b). For example, a pig producer delivers pigs to a slaughterhouse who 
delivers meat parts to a processor. Note that there are serial linkages between the 
actors; i.e., the processor cannot receive the meat parts before the pigs are slaughtered. 
• ‘Reciprocal interdependency’ refers to instances in which the input of one actor forms 
the output of other actors and vice-versa (Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook, 2001). This 
type of interdependencies are common in, for example, the automotive industry during 
product development, where the companies who develop the different parts of the car 
depend on each other’s input and output. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the difference between the various types of interdependencies70.  
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 Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig Jr. (1976) also distinguish a fourth type of interdependency ‘multi-
interdependent workflows’. However, according to Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook (2001), ‘multi-interdependent 
work flows’ may be regarded as a special case of reciprocal interdependencies. 
70
 Note that most authors apply Thomson’s (1967) conceptualization in the context of only two actors. When 
three or more actors are considered, the three types of interdependency are not (completely) mutually exclusive. 
In particular, reciprocal linkages can exist within each of the two dyads which make up the sequentially 
interdependent supply chain visualized in Figure 5.2. Considering that most if not all transactions involve some 
form of reciprocity, such a case would be regarded as a sequentially interdependent supply chain in this study. To 
put it differently, the study considers a supply chain as reciprocally interdependent only when all actors have a 
direct link with each other.  
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FIGURE 5.2 
Interdependency types 
 
 
(adapted from Lazzarini, Chaddad and Cook, 2001) 
 
The circles represent actors (e.g., companies). The square represents a shared resource. The dotted lines and 
arrows represent different channels for interdependencies (e.g., the arrows may represent product flows). 
 
With regard to ‘channel’, actors may be interdependent through various interfaces (see 
Borgatti and Li, 2009). For example, actors may obtain credit from the same bank (Uzzi, 
1999). Furthermore, actors may have interlinked board members (Burt, 1980). More closely 
related to the topic of this thesis, actors may be linked through their participation in the same 
quality management system (Wever et al., 2010) or the brand under which they produce 
(Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 2005). The present study focuses mainly on 
interdependencies which exist or arise between actors as a result from the transactions which 
they undertake. The study does take other ‘channels’ of interdependency into account (e.g., 
the participation of actors in brands), if they affect the transaction risks to which the actors are 
exposed. 
Note that multiple interdependencies types can co-exist when actors are linked through more 
than one channel. For example, sequential interdependency may exist between supply chain 
actors as a result of the transactions between them. However, also pooled interdependency 
may exist because of their participation in a collective brand. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
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FIGURE 5.3 
Co-existence of interdependency types 
 
The circles represent different companies (in this case: F = pig production company; S = slaughterhouse; P = 
processor). The square represents a shared resource, in this case: a collective brand with associated reputational 
capital. The dotted lines represent the brand membership of the actors. The arrows represent product flows. 
 
3.2 Interdependencies and risk spill-overs 
The channel through which actors are interdependent affects the type of interdependencies 
which exists between the actors and vice-versa. For example, with pooled interdependencies, 
actors are less likely to be linked through the transactions between them and more likely 
through some other channel, like a shared input market (see Grandori, 1997b). Related to this, 
as is explained below, the type and channel through which actors are linked shape the manner 
in which they are affected by risk spill-overs (i.e., externalities) from decisions or actions 
taken at other locations in the supply chain. Furthermore, they affect the extent to which an 
(individual) actor can manage its exposure to such risks.  
Although pooled interdependencies may seem like the least intensive form of 
interdependency, damages to a shared pool of resources will affect all actors71 (see Akerlof, 
1970). Furthermore, there may be little that any individual actor can do to prevent such 
harmful outcomes, as some form of collective action is likely to be required (Grandori, 
1997b). From a TCE perspective, damages resulting from pooled interdependencies are 
usually related to performance measurement difficulties; i.e., difficulties in monitoring the 
behavior of the various actors using the resource72. This can lead to ‘misuse’ of the resource 
by some actors or insufficient contribution to maintain the resource (see Alchian and 
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 This type of risk is also referred to as systemic risk (Jacobs, 2004). 
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 Uncertainty can also be an issue, as high uncertainty can increase the likelyhood that the resource is misused.   
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Demsetz, 1972). The main issue here is that actors can be affected by actors to which they 
seemingly have no linkages. Consider the agri-food market where decisions taken by an 
individual trader in fresh goods may affect the whole market. For example, when a small 
group of consumers become seriously ill after it has purchased unsafe products from this 
trader, also other traders (in safe products) may not be able to profitably market their products 
anymore because all consumers have lost faith in this particular market. To prevent such 
instances occurring, actors may need to set-up collective quality management systems which 
can measure the performance of traders and which can prevent ‘bad’ traders from access to 
the market.   
Sequential interdependencies73 are characterized mainly by direct linkages between the actors 
(Lazzarinni, Chaddad and Cook, 2001) although also indirect linkages exist (see Lambert and 
Cooper, 2000). An actor has direct linkages with its supplier and customer through the 
transactions with them. Indirect linkages exist with second-tier suppliers and second-tier 
customers. To manage its direct linkages, an actor should take into account how contracts 
used in its supply (demand) side transaction affect its risk exposure in its demand (supply) 
side transaction. To manage its indirect linkages, actors should take into account: (1), how its 
risk exposure is affected by activities further upstream (downstream) in the supply chain; (2), 
how it can use its supply (demand) side contracts to manage its exposure to these (indirect) 
risks; (3), how its own supply (demand) side contracting decision affect actors further 
upstream (downstream) in the supply chain. Note that, like with ‘pooled’ interdependencies, 
actors may be limited in what they can do to prevent harmful outcomes resulting from risk 
spill-overs. Actors are likely to have limited influence on contracting decisions with its own 
customers (suppliers) let alone on contracting decisions further downstream (upstream) in the 
supply chain (Wever et al., 2012). A well-known example of a risk spill-over resulting from 
sequential interdependencies between the actors is the ‘bull-whip’ effect – the increase in 
demand order variability for upstream stages due to decreasing insight into (final) demand 
information (Dooley et al., 2010; Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang, 1997). Within the TCE 
framework, spill-overs resulting from sequential interdependencies are related to the 
interaction between multiple transaction risks. This is further explained in Section 4.1. 
                                                           
73
 As is explained above, reciprocal linkages can exist within the two dyads which make up a supply chain with 
sequential interdependencies. Because most if not all transactions involve some form of reciprocity, the study 
considers actors to be reciprocally interdependent only when all three actors have a direct link with each other.  
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Reciprocal interdependencies can be seen as the most ‘intensive’ form of interdependency 
(see Van de Ven, Delbecq and Koenig Jr., 1976). This is because the actors are mutually 
reliant on each other (Lazzarinni, Chaddad and Cook, 2001). For this reason, all actors are 
likely to have an interest in preventing a harmful event74 (Molm, 1994; Williamson, 1983). 
Therefore, the risk of strategic self-interested behavior by one of the transaction parties is 
likely to decrease when interdependencies become more reciprocal. At the same time, the risk 
of maladaptation may increase, because mutual adjustment is required when circumstances 
change (Gulatie and Singh, 1998). Furthermore, when a harmful event occurs, its affects may 
be amplified (see Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam, 2005). To explain this, consider a situation 
similar to the Processor brand case discussed in Chapter Three (see Table 3.4 in Section 3.2), 
where the processor in the supply chain has integrated into the pig production stage of the 
supply chain. The processor provides financing to a large-scale pig production company (by 
means of an equity investment) and receives a variable compensation in return (cash 
dividends). The pig production company sells pigs to a slaughterhouse, which sells parts of 
the pigs in return to the processor. Figure 5.4 shows the interdependencies which exist in such 
a supply chain.  
FIGURE 5.4 
Example of amplification effects in a  
reciprocally interdependent supply chain 
 
The circles represent different companies (F = pig production company; S = slaughterhouse; P = processor). The 
dotted lines represent cash flows. The arrows represent input flows.  
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 This does not mean that actors have the same interest, as some actors may be more affected than others by a 
harmful outcome. Note therefore, that the study does not argue that there is no risk of strategic behavior by actors 
when reciprocal interdependencies are present. Rather, it is argued that the more reciprocal the interdependencies 
are, the less this risk is present. For a different view, see Gulati, Lawrence and Puranam (2005) 
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Consider the following scenario, in which a food safety issue arises at the pig production 
company. As a result, health inspectors may decide to close down the company. In a worst-
case scenario, the processor has to write-down its substantial investment and goes bankrupt. 
The slaughterhouse will then lose both a supplier and a customer. The same scenario in a 
regular pork supply chain, where the actors are more sequentially interdependent, would mean 
that the slaughterhouse would just have to find an alternative supplier. Possibly, this would 
have no immediate consequences for the processing company.  
At the same time, note that in the supply chain visualized in Figure 5.4, the various actors are 
likely to have a stronger incentive to prevent such a situation from occurring when compared 
to a supply chain with only sequential interdependencies between the actors. The processor 
has an additional incentive to prevent such a risk management failure at the pig production 
company because it has a direct financial exposure to it. The slaughterhouse has an additional 
incentive because it will lose both supplier and customer. The pig production company has an 
additional incentive because, even if it does not go bankrupt, it may lose both a supplier of 
capital and a customer of its pigs when food safety issues arise.  
4. TCE BASED RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN A SUPPLY 
CHAIN CONTEXT 
This section places interdependencies and associated risk spill-overs more explicitly within 
the context of the TCE framework. In the section, the focus is mainly on supply chains with 
sequential interdependencies. An emphasis in the study on interdependencies related to 
transactions means that the study focuses more on sequential than pooled interdependencies. 
As is explained in Section 3.1, with pooled interdependencies, actors are less likely to be 
linked through transactions (Grandori, 1997b). Furthermore, the TCE studies which have 
expanded their focus beyond the dyad have focused on risks resulting from sequential rather 
the reciprocal interdependencies between the actors (e.g., see Wever et al., 2012). Reciprocal 
interdependencies have received less attention within these studies, possibly because strategic 
behavior by one of the actors is less of an issue when compared to the other types of 
interdependencies (see Section 3.2). TCE is best applicable to situations in which conflicts of 
interests arise between actors.  
4.1 Trade-offs resulting from interdependencies 
As is explained in the previous section, the risks to which actors are exposed depend on the 
various transactions in which they participate, as well as on transactions at stages in the 
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supply chain in which they do not participate. Actors may face trade-offs in minimizing their 
risk exposure because interdependencies can arise between decisions in the supply chain. 
When are such trade-offs likely to arise?  
Recently, some TCE studies have started to address this question, by modeling situations in 
which companies are faced with interdependencies between their supply and demand side 
transactions. For example, Sanchez (2003) has studied what types of assets (flexible or 
specific-use) a company should acquire or develop to manage supply side risks of 
opportunism under conditions of demand side uncertainty. Barney and Lee (2000) have 
examined make or buy decisions under conditions of supply side opportunism and demand 
side (technological) uncertainty. Wever et al. (2012) have presented an overview of various 
situations under which supply and demand side contracting decisions can be expected to be 
interdependent and have modeled several of these situations in more detail. The studies have 
in common that they all examine contract decision-making situations in which actors are 
exposed to multiple transaction risks in separate transactions. Table 5.2 gives an overview of 
the various situations that have been studied by these authors.  
TABLE 5.2  
Overview of decision-making situations studied involving 
exposure to multiple transaction risks in separate transactions 
 High demand side uncertainty 
High demand side 
performance measurement 
difficulty 
Low demand side 
 performance measurement 
difficulty 
High  supply 
side asset 
specificity 
1. 
-  Wever et al. (2012) 
2.  
- Wever et al. (2011) 
- Sanchez (2003) 
- Barney and Lee (2000) 
Low  supply 
side asset 
specificity 
3.  
- Wever et al. (2012) 
 
 
 
 
Why have these authors focused on situations involving exposure to multiple transaction 
risks? This is because conflicting solutions may be required to reduce exposure to the various 
types of risks. Subsequently, actors may face trade-offs in minimizing their risk exposure; i.e., 
actions which are taken to reduce risk in one transaction, increase risk in another transaction. 
Note that the existence of multiple transaction risks is a required but not sufficient condition 
for such a trade-off to arise. Actors also need to face barriers in manipulating their contracts. 
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4.2. Barriers to risk minimization 
Chapter Four has discussed various types of contractual solutions which actors can implement 
in situations involving exposure to multiple transaction risks. What these solutions had in 
common is that they require actors to simultaneously manipulate various transactions in the 
supply chain. In such instances, trade-offs between reducing exposure to different (types of) 
transaction risks may still be largely avoided. For example, consider an actor involved in a 
situation similar to the one depicted in Box 2 in Table 5.2. The actor may implement a fixed 
price contracts in its supply side transaction to facilitate specific investments by its supplier. If 
the actor can also implement a fixed price contract in its demand side transaction, it may 
reduce exposure to both price uncertainty risks (see Box 7-8 in Table 5.1) and asset specificity 
related risks (see Box 11-12 in Table 5.1) (see also Model 3, Section 3.5 in Chapter Four). 
However, as is discussed in Section 3.2, is not always possible for actors to manipulate 
contracts in multiple transactions. Barriers which actors face in manipulating their contracts 
include the costs of implementing the contract (Coase, 1988) and arguably most importantly, 
limited bargaining power (see Shervani, Frazier and Challagalla, 2007). An actor may have 
limited influence on the contract implemented with some of its counterparties. For example, 
the actor in the example given in the previous paragraph may not be able to implement a fixed 
price contract with its customer. In that case, the actor has to make a decision about whether 
or not it is still in its best interest to enter into a fixed price contract with its supplier. In 
particular, the actor has to address the following question: are the costs of a failure to facilitate 
the specific investments (see Box 7 in Table 5.1) greater than the costs of managing the 
increase in price uncertainty exposure (see Box 12 in Table 5.1) which results from the 
contract required to support those investments75? 
4.3. Risk altering 
When an actor cannot minimize or eliminate its exposure to multiple risks, a logical next step 
is to attempt to minimize exposure to one of the risks, as is explained in Section 2.2. Under 
the conditions of interdependencies described in Table 5.2, this means that such a decision 
will affect the actor’s risk exposure; i.e., it will be altered. An actor alters its risk exposure 
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 To rephrase the question perhaps more clearly: does the return the actor obtains from the specific investments 
made by the supplier outweigh the costs of managing the increase in price uncertainty which results from the 
contract required to support those investments?  
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when it swaps one type of risk for another. For example, an actor may invest in performance 
measurement equipment to reduce the risk of shirking by suppliers (see Box 10 in Table 5.1). 
However, if the required investments are asset specific, this may increase the risk of 
opportunism (see Box 8 in Table 5.1). Furthermore, in the context of the supply chain, an 
actor may swap one type of risk in its supply side transaction, for another type of risk in its 
demand side transaction. For example, investments in performance measurement equipment 
may reduce risk of shirking by suppliers, but may increase risk of opportunism by buyers. Box 
5.1 gives an example of risk alteration which occurred in one of the cases discussed in 
Chapter Three. 
BOX 5.1 
Examples of risk altering in the pork supply chain 
In the Retailer brand case (see Table 3.4, Section 3.2 in Chapter Three), the 
brand suppliers have had to make specific investments in their production 
process to be able to produce under the brand. To compensate the suppliers for 
their investments, the brand owner (the retailer) gives the suppliers a premium 
above a reference market price for their output under the brand. Furthermore, 
to reduce the risk of opportunism (Box 8 in Table 5.1) for the suppliers, the 
brand owner has implemented a contract which obliges the former to deliver 
and the latter to purchase a minimum amount of pig meat.  
Although the minimum volume contract reduces the risk of opportunism for 
the suppliers it also increases their risk of ex-post maladaptation (Box 12 in 
Table 5.1) because it stimulates overproduction. Penalties are placed on 
underproduction, and as it is difficult to produce precise amounts (because of 
biological variation associated with animal production), actors regularly 
produce more than the minimum amount of products specified within the 
contract. When actors do overproduce, they may have to sell their 
overproduction outside Retailer channels, in which case they incur a loss as 
they do not receive the brand premium. Subsequently, the situation of the 
suppliers (e.g., the meat company) is similar to the situation described in Box 
1-2 in Table 5.2, in which an actor was exposed to supply side asset specificity 
risks as well as demand side uncertainty related risks.  
 
Under what conditions would actors want to alter their risk exposure; i.e., when would they 
want to switch exposure to one type of risk for exposure to another risk? Considering the 
importance attached to opportunism (see Williamson, 2000), the TCE framework strongly 
implies a hierarchy in the types of transaction risks to which exposure should be minimized. 
Reducing asset specificity related risks is then expected to have primacy amongst actors. 
However, as is explained in Section 2.3, this holds true only in situations in which a higher 
return on investments in specific assets offsets any costs incurred in managing increased 
exposure to other types of risk. More generally therefore, what matters from a TCE 
perspective is which risk is more costly to manage (Williamson, 1991). In the Retailer brand 
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case, the premium the actors receive for their output under the brand presumably compensates 
them for their overproduction which they cannot market under the brand. In other words the 
costs associated with a failure to invest in productive assets (Box 7 in Table 5.1) are likely to 
be higher than the costs associated with ex-post maladaptation (Box 12 in Table 5.1).  
Note that the impact of a risk alteration strategy on an actor’s transaction risk exposure cannot 
be fully understood without taking into account possible interdependencies which exist within 
the supply chain. When only a single buyer-supplier dyad is considered, examination of a risk 
alteration strategy may give the false impression that an actor has eliminated its exposure to a 
transaction risk. For example, consider a situation similar to the one described in Box 5.1, in 
which an actor swaps exposure to supply side risk of opportunism (Box 8 in Table 5.1) for 
exposure to demand side risk of maladaptation (Box 12 in Table 5.1). When only the 
transaction between the actor and its supplier is examined, it may look like the actor has 
eliminated its exposure to risks, while in fact the actor has only altered its risk exposure.  
4.4. Risk transfer 
As is explained in Chapter Four, actors may be exposed to multiple transaction risks in part 
because they have absorbed the risk exposure of other actors. In other words, actors have 
transferred risk to them. Risk is transferred in a supply chain when either the source or the 
holder of a risk has changed. An example of the former occurs when an actor swaps exposure 
to supply side price uncertainty for exposure to demand side price uncertainty (see Carlton, 
1979). An example of the latter occurs when risk is transferred from actors operating upstream 
(downstream) in the supply chain, to actors operating downstream (upstream) in the supply 
chain (see Jacobs, 2004; Gray and Boehlje, 2004). Box 5.2 gives two examples of risk transfer 
which occurred in the cases discussed in Chapter Three.  
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BOX 5.2 
Examples of risk transfer in the pork supply chain 
In the Processor brand case (see Table 3.4, Section 3.2 in Chapter Three) 
the brand suppliers have transferred some of their exposure to price 
uncertainty to the brand owner, who has offered them fixed price 
contracts. The brand owner has absorbed the risk of its suppliers to ex-
post maladaptation to falling prices (Box 11 in Table 5.1). The brand 
owner (the processor) cannot transfer this risk to the retailers, because 
they are not willing to enter into fixed price contracts.  
 
A similar example occurs in the Retailer brand, discussed above in Box 
5.2. In this case, the brand suppliers have transferred some of their 
exposure to volume uncertainty to the brand owner, who offers them fixed 
volume contracts. The brand owner has absorbed the risks of its suppliers 
to ex-post maladaptation to falling demand (Box 11 in Table 5.1). The 
retailer cannot transfer this risk to another actor further downstream in the 
supply chain, because it is the most downstream actor.  
 
As is explained in Section 2.2, TCE studies generally assume actors are risk neutral (Chiles 
and McMackin, 1996; Williamson, 1988); i.e., they have the same level of risk aversion and 
risk management competences. Subsequently, the existence of differential risk preferences 
amongst transaction parties is not a plausible (or sufficient) explanation for the transfer of 
risk. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the transfer of risk becomes mainly a useful 
strategy in situations when multiple transaction risks arise in the supply chain. In such 
situations absorbing the risk exposure of another actor may reduce an actor’s own exposure to 
another type of risk.  
In the examples discussed in Box 5.2, exposure to price and volume uncertainty risk is 
transferred downstream in the supply chain to the brand owners. In both instances, the reason 
for this was not necessarily because the brand owners were more capable in managing these 
risks, but because they had to give to their suppliers an incentive to produce under their brand. 
The fixed price or volume contracts help to reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour for 
suppliers and thus facilitate the specific investments they need to make to participate in the 
brand.  
However, note that the transfer of risk, like risk alteration, may reduce risk in an individual 
transaction, but not necessarily in the context of the supply chain. In the examples discussed 
in Box 5.2, price and volume uncertainty risks are largely eliminated in the supplier-brand 
owner transactions. However, the risk is still present in the supply chain; it is absorbed by the 
brand owners. They are still exposed to uncertainty risks in their own demand side 
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transactions (i.e., with retailers and consumers respectively). Subsequently, the brand owners 
operate in situations similar to those depicted in Box 1-2 of Table 5.2  
4.5. Risk sharing  
A risk is shared when it is held by two or more actors; i.e., when multiple actors are exposed 
to it (see Jacobs, 2004; Chung, 1991). Actors may share risk through a new or an additional 
channel – like a jointly controlled investment vehicle or an association – or through an already 
established channel, like when a contract between transaction parties is adjusted so that more 
than one actor is exposed to a risk. In particular the establishment of a new channel may have 
profound influences on the supply chain, by changing the types of interdependencies between 
the actors. When risk is shared by means of an additional channel like an association, actors in 
fact increase pooled interdependencies and reduce sequential interdependencies between them 
(see Box 5.3). 
BOX 5.3 
Example of risk sharing in the pork supply chain 
An example of risk sharing by establishing a new channel through which 
actors are linked occurs in several of the collective brand cases discussed 
in Chapter Three. In these cases, products are marketed under a brand 
owned by a collective of actors. These brands can have hundreds or 
thousands of members and are vertically organized; i.e., actors from 
various stages in the supply chain can become members. All of the brands 
have members from at least two different stages (most often farming and 
processing). 
 
How do the brands work in terms of interdependencies and risk 
management? The brands pool the investments required to support 
marketing activities and to monitor compliance with brand requirements; 
i.e., the brand is a pooled resource through which the actors are linked (see 
Figure 5.3). Through the brand, the actors share asset specificity related 
risks (Box 7-8 in Table 5.1) as well as performance measurement related 
risks (Box 8 -10 in Table 5.1). Why are these risk shared? Shirking by one 
of the actors may affect all actors if consumers lose faith in the brand.  
 
As is explained in Section 3.2, arguably the main motive for risk sharing within the TCE 
framework is to align the interests between transaction parties (see Williamson, 1983). When 
individual dyads are considered, aligning interest between transaction parties can reduce the 
risk of strategic behavior by one of the counterparties (Ménard, 2004). In other words, risk 
sharing may mean risk reduction in such circumstances. However, this is not necessarily the 
case when triads or larger entities are considered, particularly in the context of exposure to 
multiple transaction risks.  
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When exposure to a risk is spread amongst multiple actors, no single actor may have a strong 
incentive to prevent a harmful outcome occurring. For example, in the collective brand cases 
discussed in Box 5.3, no single supply chain actor has made a large investments in 
reputational capital (i.e., exposure to asset specificity related risks is shared). Therefore, none 
of the supply chain actors has a strong incentive to ensure compliance with brand standards is 
achieved (i.e., to prevent shirking). Each actor has an incentive to reduce its own 
measurement costs (box 3 in Table 5.1) and to rely on other actors for monitoring activities to 
prevent effort adjustments by some of the brand participants (Box 10 in Table 5.1).  
5. DISCUSSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study has given some insight into the management of transaction risks in a supply chain 
context. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) was used to frame this discussion. In the study, 
first an outline has been given of the different types of risks to which actors are exposed in 
bilateral transactions. TCE based contracting solutions (e.g., exchange of hostages) for 
resolving such situations were reframed as risk management strategies (e.g., risk sharing). 
Furthermore, the study has presented an overview of the different types of costs which actors 
incur in (failing to) managing their exposure to risks (see Table 5.1 in Section 2.3). From a 
TCE perspective, actors should attempt to reduce their exposure to transaction risks to the 
extent that the costs of implementing contracts are lower than the costs of continued exposure 
to the risks.  
Subsequently, the study has drawn attention to some of the ‘hidden’ risks which result from 
interdependencies in the supply chain; i.e., from linkages between actors which extend beyond 
those which exist within individual, bilateral transactions. In particular, the study has 
discussed how different types of interdependencies – pooled, sequential and reciprocal – 
expose supply chain actors to different sources of risk and different limitations in managing 
their exposure to these risks. 
Sources of risk include: shared pool of resources (e.g., collective brands, quality management 
systems etc.), actors further upstream (downstream) in the supply chain and mutual reliance 
on a third-party with which the parties transact.  
Particularly with pooled and sequential interdependencies, actors are likely to face the 
strongest limitations or barriers to manage their risk exposure. With pooled interdependencies, 
arguably the main limitation which actors have is the lack of a direct linkage to the original 
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source of the risk (e.g., another actor who markets unsafe products under a collective brand) 
and the need for collective action to manage the risk (e.g., joint setting of quality standards by 
all industry actors). With sequential interdependencies, actors are likely to face bargaining 
power constraints in the extent to which they can manipulate both their supply and demand 
side transactions as well as transactions further upstream or downstream in the supply chain. 
With reciprocal interdependencies, the interests of actors in managing a risk are more likely to 
be aligned because of the mutual reliance of the actors on each other. However, for the same 
reason, the consequence of a failure to adequately manage a transaction risk may be amplified 
(see Figure 5.4 in Section 3.2).  
 Finally, the study has discussed various contracting strategies which actors can use to manage 
their transaction risk exposure in supply chains with mainly sequential interdependencies.  In 
particular, the study has focused on situations in which the actors were exposed to multiple 
transaction risks in separate transactions. In such situations, actors are likely to face trade-offs 
in managing their transaction risk exposure because conflicting solutions may be required to 
resolve the different types of risks. The study has discussed three TCE based risk management 
strategies which actors can use under these conditions – risk transferring, risk altering and risk 
sharing – and has placed these strategies in a supply chain context.  
Although these contracting strategies may seem to reduce risk when only an individual 
transaction is considered, they may lead to additional or different types of risks when the 
larger supply chain context is taken into account. For example, risk sharing in the context of 
an individual transaction may align interests between the two parties. However, in a non-
bilateral context, exposure to a risk can be spread too ‘thin’ (i.e., amongst a too large number 
of actors) and no single actor may have a strong incentive to prevent a harmful outcome for 
the supply chain as a whole (see Section 4.5) 
A limitation of the study is that is has not addressed the question of which actors are best 
positioned to manage the various risks in the supply chain. In part, this is because of the 
reliance of the study on the TCE framework, which assumes actors are risk neutral. Further 
TCE-based studies of supply chain risk management should attempt to take into account 
differences in the ‘risk appetite’ of the various actors. For example, a large actor may be more 
willing to accept exposure to a risk, because it is more capable of managing it. 
Additionally, when studies based on the TCE framework start to expand their focus beyond 
the dyad, it becomes important to take the structure of the supply chain into account. This is 
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because the structure of the supply chain (e.g., number of actors operating at each stage) is 
likely to be related to the outcome of (inadequate) risk management activities. For example, 
when one large actor is the intermediary between hundreds of suppliers and hundreds of 
customer, transferring risk exposure to this actor may not be desirable. Its central location 
within the supply chain may amplify the impact of a failure to adequately manage the risk.   
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The final chapter discusses and concludes the main findings of the thesis. Section 1 outlines 
the answers to the research questions. Section 2 provides the general conclusion and 
discussion. Sections 3-4 discus the theoretical and managerial implications of the thesis. 
Section 5 outlines areas for further research.  
1. Conclusions Regarding the Research Questions 
Agri-food supply chains are characterized by strong interdependencies between the different 
supply chain stages. Interdependency can lead to negative externalities (i.e., risk-spill-overs), 
as when a downstream (upstream) actor is exposed to transaction risks resulting from 
activities further upstream (downstream) in the supply chain. For example, a change in the 
formula used to calculate the price in a farmer-processor transaction (e.g., changes to bonuses 
or penalties), may reduce incentives for farmers to produce high quality products. This can 
increase the risks that low quality products are exchanged in the processor-retailer transaction.  
The aim of the thesis has been to gain more insight in the challenges which companies face in 
managing interdependencies and associated transaction risks within the supply chain. More 
specifically, the aim has been to examine: (1), how risks arise within the supply chain as a 
result of interdependencies between the various transactions making up the supply chain; (2), 
what types of contracts are suitable for supply chain actors to implement in order to reduce or 
eliminate their exposure to these risks. The thesis has focused mainly on transaction risks 
which arise from conflicts of interest between the supply chain actors. 
The thesis has addressed its subject from various angles, which have resulted in three main 
research questions. Answers to the research questions have been formulated by means of both 
a theoretical and an empirical approach. The theoretical approach was largely grounded 
within Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) literature. The empirical research was conducted in 
a specific sub-section of the agri-food sector: the pork meat industry. This was considered a 
suitable context for various reasons, amongst others because the management of 
interdependencies is of particular importance in the meat industry. Inadequate management of 
interdependencies and associated transaction risks can have not only economic consequences, 
but also public health consequences resulting from food quality problems. The thesis has 
examined the transactions between the actors operating in the pork supply chain.  
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Conclusions regarding the first research question 
The first research question has focused on the relation between quality management systems 
(QMSs) and the contracts used between the supply chain actors participating in these QMSs. 
Although inter-company coordination of quality management is increasingly important for 
meeting end-customer demand, few researchers focus on the relation between QMSs and 
contracts. However, insufficient alignment between QMSs and contracts can result in high 
transaction costs, amongst others by leading to under-investments in quality improvements, 
quality cheating, and difficulties in adjusting quality standards within the supply chain.  
To address this gap in research, the thesis has aimed to obtain insights into what types of 
contracts best match with the various types of quality management systems used by supply 
chain actors. In particular, the following research question has been addressed. 
Research question 1: What is the relation between the participation of supply chain actors in 
different types of quality management systems and their contracting choices? 
An answer to the research question has been formulated in three steps.  
First, based on a literature review, classification schemes have been developed of both QMSs 
and contract types. QMSs have been distinguished based on their ownership (public or 
private), their vertical scope across the supply chain (company-to-company or chain-wide) 
and their horizontal scale of adoption at a particular supply chain stage (small or large)76. 
With regard to contracts, a distinction has been made between more market-based and more 
hierarchical types of contracts. In total, five different types of contracts were distinguished: 
spot market contracts, verbal agreements, formal contracts, equity based contracts and vertical 
integration77.  
Second, Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) theory has been used to relate the above 
mentioned aspects of QMSs to the contracts used by actors in their supply chain transactions. 
Based on TCE, three propositions were developed which formalize the relation between 
QMSs and contracts, as is shown in Table 6.1.  
                                                           
76
 See Table 2.1 in Chapter Two (Section 3.2) for an overview of the specific coding rules used in classifying 
QMSs.  
77
 See Table 2.2 in Chapter Two (Section 3.2) for an overview of the specific coding rules used in classifying 
contracts. Equity based contracts were not used in the cases discussed in Chapter Two.  
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TABLE 6.1 
Propositions about relation QMSs and contracts 
Propositions 
P1: Supply chains with company-to-company QMSs need, when compared to supply chains 
with supply chain-wide QMSs, more hierarchical types of contracts  
P2A: Supply chains with private chain-wide QMSs need, when compared to supply chains 
with public supply chain-wide QMSs, more hierarchical types of contracts  
P2B: Supply chains with private supply chain-wide QMSs that are adopted on a small 
scale need, when compared to supply chains with private supply chain-wide QMSs that are 
adopted on a larger scale, more hierarchical types of contracts  
 
According to TCE, different types of QMSs can be expected to affect the attributes of the 
transaction – level of asset specificity, level of performance measurement difficulty, level of 
uncertainty – in different ways. It is because of this reason that different types of QMSs need 
different types of contracts: unless parties to a transaction employ a contract which manages 
transaction risks resulting from the employed QMS, a loss of value will occur as supply chain 
actors may scale back investments and adapt less. Figure 6.1 shows the TCE logic in which 
the propositions are grounded.  
FIGURE 6.1 
 TCE grounding of relation between QMSs and contracts 
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Discusion and Conclusions 
 
143
Third, case study research has been conducted in the pork industry to validate the 
propositions. In total seven cases have been examined in four different EU countries 
(Germany, Hungary, Spain and The Netherlands). Each case formed a pork supply chain from 
feed-producer to retailer. The examined cases are characteristic examples of the different 
types of supply chains which can be found in these countries. The results showed that four 
different types of systems can be distinguished for coordinating quality management in EU 
pork supply chains: one public baseline QMS, two types of private chain-wide QMSs and one 
public chain-wide QMS.  
The patterns found between QMSs and contracts in the examined cases indicate that 
Transaction Cost Economic considerations are an important factor in explaining QMSs 
choices. As is shown in Figure 6.2, the four types of systems largely relate to the use of 
contracts as predicted by the propositions. In support of P1, supply chain actors participating 
in QMSs without a chain-wide scope (Box 3), used mainly hierarchical types of contracts. 
Furthermore, in support of P2A, more hierarchical types of contracts were used in (small 
scale) private chain-wide QMSs (Box 8) when compared to public chain-wide QMS (Box 6). 
Additionally, in support of P2B, more market types of contracts were used in large scale 
private QMSs (Box 4) when compared to small scale private QMSs (Box 8). 
FIGURE 6.2 
Empirical relation between quality management systems and contracts across 
cases 
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* Note that, for the purpose of validating the propositions, only the main QMS used in the examined 
cases were considered. Most of the cases had also other types of QMSs than the main type used. As 
these other types of QMSs were not used to examine the propositions, some of the boxes shown in the 
figure are empty. 
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Conclusions regarding the second research question  
Besides the coordination of quality, which has been the focus of the first research question, it 
is also important to consider the role of contracts in coordinating other aspects of transactions. 
The second set of research questions has focused on the mechanisms which are used within 
contracts to coordinate prices, volume, quality and investments. The use of these mechanisms 
has been examined within five different types of contracts: (1), spot market contract; (2), 
verbal agreement; (3), formal contract; (4), investment based contract; and (5), vertical 
integration.  
Furthermore, supply chain actors’ use of coordination mechanisms has been compared across 
three different types of supply chains: (1), commodity supply chains; (2), collective brands; 
(3), proprietary brands. Commodity chains are those supply chains in which no brands are 
used to differentiate products in the consumer market. Collective brands are those supply 
chains in which the brand is jointly owned by multiple supply chain actors. Proprietary brands 
are those supply chains in which the brand is owned by one of the supply chain actors. The 
diversity of supply chains studied has allowed for the examination of a wide-variety of 
contracts and underlying coordination mechanisms.  
The following research questions have been addressed. 
Research question 2A: What types of coordination mechanisms are used within supply chain 
contracts (spot market contract, verbal agreement, formal contract, investment based 
contract, vertical integration)? 
Research question 2B: What differences can be observed in the use of these mechanisms 
across various types of supply chains (commodity supply chains, proprietary brands and 
collective brands)? 
An answer to the research questions has been formulated in three steps.  
First, based on a review of extant literature (see Chapter 3) a typology has been developed of 
contractual coordination mechanisms. The typology has been developed by: (a), determining 
variables (including values) by which coordination mechanisms can be distinguished; and (b), 
differentiating between various types of coordination mechanisms based on these variables. 
Table 6.2 gives an overview of the variables used in the study. Table 6.3 gives an overview of 
the types of coordination mechanisms distinguished in the study based on these variables. 
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TABLE 6.2  
Variables used to distinguish between coordination mechanisms 
TYPE OF 
MECHANISM VARIABLES VALUES 
PRICE 
Source Centralized 
markets 
Third-party 
 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Intra-company 
 
Duration Short-term Medium/long-term Indefinitely 
Criteria 
Base price  
variable 
Base price 
fixed 
No bonus 
component 
Variable 
 bonus 
Fixed  
bonus 
VOLUME 
Duration Short-term Medium/long-term Indefinitely 
Specifications No volume 
specified 
Range amount 
 
Fixed amount 
QUALITY 
Standard setting Public actor(s) Third-party 
 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Intra-company 
 
Monitoring Public actor(s) Third-party Party(s) to the transaction Intra-company 
INVESTMENT 
 
Source Capital  
markets 
Third-party 
 
Party(s) to the 
transaction 
Internal capital 
allocation 
Monetary 
benefits/risks Fixed return Residual returns/risks 
Non-monetary 
benefits/risks 
Control if company/project is 
expected to be discontinued. 
Control if company/project is 
expected to continue to operate. 
 
 
 
TABLE 6.3 
Integrated typology of contractual coordination mechanisms 
 MARKET  <------------------------------------------------------------------> HIERARCHY 
PRICE Spot price 
 
Reference  
market price 
 
Fixed forward price 
 
Internal price 
 
VOLUME Spot volume 
 
Fixed volume with 
deviations 
Fixed volume 
 
Internal volume 
 
 
QUALITY 
Spot market 
specifications 
 
Third-party quality 
coordination 
 
Counterparty quality 
coordination 
Internal quality 
coordination 
 
INVESTMENT 
(SOURCE) 
Capital markets 
 
Third-party to 
transaction 
Party to the  
transaction 
 
Internal capital 
allocation 
 
INVESTMENT 
(TYPE) 
No (external) 
investments required 
for transaction 
Debt 
 
Hybrid 
 
Equity 
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 Second, the typology has been used to characterize the coordination mechanisms used in the 
various types of pork supply chain contracts which have been distinguished in the conclusion 
of the thesis’s first research question. Data from contracts in eight pork supply chains have 
been examined. The results showed the usefulness of looking at contracts at a more detailed 
level: companies have much more freedom in combining various types of coordination 
mechanisms within a single type of contract than is generally assumed within the literature 
(including Study One of this thesis). Even within the two polar contract forms – spot market 
contracts and vertical integration – some differentiation could be made when the underlying 
coordination mechanisms were examined (see Section 4 in Chapter Three).  
The three types of intermediate contract forms distinguished – verbal arrangement, formal 
contracts and investment contract – unsurprisingly showed the most diversity with regard to 
the types of underlying coordination mechanism used. For example, within some formal 
contracts, prices and volumes were completely fixed while in other formal contracts, prices 
and volume were determined by spot market conditions. Investment based contracts 
sometimes involved (minority) equity investments in supply chain partners, but could also 
involve hybrid investments through a pooled investment vehicle. Although one would expect 
extensive conditions in investment based contracts, this was often not the case in the 
examined transactions, where key aspects, like prices or volumes, were regularly not agreed 
upon in the contract. Furthermore, although verbal arrangements frequently relied on third-
party actors for coordinating aspects of the transaction, this third-party could have very 
different roles. In some transactions, the third-party only coordinated quality, in other 
instances the third-party also coordinated investments or even prices. 
Third, the typology has been used to characterize the use of coordination mechanisms across 
the three different types of supply chains. With regard to their coordination of prices and 
volumes, the commodity supply chains used mainly spot mechanisms, while the branded 
supply chains used mainly ex-ante arrangements, like fixed price or reference market price 
contracts. Ex-ante arrangements prevent renegotiation by counterparties, which is particularly 
important in branded supply chains because of the limited number of potential trading 
partners. In the proprietary brands, prices and volumes were completely fixed in most 
transactions, while in collective brand cases more flexible arrangements were used, like 
reference market prices. The use of these mechanisms limits the scope for counterparties to 
renegotiate conditions like in fixed forward contracts, but, unlike fixed forward contracts, 
prevents the contract price from moving out of line with spot market prices. 
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With regard to the coordination of quality, the second research question focused on the 
standards and compliance monitoring activities undertaken within supply chains (i.e., aspects 
employed in all quality management systems78) rather than the characteristics by which 
different types of quality management systems can be distinguished (i.e., ownership, scale and 
scope – see the conclusions for the first research question). The results showed that 
commodity chains use mainly spot specifications and third parties (certifying institutions) for 
quality coordination. In proprietary brands, quality was coordinated mainly by counterparties, 
while in collective brands quality coordination was largely outsourced to third-parties (the 
associations which own the brand). Branded supply chains require additional quality 
coordination mechanisms when compared to commodity chains, because they set additional 
requirements for the supply chain actors to help differentiate the products sold under the 
brand. Compliance with these standards needs to be monitored. Furthermore, proprietary 
brands may need to be more actively involved in the coordination of quality (i.e., by means of 
counterparty monitoring) when compared to the collective brands (which rely on third-party 
monitoring). This is because their standards are generally more unique or idiosyncratic in 
order to help differentiate their products. Collective brands have more accessible standards in 
order to keep and expand membership of the association.  
With regard to the coordination of investments, across both the proprietary brand and 
commodity cases most transactions did not require external investments. In the proprietary 
brand cases, this is because most investments were financed with intra-firm capital. In the 
commodity cases, this is because most transactions did not require investments. For those 
transactions for which external investments were required, both the proprietary and 
commodity supply chains used mainly equity mechanisms. In the collective brand cases, most 
transactions required external investments. These investments were made through the 
associations which owned the brand, which can be regarded as a hybrid investment 
mechanism. Associations may be a particularly suitable mechanism to govern collective 
brands, because they guarantee the continuation of the brand as a collective entity. This is 
because associations prevent, unlike the equity mechanisms used within the proprietary 
brands, concentration of ownership and control. 
                                                           
78
 Also quality signals were considered: a distinction was made between supply chains in which quality was 
signaled to the end-consumer and those supply chains in which this was not the case. 
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Conclusions regarding the third research question  
While the second set of research questions has considered both commodity and differentiated 
supply chains, the third set of research questions has focused mainly on differentiated supply 
chains. Differentiated supply chains are interesting to examine because they may limit the 
contractual options the supply chain actors have in managing their exposure to transaction 
risks. This is because differentiation can increase interdependency between an actor’s supply 
and demand side transactions. Based on the present state of research into this subject, 
particularly within transaction cost economics (TCE) literature, it is impossible to evaluate 
how companies should manage interdependencies between their supply chain transactions.  
To help bridge this gap in research, the following research questions have been addressed.  
Research question 3A: What types of conditions lead to interdependencies in differentiated 
supply chains? 
Research question 3B: What are the consequences of interdependencies for the transaction 
risk exposure of supply chain actors? 
Research question 3C: What types of contractual options do supply chain actors have in 
managing the transaction risks arising from these interdependencies? 
An answer to the research questions has been formulated based on a theoretical approach 
grounded in TCE.  
With regard to research question 3A, the thesis has focused mainly on examining the 
conditions under which interdependencies arise through the various transactions in which 
actors participate79. In particular, such ‘transaction interdependencies’ have been examined in 
the context of supply chains where the actors are sequentially linked; i.e., situations in which 
supply (demand) side contracting decisions by an actor affect its demand (supply) side risk 
exposure. Transaction interdependencies are likely to arise when supply chain actors are 
exposed to multiple transaction risks in separate transactions. Exposure to multiple transaction 
risks occurs when a transaction has high levels of attributes of more than one type. For 
example, exposure to both high levels of asset specificity and high levels of performance 
measurement difficulty. An actor may also be exposed to multiple transactions risks in 
separate transactions; e.g., to asset specificity related risks in its supply side transaction and 
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 The thesis has taken other channels by which actors were linked into account, if they were likely to affect their 
transaction risk exposure. Examples include (large scale) quality management systems (Study Two) and 
collective brands (Studies Two-Four). 
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volume uncertainty risks in its demand side transaction. Such situations can lead to 
interdependency between transactions because they may require conflicting contractual 
solutions to reduce the different types of transaction risk exposure. The dark shaded areas in 
Table 6.4 give an overview of the different combinations of transaction risks which are most 
likely to lead to interdependency.   
 
TABLE 6.4 
Overview of decision-making situations studied involving 
exposure to multiple transaction risks in separate transactions 
 
High demand side uncertainty 
High demand side  
performance measurement difficulty 
Low demand side 
performance measurement difficulty 
High supply side  
asset specificity 
Box 1 Box 2 
Low supply side  
asset specificity 
Box 3  
 
To address research question 3B, the thesis has considered only briefly risks resulting from 
non-sequential types of interdependencies between the actors, like pooled80 and reciprocal81 
interdependencies. Similar to research question 3A, the thesis has focused primarily on risks 
in supply chain where the actors are (mainly) sequentially linked by means of the transactions 
which they undertake. Five simulations have been undertaken which model the consequences 
of such interdependencies for supply chain actors’ risk exposure. Broadly, three different 
types of situations have been modeled. The first type of situation illustrated some of the 
limitations of a separate optimization of supply and demand side transactions. Formal 
contracts, with fixed prices and volumes, may encourage suppliers of a company to make 
specific investments, as they minimize risks associated with opportunistic behavior. But, if no 
similar contracts are put in place at a company’s demand side, then the rigidity of these 
contracts may expose it to maladaptation risks in transactions with customers. Under those 
                                                           
80
 Amongst others, the thesis has discussed how pooled interdependencies can increase the exposure of actors to 
systemic risk. Damages to a shared pool of resources, like a collective brand, will affect all actors using these 
resources. From a TCE perspective, such damages are particularly likely when there are difficulties in 
monitoring or measuring the behavior (performance) of the various actors using the resource. 
81
 Reciprocal interdependencies can reduce the risk of strategic behavior by one of the transaction parties (as the 
actors are mutually dependent on each other), but increase the risk of maladaptation (because mutual adjustment 
is necessary when circumstances change). Furthermore, because of the mutual dependency between actors, the 
consequence of a failure to adequately manage a risk can be amplified.  
 
Chapter Six 
 
150
circumstances, supply side specific investments by the company may increase its exposure to 
demand side price or volume uncertainty. The second and third type of situation showed that 
risks may result from transactions in which an actor is not directly involved. The second type 
of situation showed that demand side risk of shirking can be amplified because of uncertain 
volume demand of second-tier customers. The third type of situation showed that supply side 
risk of shirking can be amplified because of difficulties in monitoring the performance of 
second-tier suppliers.  
The modeled situations have also helped to address Research question 3C, by showing how 
supply chain actors may reduce the impact of negative consequences resulting from 
interdependencies. Broadly, two different types of solutions were identified: (a), to 
simultaneously adjust both supply and demand side contracts to reduce imbalances in 
transaction risk exposure; (b), to outsource some coordination functions, like compliance 
monitoring, to a third-party to the transaction. Employing third parties is considered the 
preferred option when risks result from transactions in which an actor is not directly involved 
(see Section 4 for a more in-depth discussion of the contractual solutions identified in the 
thesis). Furthermore, the thesis has examined various contracting strategies which actors can 
employ when they cannot manipulate the various contracts in which they participate. In 
particular, three strategies were distinguished: risk altering, risk transferring and risk sharing. 
Rather than eliminating risk in the supply chain, these strategies shift it to other actors or 
expose them to other types of risk. 
2. General Conclusion and Discussion 
The risks to which supply chain actors are exposed depend on the various transactions in 
which they participate, as well as on transactions at stages in the supply chain in which they 
do not participate. Actors may face trade-offs in minimizing their risk exposure because 
interdependencies can arise between decisions in the supply chain; i.e., actions taken to 
reduce risk in one transaction, increase risk in another transaction. The focus in the thesis has 
been on the contracting decisions which actors make when faced with such transaction 
interdependencies and how these decisions transfer or alter the risk exposure of the actors in 
the supply chain.  
At first, the decision which an actor should take in such a situation may seem clear: employ a 
solution which reduces these interdependencies. Subsequently, the need to make a trade-off 
between minimizing exposure to different (types of) risks will be avoided. This is the strategy 
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employed by actors operating in some commodity supply chains, where large scale, chain-
wide quality management systems reduce transaction interdependencies82. Such systems, by 
standardizing quality, allow actors to transact with most other actors in an industry. This 
course of action is not taken in differentiated supply chains, where any specific investments 
required to produce under a brand will limit the number of potential trading partners at each 
stage. Contracting decisions at one stage of the supply chain are therefore more likely to 
affect actors operating at another stage; i.e., increased transactions interdependencies arise. 
Under these circumstances, why would actors choose to participate in differentiated supply 
chains? Because the return on investments in specific assets may off-set any costs incurred in 
managing increased interdependencies.  
Then, in differentiated supply chains, transaction interdependencies are largely given and the 
focus of actors shifts towards managing the risks which arise as a result. The various types of 
(contractual) solutions which actors can implement in such situations are discussed in detail in 
Section 3. What these solutions have in common is that they require actors to simultaneously 
manipulate various transactions in the supply chain. For example, an actor adjusts both its 
supply and demand side contracts or adjusts contracts with both supplier and second-tier 
suppliers. In such instances, trade-offs between reducing exposure to different (types of) 
transaction risks may still be largely avoided. For example, an actor may implement a fixed 
price contract in its supply side transaction to facilitate specific investments by its supplier. If 
the actor can also implement a fixed price contracts in its demand side transaction, it may 
reduce exposure to both price uncertainty and asset specificity related risks. In practice, it is 
not always possible for actors to manipulate contracts in multiple transactions. An actor may 
have limited influence on the contract implemented with some of its counterparties, let alone 
on transactions in which the actor is not directly involved. For example, the actor in the 
previous example may not be able to implement a fixed price contract with its customer. In 
that case, the actor has to make a decision about whether or not it is still in its best interest to 
enter into a fixed price contract with its supplier. Does the return it obtains from the specific 
investments made by the supplier outweigh the costs of managing the imbalance in price 
uncertainty exposure which results from the contract required to support those investments83?  
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 Note that the actors who participate in such a quality management systems reduce the importance of linkages 
through one channel (the transaction) and increase the importance of linkages through another channel (the 
quality management system). Furthermore, note that actors have increased pooled interdependencies between 
them (by means of a new shared resource: the quality management system).  
83
 The actor will pay a fixed price for its inputs and will receive a variable price for its outputs.  
Chapter Six 
 
152
In situations where such trade-offs arise, a contract becomes more of a tool to alter, transfer or 
share risk in the supply chain rather than to reduce or eliminate it. An actor alters its risk 
exposure when its swaps one type of risk for another. For example, an actor may invest in 
performance measurement equipment to reduce the risk of shirking by suppliers. However, if 
the required investments are asset specific, this may increase the risk of opportunism (see 
Wever et al., 2012). Risk is transferred in the supply chain when either the source or the 
holder of the risk has changed. An example of the former occurs when an actor swaps 
exposure to supply side price uncertainty for exposure to demand side price uncertainty (see 
Carlton, 1979). An example of the latter occurs when risk is transferred from actors operating 
upstream (downstream) in the supply chain, to actors operating downstream (upstream) in the 
supply chain84 (see Jacobs, 2004; Gray and Boehlje, 2004). A risk is shared when it is jointly 
held; i.e., when multiple actors are exposed to it (see Jacobs, 2004; Chung, 1991). Intentional 
risk sharing occurs, for example, when actors pool risks by means of jointly controlled 
investments vehicles, associations, collective brands or a combination of the three85.   
The thesis has not addressed directly the question of whether or not it is beneficial to alter, 
transfer or share exposure to transaction risks within the supply chain nor has the thesis 
addressed the related question of which supply chain actor is best positioned to manage (some 
of) these risks. Largely, this is because the TCE assumes actors to be to be risk neutral 
(Williamson, 1988). Subsequently, a key motive for transferring and absorbing risk – a 
different level of risk aversion amongst the transaction parties – is not taken into account 
within the TCE framework (Chiles and McMackin, 1996). However, some remarks can 
nonetheless be made.  
First, TCE strongly implies a hierarchy in the types of transaction risks to which exposure 
should be minimized (see Williamson, 2000). Reducing asset specificity related risks (i.e., 
opportunism) generally should have primacy amongst actors86, even if it increases price or 
volume uncertainty in (parts of) the supply chain. As is explained above, this holds true only 
in situations in which a higher return on investments in specific assets offsets any costs 
incurred in managing increased uncertainty. Reducing risks related to performance 
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 For example, a downstream actor which implements a fixed price contracts with upstream actors absorbs (part 
of) the price uncertainty risks of these actors. 
85
 In the case of a collective brand, the actors not only pool risks related to investments in tangible assets (i.e., 
the collective financial capital the actors have contributed to support the brand) but also to investments in 
intangible assets (i.e., the collective reputational capital of the actors).  
86
 Brand owners want to reduce the risk of opportunism because they want to facilitate specific investments by 
their suppliers. Suppliers will only make such investments, if the risk of opportunism by the brand owner is 
minimized. 
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measurement difficulties (i.e., shirking) will also be important in differentiated supply chains, 
at least for some actors87, but becomes mainly an issue after specific investments (in 
reputational capital) are made and related risks are minimized.  
Second, when a researcher or analyst attempts to determine where in the supply chain risk 
exposure should be held, it becomes important to consider the difference between transferring 
the management of a risk and transferring exposure to a risk. A failure to recognize the 
difference between the two may give the false impression that a supply chain actor has 
reduced its risk exposure. For example, when an actor outsources responsibility for 
monitoring its supplier to a third-party, as happened in a number of the studied cases, the 
actor has transferred the management of performance measurement difficulty risks, but has 
not altered its risk exposure. Unless another actor is more capable in managing a risk (e.g., a 
certifying institution), it is prudent if the actor managing the risk also has the most exposure to 
it. This is because it will have the strongest incentive to manage the risk adequately. In the 
best case scenario, the actor who holds exposure to a risk is also responsible for managing this 
risk and is capable of doing so. The studies have indicated that there are various reasons why 
this may not always be the case:  
• Exposure to some risks may yield high returns. Therefore, actors with bargaining 
power may attempt to capture these returns by exposing themselves to the risk, even if 
other actors are better capable of managing it. For example, an actor wants to capture 
the return which flows to the brand owner who puts its reputational capital at risk, 
even if it has limited influence on the quality of products marketed under the brand88; 
•  It can be costly for an individual risk holder to undertake risk management 
responsibilities or to obtain risk management competencies. In such cases, risk 
management responsibilities may be outsourced to a third party who can use the 
required competences in multiple transactions. For example, a brand owner outsources 
the responsibility of monitoring compliance with brand standards to a certifying 
institution89; 
• The actor most capable of managing exposure to a risk may not be able to assume risk 
management responsibilities because it will give malincentives to the other actors in 
                                                           
87
 When an actor’s brand name is visible to the consumer, this actor has a strong incentive to assure that quality 
products are marketed to the consumer; i.e., it has an incentive to reduce shirking by suppliers. Note however, 
that the brand owner may still have an incentive to shirk vis-à-vis its suppliers (see Section 3.6., Chapter Four).  
88
 For example, as is explained in Section 3.7 in Chapter Four, the last link in the supply chain (e.g., the retailer), 
is likely to be less capable than its supplier (e.g., the slaughterhouse) in monitoring the performance of its 
second-tier suppliers (e.g., farmers), who arguably have the most influence on product quality. Nonetheless, 
frequently product quality is guaranteed to the consumer by means of retailer brands.  
89
 For example, in the Retailer brand case (see Section 3.2, Chapter Three), the retailer markets a portfolio of 
products under its own brand name. It may be difficult for the retailer to obtain competences in monitoring the 
suppliers of each of these different products. A specialized certifying institution can use the competences it 
obtains in monitoring supplier compliance also to service other retailers. 
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the supply chain. For example, a retailer who manages a portfolio of products may be 
the best positioned actor in the supply chain to absorb price uncertainty risks, as it is 
least affected by fluctuations in the price of any individual product. However, it may 
not want to absorb this risk (e.g., by fixing the price in the contract with its suppliers), 
because it reduces the incentive of its suppliers to reduce their costs90.  
Third, which actor is best positioned to manage a risk may also depend on the structure of the 
supply chain. This is because this structure can affect the impact of a failure to adequately 
manage a risk. For example, in a supply chain with a ‘hourglass’ like structure, as most agri-
food supply chains are shaped, a single large actor may be the intermediary between hundreds 
of suppliers and hundreds of customers. Even though this actor may be the most capable of 
managing a certain risk (e.g., price uncertainty), transferring risk exposure and risk 
management responsibilities to this actor may not be desirable. Its central location within the 
supply chain may amplify the impact of a failure to manage the risk91. 
3. Implications for Literature 
The thesis has made contributions to the literature in three areas: (1), quality management 
systems; (2), inter-organizational forms, governance structures and contract types; (3), 
Transaction Cost Economics.  
Quality management systems  
Three main contributions have been made to research in this area.  
First, the thesis has contributed to the development of the quality management system (QMS) 
concept. A QMS is considered to consist of three elements: quality signals, quality standards, 
and quality compliance monitoring mechanisms. Giving form and meaning to QMS, as well 
as its related underlying concepts like quality standards, is important because it has often been 
a poorly defined and inconsistently applied concept within the literature. A failure to clearly 
explain in a study what aspects of a QMS are considered may lead to imprecise or incomplete 
conclusions and recommendations. For example, Van Plaggenhoef (2007), while examining 
the benefits of self-regulation in agri-food supply chains, argues that supply chain companies 
should integrate their QMSs with their suppliers. However, at the same time, the author 
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 A situation similar to this example occurred in the Processor brand case (see Section 6.2, Chapter Three). 
91
 Imagine a large slaughterhouse with fixed price contracts with farmers and variable price contracts with 
retailers. In effect, the slaughterhouse has absorbed the price uncertainty risks of the farmers. However, if the 
slaughterhouse goes bankrupt because it fails to adequately manage this risk (e.g., demand side prices keep 
falling) hundreds of farmers who have delivered their products, but may not have received their payments yet, 
will be affected. This is not a far-fetched example, as in one of the commodity chain cases, a similar imbalance 
was identified (i.e., the slaughterhouse had a fixed volume contract with its suppliers and a variable volume 
contracts with its customers).  
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argues that the companies should less frequently and comprehensively monitor their suppliers. 
It is unclear then, whether compliance monitoring forms part of a QMS or whether companies 
should integrate only part of their QMS. Furthermore, Coronado (2010), while discussing the 
relation between ownership of quality standards and contract use by supply chain actors, does 
not explicitly distinguish between the various parts of a QMS. The author seems to consider 
monitoring mechanism as part of a quality standard, but this conceptualization fails to take 
into account that different actors can be responsible for standard setting and compliance 
monitoring. Although Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) distinguish between responsibility for 
standard setting and compliance monitoring in their study of supply chain governance, they 
do not discuss quality signals. However, the extent to which quality attributes, like origin, are 
signaled within the supply chain is an important aspect to consider in the context of 
governance decisions92. Finally, while Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) insufficiently take into 
account how quality management practices are signaled across the supply chain, Sporleder 
and Goldsmith (2001), insufficiently consider the role of standards and monitoring 
mechanisms in supporting quality signals. 
Second, a classification scheme has been developed by which QMSs can be distinguished 
along three dimensions: ownership, scope and scale. Compared to some of the QMSs 
classification schemes used in previous studies (e.g., see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 
2005; González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003; Humphrey and Schmitz 2001), the present 
thesis distinguishes QMSs along more dimensions. This holds particularly true for studies 
which use such schemes to examine the relation between supply chain actors’ participation in 
QMSs and their choice of contracts (Coronado, 2010; Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 
2005; González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003). Often in such studies, only a distinction 
is made between public and private QMSs. However, private QMSs can be similar to public 
QMSs in a lot of aspects when other dimensions than ownership are considered. For example, 
private QMSs which are adopted on a large scale in an industry require, just like public 
QMSs, few (specific) investments by any individual supply chain actor. As is explained in 
Study Two, the extent to which participation in a QMS requires (specific) investments by 
supply chain actors affects the types of contracts which are suitable to support this 
participation. Therefore, studies which distinguish QMSs on just one dimension are likely to 
make incomplete conclusions on the relation between QMSs and contracts.  
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 For example, self-regulation of (some) quality management practices by industry actors may work better when 
manufacturer names are visible on end-consumer labels than when only retailer names are visible. This is 
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Third, by developing various propositions, the thesis has formalized the relation between 
contracts and QMSs. Although previously examined (see Raynaud, Sauvée and Valceschini, 
2005; González-Díaz, Barcala and Arruñada, 2003), the relation between QMSs and contracts 
has not been operationalized in testable propositions or hypothesis. The propositions 
developed in the present thesis, which are grounded in TCE theory, can facilitate researchers 
in understanding how the use of suitable contract forms can efficiently reduce conflicts of 
interests between supply chain actors operating in different types of QMSs. Considering the 
importance of both quality management systems and contracts for coordinating supply chain 
transactions in the context of the agri-food industry, insights into how they can best be 
combined are crucial. 
Inter-organizational forms, contracts, governance structures  
The main contribution the thesis has made to research in this area is the development of an 
integrated typology of contractual coordination mechanisms. This typology93 has a number of 
advantages compared to previous typologies of inter-organizational forms, contracts or 
governance structures which are worth mentioning.  
First, the typology presented in this thesis allows researchers to examine the contracts used by 
supply chain actors in more detail. Frequently, typologies used in studies distinguish only 
between generic contracts (e.g., verbal arrangements, formal contracts, equity-contracts) and 
do not specify the underlying coordination mechanisms (e.g., fixed forward or spot price 
mechanisms) which are used in these contracts (e.g., Gellynck and Molnár, 2009; Webster Jr., 
1992; Williamson, 1991). As a result, in studies which use such typologies (see Table 3.1 in  
Section 2.1, Chapter Three), it is frequently unclear what exactly the contracts are supposed to 
coordinate. Furthermore, the studies mentioned above do not explain if and how various types 
of coordination mechanisms can be combined within the same contract. However, this is an 
important aspect to consider because some aspects of a transaction (e.g., prices) may be 
coordinated by more market forms and other aspects (e.g., quality) by more hierarchical forms 
of coordination. The typology developed in this thesis, which does take underlying 
coordination mechanisms into account, can help researchers address these shortcomings. 
Second, compared to studies which do examine underlying coordination mechanisms (e.g., 
Mulherin, 1986; Masten and Crocker, 1985), the present study has considered a broader range 
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 Note that, as the typology has been developed based on theory from general management journals rather than 
specifically for the agri-food sector, it should be applicable (with minor modifications) also to other contexts. 
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of coordination mechanisms. In total, four different types of coordination mechanisms have 
been integrated in the typology: price, volume, quality and investments. Most studies focus on 
only one or two types of coordination mechanisms (e.g., only price and volume mechanisms; 
see Heyder, Theuvsen and Von Davier, 2010; Goldberg and Erickson, 1987). Such studies 
insufficiently consider how interaction between different types of coordination mechanisms 
(e.g., the role of third-party certifying institutions on the use of price coordination 
mechanism) affect contract choices by supply chain actors. 
Third, the typology has been developed based on an extensive set of variables. Compared to 
previous typologies (e.g., Gellynck and Molnár, 2009), these variables arguably allow for a 
more reliable classification of the contract types used in empirically examined transactions; 
i.e., it is more likely that two different researchers will reach the same conclusion about what 
type of contract is used in the transaction. When only generic contracts are examined in a 
study, the distinction between the different contract types can seem somewhat arbitrary. For 
example, classifying a reoccurring transaction between two parties which contains only a 
(implicit) verbal commitment for future transactions can be difficult. Some researchers may 
consider such a transaction to be governed by a verbal agreement, others by a spot market 
contract. There is less room for debate when the underlying coordination mechanisms are 
examined; e.g., either a forward price agreement has been established or not.    
Fourth, besides facilitating a more in-depth examination of contracts, the developed typology 
also allows for a better linking of contracts with the supply chain contexts in which they are 
embedded. This is important because this context is frequently ignored by contracting studies, 
which often only examine bilateral transactions (according to Wever et al., 2012; Voß and 
Schneidereit, 2002; Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999). The typology helps researchers in 
addressing this issue, amongst others by allowing for a more fine-grained examination of the 
role of third-parties to the transaction. For example, is the third-party an external actor to the 
supply chain (e.g., a certifying institution) or is it another (lead) supply chain actor? And, does 
the third-party coordinate quality (e.g., an association) or does it also facilitate investments 
(e.g., a bank)? What supply chain stages are covered by the third-party’s activities? In helping 
researchers answering these types of questions, the typology can thus be used to study triadic 
relationships (and larger structures) next to dyadic relationships. The importance of studying 
structures larger than dyads is discussed in the next section in more detail, where the 
contributions of the thesis to TCE literature are discussed. 
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Transaction Cost Economics  
The thesis has made various contributions to TCE literature.  
First, through the development of the typology of contractual coordination mechanisms, 
researchers can relate the conditions which affect contracting decisions within the TCE 
framework also to the use of the coordination mechanisms underlying these contracts. Most 
TCE studies examine only generic contracts in which the use of underlying coordination 
mechanisms are not specified. For example, within the TCE framework, asset specificity and 
uncertainty are regarded as two important drivers of contracting decisions. However, few 
studies (Grover and Malhotra 2003; Rindfleisch and Heide 1997) have linked these conditions 
to the use of price coordination mechanisms. But, this is important, as the use of fixed price 
mechanisms may be more beneficial under some than other conditions (see Section 5 for 
examples of propositions).  
Second, the thesis has drawn (renewed) attention to the study of the trade-offs companies 
encounter in managing their exposure to multiple transaction risks. Although previous studies 
have examined this subject, few researchers take all three main TCE based transaction risks 
into account (e.g., see Geyskens, Steenkamp and Kumar, 2006). Especially performance 
measurement difficulties are often insufficiently taken into account in TCE studies (see 
Grover and Malhotra, 2003; Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Taking a holistic approach to 
examining the transaction risk exposure of supply chain actors can lead to a better 
understanding of their contracting choices and the barriers they may face to implementing 
suitable contractual solutions. 
Third, and arguably its main implication, the thesis has contributed to a shift within TCE 
literature from a focus on bilateral transactions, to examining transactions within a supply 
chain context. Making this shift is important because contracting decisions within dyads can 
be affected by decisions elsewhere within the supply chain. This is shown in Study Three 
which has identified some of the limitation of the traditional, bilateral TCE framework and 
which has laid the groundwork for the development of a more supply chain-wide TCE 
approach. Furthermore, this is shown in Study Four, which has examined a broad range of 
TCE based contracting strategies which actors can use in a supply chain context.  
4. Implications for Managers 
The main implication of the thesis for practitioners is that they should take a more supply 
chain-wide approach to managing their contractual relations. As is explained in Section 1, two 
Discusion and Conclusions 
 
159
generic types of strategies have been distinguished in the thesis: (a), to limit the use of 
contracts which impair the flexibility of the supply chain actors or which lead to imbalances 
in the supply chain (see Studies Three-Four); (b), to outsource some coordination functions, 
like price-setting or compliance monitoring, to a third-party to the transaction (see Studies 
One-Four). The first type of strategy applies mainly to differentiated supply chains, where 
increased interdependencies between supply chain transactions have to be managed. The latter 
type of strategy applies to both differentiated and commodity supply chains. Some specific 
examples of the strategies are given below, as well as the conditions under which they should 
be employed.   
First, actors operating in differentiated supply chains should attempt to balance supply and 
demand side contracts to reduce imbalances in exposure to price or volume uncertainty. These 
imbalances, which can lead to maladaptation, are likely to arise when actors have made 
specific investments in only parts of the chain and have used contracts with fixed prices or 
volumes to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior for those transactions94. In these cases, 
an option for supply chain actors is to use contracts with ‘reference market prices’, where the 
contract price is based on the quoted price of a similar product exchanged in the open market. 
Such contracts are a safeguard against opportunistic behavior, as they limit the ability of 
transaction parties to renegotiate prices. But, the use of reference market prices also allows 
the contract price to move in line with current market prices, and thus reduces risks associated 
with maladaptation95.  
Second, related to the previous point, imbalances may also occur because actors are limited in 
their ability to manipulate both supply and demand side transactions. In those circumstances, 
partially adjusting the contract which the actor can manipulate, to the conditions of the 
contract which it cannot manipulate, can be a suitable strategy. For example, when a demand 
side market price contract cannot be altered, a company could implement also a more market 
like contract (e.g., a reference market price contract) with its suppliers. 
Third, actors should consider sharing the costs of making investments in assets which are 
specific and are used across the supply chain (e.g., in brand development in differentiated 
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 Obtaining this type of risk exposure can be a deliberate choice by a company, as it attempts to capture a risk 
premium. But, it can also be an unintended consequence of participating in a differentiated supply chain where 
bargaining power constraints prevent a company from obtaining its optimal configuration of supply chain 
contracts. 
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 The price in a reference market price contract is based on the quoted price of products traded in an open 
market. Thus, the contract price will move in line with market prices. 
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chains) or for which the benefits and risks of its use flow across company boundaries (e.g., 
measurement technology which makes standardization possible in commodity chains). 
Sharing these costs, and some of the benefits, may be beneficial because actors can reduce 
their exposure to opportunism and shirking by (second-tier) suppliers (customers). To give an 
example, most supply chain actors stand to benefit if they spend fewer resources on 
monitoring each other. They can achieve this by jointly contracting with a third-party 
monitoring agency. Currently, it is more common for the actor receiving the certification to 
contract with the third-party, but this may compromise the independency of that entity. 
Fourth, related to the previous point, when the quality of the final product in the supply chain 
depends strongly on practices in preceding stages, it may be particularly beneficial for (lead) 
actors to share the property rights of the brand under which the products are marketed. This 
can be done by means of vertically organized associations, through which the costs of making 
investments in brand development are pooled. Sharing these costs can reduce exposure to 
both opportunistic and shirking behavior, as actors operating at other stages in the supply 
chain have more of an incentive to contribute, since they have a stake in the brand’s success. 
However, managers should be aware that, as is also explained in the next paragraph, sharing 
brand property rights may fail to incentivize actors when the rights are shared amongst a large 
number of actors at each stage96. Although every actor will have some stake in the brand’s 
success, no individual actor may have a large enough stake to make an effort to prevent a 
failure of the brand.  
Fifth, when they face barriers to minimizing or eliminating risk in the supply chain (e.g., 
because of limited bargaining power), actors should consider implementing contracting 
strategies which alter, transfer or share risk amongst them. Risk altering is a suitable strategy 
when the costs of exposure to one type of risk (e.g., asset specificity) are clearly more costly 
than exposure to another type of risk (e.g., price uncertainty). Risk transfer is a suitable 
strategy when the actor absorbing the risk (e.g., of price uncertainty) can reduce its own 
exposure to another risk (e.g., risk of opportunism). Risk sharing may align interests between 
the actors, as is explained in the previous two paragraphs. However, managers should be 
aware of situations in which exposure to a risk is spread too ‘thin’; i.e., amongst a too large 
number of actors. Under such circumstances no individual actor may have a strong incentive 
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 I.e., when brand property rights are not only shared ‘vertically’ alongside the various stages in the supply 
chain, but also ‘horizontally’; i.e., amongst a large number of actors operating at each of the stages.  
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to prevent a harmful outcome (e.g., of damages to reputational capital in case of a collective 
brand). 
Perhaps the main contribution of the thesis for managers is that it has made some previously 
‘hidden’ transaction risks more explicit. Although managers may be constrained in fully 
implementing the strategies outlined above, a higher awareness of the interdependency 
between transactions, and the negative externalities which can result from this, should 
encourage collaboration between lead actors and (second-tier) suppliers. 
5. Implications for Further Research 
The implications of the thesis for further research are outlined in detail in each of the studies. 
This section outlines some general implications and summarizes the main implications of the 
studies. 
First, researchers could attempt to examine the relation between a broader set of QMSs and 
contract choices. As is shown in Table 6.2, only four types of QMSs have been examined in 
Study Two. Although also some of the other QMSs shown in the table were used in the 
examined pork supply chains, these were not the main QMSs used in these cases and were 
thus insufficiently considered in the study. Other studies could examine cases where these 
‘missing’ QMSs are the main type of QMS used. Furthermore, researchers could consider 
classifying QMSs based on a broader set of variables or categories. For example, the study 
distinguishes between small and large scale QMSs, but perhaps it would be useful to 
distinguish also a third category: ‘intermediate scale QMS’. Additionally, researchers could 
try to examine the relation between different types of end-consumer signals and the type of 
QMS used in the supply chain. For example, to what extent are the relations between supply 
chain actors affected when the use of a QMS is no longer signaled to the end-consumer?97  
Second, studies could use the typology of contractual coordination mechanisms developed in 
Study Two to further specify existing contract theory. For example, TCE provides a 
perspective on the conditions which affect the usage of contracts, but only limited guidance 
on the conditions which affect the use of the coordination mechanisms underlying these 
contracts. Researchers could use the typology to relate the various conditions (e.g., asset 
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  Study One stated that most retailers have stopped signaling the QMS used in the Dutch pork chain to 
consumers, to be able to source products from other countries (where the QMS is not used). This suggests that 
changes in QMS practices influence relations between actors and highlights the importance of more in-depth 
research into this area. 
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specificity) which affect contracting decisions within the TCE framework also to the use of 
these coordination mechanisms. Table 6.5 gives an example of the types of propositions 
which could be tested.  
TABLE 6.5 
Example of propositions related to the use of price coordination mechanisms 
Propositions  
PA: With high levels of asset specificity, and low levels of price uncertainty, actors will use 
internal or fixed forward price mechanisms in their supply chain transactions 
PB: With high levels of asset specificity, and high levels of price uncertainty, actors will use 
reference market price mechanisms in their supply chain transactions  
PC: With low levels of asset specificity, actors will use spot price mechanisms in their supply 
chain transactions  
 
Third, related to the previous point, the typology can be used to combine different theoretical 
perspectives. For example, researchers have recently started to combine TCE and the 
Resource Based View (see McIvor, 2009; Leiblein, 2003; Barney and Lee 2000). Studies 
could use the typology to establish additional linkages between the two perspectives. For 
example, the perspectives can be combined to explain under what conditions outsourcing 
quality coordination to a third-party coordinator is expected to be beneficial. Table 6.6 gives 
an example of the types of propositions which could be tested.  
TABLE 6.6  
Example of propositions related to the use of quality coordination mechanisms 
Propositions  
PA: With unique quality requirements, and high levels of performance measurement 
difficulty, actors will coordinate quality in supply chain transactions internally or by means 
of counterparty monitoring 
P2: With generic quality requirements, and high levels of performance measurement 
difficulty, actors will coordinate quality in supply chain transactions by means of a third-
party  
P2: With low levels of performance measurement difficulty, actors will coordinate quality in 
supply chain transactions by means of spot market specifications 
 
Fourth, perhaps most importantly, researchers should focus on further developing the 
extended, supply chain-wide TCE framework presented in Studies Three-Four. For example, 
researchers could try to identify a broader range of conditions which lead to interdependency 
between supply chain contracting decisions. In particular, researchers could try to identify 
more situations in which actors’ contracting decisions depend on transactions in which they 
are not directly involved. Furthermore, researchers could try to find (more) situations in which 
the interdependency between transactions has positive externalities; i.e., when a contract 
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implemented upstream in the supply chain reduces also the transaction risk exposure of 
downstream supply chain actors. Additionally, further research should develop more 
quantitative constructs of interdependency. Such studies could examine, by means of more 
quantitative approaches, whether managers’ attempts at optimization of their contractual 
relations are more in accordance with the logic of the traditional or the supply chain-wide 
TCE approach. Two propositions in particular should be tested in further research (see Table 
6.7). 
 
TABLE 6.7 
Examples of propositions for further testing of supply chain-wide TCE approach 
Example of 
proposition 
Example of test  Support of supply 
chain-wide TCE 
approach 
Support of traditional 
TCE approach 
1. Interdependency 
between transactions:  
Actors’ use of supply  
side contracts does 
not depend on their 
exposure to demand 
side transaction risks 
A comparison of the supply side 
contracts used by two different 
groups of actors: (1), exposed to 
both supply side asset specificity 
and demand side volume 
uncertainty; (2), exposed only to 
supply side asset specificity.  
Rejection of 
proposition: the two 
groups use different 
type of supply side 
contracts, as actors in 
the first group attempt 
to balance supply and 
demand side contracts. 
Failure to reject 
proposition: both groups 
use the same type of 
supply side contract, as 
actors in the first group 
alter only demand side 
contracts to manage 
demand side risks. 
2. Consequence of 
contractual strategy: 
Actors that attempt to 
minimize exposure to 
bilateral transaction 
risks are exposed to 
less total transaction 
risks (sum of supply 
and demand side 
risks) than actors that 
do not attempt this 
A follow-up to the research 
outlined above (assuming the first 
proposition is rejected). The first 
group is split into two sub-groups: 
(1), made up of actors which 
altered both supply and demand 
side contracts; (2), made up of 
actors that altered only demand 
side contracts. A time-series 
analysis should indicate whether 
there is a significant difference in 
risk exposure in the groups over 
time. 
Rejection of 
proposition: the second 
group, which consists 
of those actors that are 
oriented towards 
minimizing exposure to 
bilateral transaction 
risks, is exposed to 
higher transaction risks 
than the other group.  
Failure to reject 
proposition: the first 
group, which consists of 
actors that are oriented 
towards balancing 
supply and demand side 
contracts, is exposed to 
higher transaction risk 
than the other group.  
 
Fifth, as is explained in Section Two, the thesis has not addressed directly the question of 
which supply chain actor should hold or manage transaction risk exposure. Further studies on 
this subject should take into account differences in risk management competences between 
the various supply chain actors and how these differences affect which actors should have risk 
management responsibilities. Related to this, such studies could also take the structure of the 
supply chain into account in determining which actor is best positioned to manage a risk. For 
example, an (large) actor with a central position in the supply chain may be most capable 
actor of managing a certain risk. However, any mistakes such an actor makes in managing the 
risk may have systematic consequences because of its strong links or interdependencies with 
the other actors in the supply chain or network. 
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Six, further research should examine to what extent the implications of the thesis are 
applicable also to other contexts than the pork industry. Because the theoretical approach 
taken to the thesis is not developed specifically for the pork industry, while the empirical 
results are based on this approach, its main implications should be applicable also to other 
contexts. However, this should be tested. For example, other studies could examine to what 
extent the typology of contractual coordination mechanisms developed in Study Two is useful 
for characterizing contractual relations also in other industries and sectors. Additionally, 
studies could examine to what extent some of the negative consequences of transaction 
interdependency mentioned in Study Three occur also in supply chains that have non-
sequential linkages in the production process (e.g., construction activities), supply chains 
which produce non-perishable products (e.g., petroleum-based products) or service supply 
chains (e.g., the structuring and subsequent marketing of mortgages-backed securities in the 
financial services industry).
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SUMMARY 
Agri-food supply chains are characterized by strong interdependencies between the different 
stages. Interdependency may lead to negative externalities, as when a downstream actor is 
exposed to transaction risks resulting from activities further upstream in the supply chain. For 
example, a change in the formula used to calculate the price in a farmer-processor transaction, 
may reduce incentives for farmers to produce high quality products. This can increase the 
risks that low quality products are exchanged in the processor-retailer transaction.  
The present thesis aims to gain more insight in the challenges which companies face in 
managing such interdependencies and associated transaction risks. More specifically, the 
thesis aims to examine: (1), how risks arise in the supply chain as a result of 
interdependencies between the various transactions making up the supply chain; and (2), what 
types of contracts are suitable for supply chain actors to implement in order to reduce or 
eliminate their exposure to these risks. The thesis focuses mainly on economic risks resulting 
from conflicts of interests between supply chain actors.  
The thesis addresses its subject from various angles, which has resulted in three main research 
questions which are addressed in four different studies. Answers to the research questions 
have been formulated in the studies by means of both a theoretical and an empirical approach. 
The theoretical approach is grounded within Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) literature. The 
empirical setting for the study is the pork meat industry. 
STUDY ONE: ALIGNMENT BETWEEN CHAIN QUALITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
AND CONTRACTS  
The first study focuses on the relation between quality management systems (QMSs) and the 
contracts used between the supply chain actors participating in these QMSs. Although inter-
company coordination of quality management is increasingly important for meeting end-
customer demand, few researchers focus on the relation between QMSs and contracts. 
However, insufficient alignment between QMSs and contracts can result in high transaction 
costs, amongst others by leading to under-investments in quality improvements, quality 
cheating, and difficulties in adjusting quality standards within the supply chain. To address 
this gap in research, this study aims to obtain insight into what types of contracts best match 
with the various types of quality management systems used by supply chain actors. In 
particular, the following research question is addressed. 
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Research question 1: What is the relation between the participation of supply chain actors in 
different types of quality management systems and their contracting choices? 
To answer the research question, first a conceptual analysis of the relation between QMSs and 
contracts is made, based on Transaction Cost Economic (TCE) theory. Three propositions are 
developed about the relation between various aspects of QMSs (ownership, vertical scope and 
horizontal scale of adoption) and use of different types of contracts by the supply chain actors. 
Case study results from seven pork supply chains in four different countries (Germany, 
Hungary, Spain and The Netherlands) show that four main types of systems can be 
distinguished for coordinating quality management in EU pork supply chains: one public 
baseline QMS, two private chain-wide QMSs and one public chain-wide QMS. The four types 
of systems largely relate to the use of contracts as predicted by the propositions: (1), actors 
participating in QMSs without a chain-wide scope use mainly hierarchical types of contracts; 
(2), more hierarchical types of contracts are used in private chain-wide QMSs when compared 
to public chain-wide QMS; (3), more market types of contracts are used in large scale private 
QMSs when compared to small scale private QMSs.  
The patterns found between QMSs and contracts indicate that TCE considerations help to 
explain QMSs choices. This supports the view that alignment between QMSs and contracts is 
an important aspect to consider for the efficient coordination of quality management in (agri-
food) supply chains.  
STUDY TWO: EXAMINING CONTRACTUAL COORDINATION MECHANISMS IN 
DIFFERENTIATED AND COMMODITY CHAINS 
Besides the coordination of quality, which is the focus of the first study, it is also important to 
consider the role of contracts in coordinating other aspects of transactions. The second set of 
research questions focuses on the mechanisms which are used within contracts to coordinate 
prices, volume, quality and investments. Furthermore, actors’ use of coordination mechanisms 
is compared across three different types of supply chains: (1), commodity supply chains; (2), 
collective brands; (3), proprietary brands. The diversity of supply chains studied allows for 
the examination of a wide-variety of contracts and underlying coordination mechanisms.  
The following research questions are addressed. 
Research question 2A: What types of coordination mechanisms are used within supply chain 
contracts? 
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Research question 2B: What differences can be observed in the use of these mechanisms 
across various types of supply chains? 
To answer the research questions, the study: (1), develops a comprehensive typology for 
studying supply chain contracts; (2), uses the typology to characterize transactions in eight 
supply chains from five major pork producing countries (Brazil, Denmark, France, Spain and 
The Netherlands). The results show the usefulness of looking at contracts in a more detailed 
level: transactions which look hierarchical when examined at contract level are largely 
conducted in a market-like manner when the underlying coordination mechanisms are 
examined. For example, some hierarchical types of contracts are used in order to formalize 
exchanges, and not to commit the actors to future transactions. Furthermore, the results show 
that companies have much more freedom in combining various types of coordination 
mechanisms within a single type of contract than is generally assumed within the literature.  
With regard to the three types of supply chains, actors in commodity chains generally do not 
commit themselves to future transactions to another party. In the rare instances that such 
commitments are made, the conditions of the exchange, particularly with regard to price and 
volume are left open. The exception is quality coordination, which is frequently conducted by 
third-parties (i.e., associations or certifying institutions). In the collective brand chains, these 
third-parties have an even more active role. Besides quality, also investments and even price 
setting responsibilities are regularly outsourced to the associations which own the brands. 
While both the commodity supply chains and the collective branded cases are characterized 
by an external administrative organization which undertakes some key coordination functions 
(i.e., the associations), in the proprietary brands these coordination functions are undertaken 
by the supply chain actor who is the brand owner. The brand owners employ hierarchical 
types of coordination mechanisms (e.g., fixed forward prices and volumes, counterparty 
quality coordination) within the largely hierarchical types of contracts that they use. 
STUDIES THREE-FOUR: INTERDEPENDENCIES, RISKS AND THEIR 
CONTRACTUAL SOLUTIONS IN DIFFERENTIATED CHAINS 
While the second study considers both commodity and differentiated supply chains, the third 
and fourth study focus mainly on differentiated supply chains. Differentiated supply chains 
are interesting to examine because they may limit the contractual options actors have in 
managing their exposure to transaction risks. This is because differentiation can increase 
interdependency between an actor’s supply and demand side transactions. Based on the 
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present state of research into this subject, particularly within transaction cost economics 
(TCE) literature, it is impossible to evaluate how companies should manage 
interdependencies between their supply chain transactions. To help bridge this gap in 
research, the following research questions are addressed.  
Research question 3A: What types of conditions lead to interdependencies in differentiated 
supply chains? 
Research question 3B: What are the consequences of interdependencies for the transaction 
risk exposure of supply chain actors? 
Research question 3C: What types of contractual options do supply chain actors have in 
managing the transaction risks arising from these interdependencies? 
In addressing research question 3A, the thesis focuses mainly on examining the conditions 
under which interdependencies arise through the various transactions in which actors 
participate. Such transaction interdependencies are likely to arise when supply chain actors 
are exposed to multiple transaction risks in separate transactions. Exposure to multiple 
transaction risks occurs when a transaction has high levels of attributes of more than one type. 
An actor may also be exposed to multiple transactions risks in separate transactions; e.g., to 
asset specificity related risks in its supply side transaction and volume uncertainty risks in its 
demand side transaction. Such situations can lead to interdependency between transactions 
because they may require conflicting contractual solutions to reduce the different types of 
transaction risk exposure.  
To address research question 3B, three types of situation are modeled which examine the 
consequences of transaction interdependencies for supply chain actors’ risk exposure. The 
first type of situation illustrates some of the limitations of a separate optimization of supply 
and demand side transactions: demand side volume uncertainty can be amplified by the 
attempts of an actor to reduce its supply side risk of opportunism. The second and third type 
of situation show that risks may result from transactions in which an actor is not directly 
involved. The second type of situation shows that demand side risk of shirking can be 
amplified because of uncertain volume demand of second-tier customers. The third type of 
situation shows that supply side risk of shirking can be amplified because of difficulties in 
monitoring the performance of second-tier suppliers.  
The modeled situations also help to address Research question 3C, by showing how actors 
may reduce the impact of negative consequences resulting from interdependencies. Broadly, 
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two different types of solutions are identified: (a), to simultaneously adjust both supply and 
demand side contracts; (b), to outsource some coordination functions to a third-party. 
Furthermore, the thesis identifies various contracting strategies which actors can employ 
when they cannot manipulate the various transactions in which they participate. Rather than 
eliminating risk in the supply chain, these strategies – risk altering, risk transferring and risk 
sharing – change the risk exposure or shift it to other stages. 
DISCUSSION  
The risks to which supply chain actors are exposed depend on the various transactions in 
which they participate, as well as on transactions at stages in the supply chain in which they 
do not participate. Actors face trade-offs in minimizing their risk exposure because 
interdependencies arise between decisions in the supply chain; i.e., actions taken to reduce 
risk in one transaction, increase risk in another transaction. The studies have examined the 
contracting decisions which actors make when faced with such interdependencies and how 
these decisions transfer or alter the risk exposure of the actors in the supply chain. Based on 
the studies, various implications for researchers and managers can be drawn. The most 
important of these implications are outlined below.  
Two main theoretical contributions have been made in the thesis. First, the typology of 
contractual coordination mechanisms presented in Study Two. The typology has a number of 
advantages compared to previous typologies of contracts, most important of which is that it 
allows researchers to examine the contracts used by supply chain actors in more detail. This 
can help researchers to: (a), capture the complexity of problems which companies face in 
making contract related decisions; (b), prescribe a specific mix of coordination mechanisms to 
address these problems rather than ‘blunt’ generic contracts. Second, the thesis has 
contributed to a shift within TCE literature from a focus on bilateral transactions, to 
examining transactions within a supply chain context. The thesis has identified some of the 
limitation of the traditional, bilateral TCE framework and has laid the groundwork for the 
development of a more supply chain-wide TCE approach. This makes it possible for 
researchers to examine, for example, how conflicts of interests between actors upstream in a 
supply chain can affect the transaction risk exposure of actors operating downstream. 
An important implication of the thesis for managers is that they should take a more supply 
chain-wide approach to managing their contractual relations. Various types of contracting 
strategies have been distinguished which actors can use to minimize, alter, transfer or share 
Summary 
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transaction risk exposure in the supply chain. However, arguably the main contribution of the 
thesis for managers is that it has made some previously ‘hidden’ transaction risks more 
explicit. Although managers may be constrained in fully implementing some of the 
contracting strategies discussed in the studies (e.g., because of limited bargaining power), a 
higher awareness of the interdependency between transactions, and the negative externalities 
which can result from this, should encourage collaboration between lead actors and (second-
tier) suppliers (customers).
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SAMENVATTING98 
Productieketens in de agrarische sector worden gekenmerkt door een sterke onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid tussen de bedrijven in de keten. Deze afhankelijkheid kan leiden tot negatieve 
externe effecten. Een voorbeeld hiervan is dat een bedrijf dat stroomafwaarts in de keten 
actief is kan worden blootgesteld aan transactierisico’s die voortvloeien uit activiteiten van 
bedrijven die stroomopwaarts opereren. Dit proefschrift heeft als doel meer inzicht te 
verkrijgen in de uitdagingen waarmee bedrijven worden geconfronteerd bij het managen van 
dit soort afhankelijkheden. Meer specifiek is het doel van het proefschrift om inzicht te 
verkrijgen in: (1) hoe risico’s ontstaan in de productieketen als gevolg van de 
afhankelijkheden tussen de bedrijven; (2) wat voor typen contracten de bedrijven dienen te 
gebruiken om hun blootstelling aan deze risico’s te minimaliseren. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit vier studies. De theoretische benadering die in de studies wordt 
gebruikt is gebaseerd op “Transaction Cost Economic”(TCE)-literatuur. Verder wordt in het 
proefschrift gebruik gemaakt van onderzoek verricht in de varkensindustrie.  
EERSTE STUDIE: AFSTEMMING TUSSEN 
KWALITEITSMANAGEMENTSYSTEMEN EN CONTRACTVORMEN 
De eerste studie richt zich op de relatie tussen de participatie van bedrijven in gezamenlijke 
kwaliteitsmanagementsystemen en de contracten die gebruikt worden door deze bedrijven om 
hun onderlinge transacties te structureren. Onvoldoende afstemming tussen een 
kwaliteitsmanagementsysteem en de geïmplementeerde contracten kan leiden tot hoge 
transactiekosten voor de bedrijven, onder andere door: (1) onderinvesteringen in 
kwaliteitsverbetering; (2) problemen bij het meten van de kwaliteit van geleverde producten; 
en (3) moeilijkheden bij het aanpassen van de kwaliteitsnormen binnen de productieketen. 
Onderzoeksvraag 1: Wat is de relatie tussen de participatie van bedrijven in verschillende 
soorten kwaliteitsmanagementsystemen en hun keuze voor een bepaald type contractvorm? 
Om de onderzoeksvraag te kunnen beantwoorden is eerst een conceptuele analyse gemaakt 
van de relatie tussen kwaliteitsmanagementsystemen en contracten. Drie stellingen zijn 
ontwikkeld over de relatie tussen verscheidene aspecten van kwaliteitsmanagementsystemen 
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(eigendom, verticale dekking en horizontale adoptie) en het gebruik van verschillende soorten 
contractvormen door de bedrijven.  
Vervolgens zijn zeven productieketens van varkensvlees in vier verschillende landen 
geanalyseerd (Duitsland, Hongarije, Spanje en Nederland). Vier typen 
kwaliteitsmanagementsystemen worden gebruikt in deze ketens: één type privaat systeem 
zonder ketenbrede dekking; twee typen private systemen met ketenbrede dekking en één type 
publiek systeem met ketenbrede dekking. Het contractgebruik van de bedrijven in de vier 
typen systemen is in overeenstemming met de proposities. Hiërarchische contractvormen 
worden gebruikt wanneer: (1) een kwaliteitsmanagementsysteem met ketenbrede dekking in 
de productieketen ontbreekt; of (2) participatie in een kwaliteitsmanagementsysteem 
specifieke investeringen vereist en deze investeringen niet kunnen worden verdeeld onder een 
groot aantal bedrijven.  
TWEEDE STUDIE: HET GEBRUIK VAN CONTRACTUELE COÖRDINATIE-
MECHANISMEN IN VERSCHILLENDE TYPEN PRODUCTIEKETENS  
De tweede studie richt zich op de mechanismen die worden gebruikt in contracten om prijzen, 
volume, kwaliteit en investeringen te coördineren. Er wordt een vergelijking gemaakt tussen 
het gebruik van deze mechanismen in drie verschillende typen productieketens: (1) ketens 
waarin producten worden verkocht zonder merknaam (‘commodity’ ketens); (2) ketens 
waarin gedifferentieerde producten worden verkocht onder een bedrijfsmerknaam 
(‘proprietary brand’ ketens); (3) ketens waarin gedifferentieerde producten worden verkocht 
onder een collectieve merknaam (‘collectieve brand’ ketens). 
Onderzoeksvraag 2A: Wat voor soorten coördinatiemechanismen worden gebruikt in 
contracten?  
Onderzoeksvraag 2B: Wat is het gebruik van deze mechanismen in verschillende typen 
productieketens? 
Om de onderzoeksvragen te kunnen beantwoorden is er in de studie eerst een typologie 
ontwikkeld voor het bestuderen van coördinatiemechanismen binnen contracten. Vervolgens 
is deze typologie gebruikt om transacties te karakteriseren in acht productieketens uit vijf 
verschillende landen (Brazilië, Denemarken, Frankrijk, Spanje en Nederland). Al deze landen 
zijn belangrijke varkensvleesproducenten. De resultaten tonen aan dat bedrijven veel meer 
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vrijheid hebben in het combineren van verschillende soorten coördinatiemechanismen binnen 
een enkel type contract dan algemeen wordt aangenomen in de literatuur.  
Met betrekking tot de drie soorten productieketens, bedrijven in ‘commodity’ ketens laten 
over het algemeen de voorwaarden van de transactie open. Dit heeft als gevolg dat er continu 
heronderhandeld wordt over de transactievoorwaarden. De uitzondering is de coördinatie van 
kwaliteit; bedrijven eisen vaak dat hun leveranciers over specifieke kwaliteitscertificaten 
beschikken. ‘Proprietary brand’ ketens worden gekenmerkt door overeenkomsten waarin, 
naast kwaliteit, ook met betrekking tot de andere voorwaarden voor een langere termijn (6-12 
maanden) afspraken worden gemaakt. Het bedrijf dat de merkeigenaar is stelt deze 
voorwaarden vast. In ‘collective brand’ ketens speelt de vereniging (samenwerkingsverband) 
die het merk beheert een belangrijke rol bij het vaststellen van de transactievoorwaarden. De 
vereniging stelt minimale kwaliteitsvoorwaarden vast en int een heffing op de transacties 
waarin het merk gebruikt wordt. Met deze heffingen financiert de vereniging de investeringen 
die nodig zijn om het merk te promoten.  
DERDE EN VIERDE STUDIE: ONDERLINGE AFHANKELIJKHEID, RISICO EN 
CONTRACTUELE OPLOSSINGEN IN GEDIFFERENTIEERDE KETENS 
 De focus in de derde en vierde studie is gericht op productieketens waarin gedifferentieerde 
producten gemaakt worden. In dit soort ketens is er sprake van een vergrote onderlinge 
afhankelijkheid tussen de bedrijven en een toename van de daaraan verbonden risico’s. Op 
basis van de huidige stand van onderzoek naar dit onderwerp is er weinig inzicht in wat voor 
typen contracten de bedrijven dienen te implementeren in zulke situaties.  
Onderzoeksvraag 3A: Welke omstandigheden leiden tot onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen de 
bedrijven in gedifferentieerde productieketens? 
Onderzoeksvraag 3B: Wat zijn de gevolgen van deze afhankelijkheid voor de blootstelling van 
de bedrijven aan transactierisico’s? 
Onderzoeksvraag 3C: Wat voor contractuele opties hebben de bedrijven om deze risico’s te 
managen? 
Bij het beantwoorden van onderzoeksvraag 3A was de focus in het proefschrift vooral op de 
afhankelijkheden die ontstaan tussen de verschillende transacties waaraan een bedrijf 
deelneemt. Er is sprake van afhankelijkheid wanneer het contract dat een bedrijf wil 
implementeren in de transactie met zijn leverancier (afnemer) beïnvloed wordt door het 
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contract dat het bedrijf implementeert met zijn afnemer (leverancier). Deze afhankelijkheid 
ontstaat wanneer de participatie van het bedrijf in de twee transacties tegenstrijdige eisen stelt 
aan zijn bedrijfsvoering, o.a., met betrekking tot de mate waarin het noodzakelijk is om de 
prestaties van de leverancier (afnemer) te meten en om flexibele productiecapaciteit aan te 
houden. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer een bedrijf verticaal integreert met zijn leverancier om 
meetproblemen op te lossen kan een (ongewenst) gevolg hiervan zijn dat het bedrijf een vaste 
toelevering van inputs verkrijgt. Dit beperkt het bedrijf in de mate waarin het de 
productiecapaciteit kan aanpassen indien er een veranderde vraag is naar zijn outputs. 
Om onderzoeksvraag 3B te beantwoorden zijn drie situaties gemodelleerd. De eerste situatie 
illustreert een aantal van de problemen die resulteren uit een afzonderlijke optimalisatie van 
transacties aan zowel de vraag- als aanbodzijde: onzekerheid in de transactie aan de 
vraagzijde kan worden versterkt door de pogingen van een bedrijf om het risico van 
opportunistisch gedrag in de transactie aan de aanbodzijde te verminderen. De tweede en 
derde situatie laten zien dat risico’s ook kunnen voortvloeien uit transacties waarbij een 
bedrijf niet direct betrokken is. De tweede situatie toont aan dat meetproblemen in de 
transactie aan de vraagzijde versterkt kunnen worden door fluctuaties in de vraag van de 
‘klant van de klant’. De derde situatie toont aan dat onderprestatie in de transactie aan de 
aanbodzijde toeneemt naarmate er meer moeilijkheden zijn bij het meten van de prestaties van 
de ‘leverancier van de leverancier’.  
De gemodelleerde situaties zijn ook gebruikt om onderzoeksvraag 3C te beantwoorden. In 
grote lijnen zijn er twee verschillende soorten oplossingen te onderscheiden voor bedrijven 
om risico’s in de keten te beperken of te elimineren: (a) het gelijktijdig aanpassen van de 
contracten aan de vraag- en aanbodzijde; (b) bepaalde coördinerende taken uit te besteden aan 
een derde, ‘onafhankelijke’ partij. Hiernaast zijn er in het proefschrift verschillende 
strategieën geïdentificeerd die bedrijven kunnen gebruiken wanneer het niet mogelijk is om 
de beide transacties waarin ze participeren te manipuleren. In plaats van het elimineren van 
risico’s, leiden deze strategieën tot het delen of overdragen van risico’s in de keten.  
DISCUSSIE 
De risico’s waaraan bedrijven worden blootgesteld zijn afhankelijk van de verschillende 
transacties waaraan zij deelnemen, maar ook van transacties in de keten waaraan zij niet 
deelnemen. Bedrijven moeten keuzes maken met betrekking tot de risico’s die ze willen 
elimineren indien er afhankelijkheden in de keten zijn: handelingen die ondernomen worden 
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om risico’s in één transactie te verminderen, kunnen risico’s in een andere transactie 
verhogen. In het proefschrift is onderzocht wat voor typen contracten bedrijven (moeten) 
implementeren in dat soort situaties. De vier studies die gepresenteerd zijn in het proefschrift 
hebben verscheiden consequenties voor onderzoekers en managers.  
Twee belangrijke theoretische bijdragen zijn gemaakt in het proefschrift. Ten eerste stelt de 
typologie die gepresenteerd is in de tweede studie onderzoekers in staat om de contracten die 
door bedrijven worden gebruikt in meer detail te bestuderen. Dit kan onderzoekers helpen om: 
(a) meer inzicht te verkrijgen in de complexiteit van de problemen die bedrijven ondervinden 
bij het maken van contractuele keuzes; (b) meer specifieke aanbevelingen te geven. Ten 
tweede draagt het proefschrift bij aan een verschuiving binnen de TCE-literatuur van een 
focus op bilaterale transacties, naar het analyseren van transacties binnen een ketenbrede 
context. Dit kan onderzoekers helpen bij het bestuderen van de vraag hoe contractuele 
beslissingen in de verschillende stadia van de keten elkaar beïnvloeden.  
Een belangrijke implicatie van het proefschrift voor managers is dat ze een meer ketenbrede 
benadering moeten nemen bij het managen van hun relaties. Verschillende typen contractuele 
strategieën zijn gepresenteerd die bedrijven kunnen gebruiken om risico’s in de keten te 
minimaliseren, aan te passen, te delen of over te dragen aan andere partijen. Misschien wel de 
belangrijkste bijdrage van dit proefschrift voor managers is dat voorheen ‘verborgen’ 
transactierisico’s meer zichtbaar gemaakt zijn voor de ketenpartijen. Hoewel managers 
wellicht beperkt zijn in de vrijheid die ze hebben om de meest optimale contractuele strategie 
te implementeren, kan een hoger bewustzijn van de onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen 
transacties en de externe effecten die hieruit voortvloeien, de samenwerking tussen bedrijven 
en (tweedelijns)leveranciers (afnemers) versterken. 
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APPENDIX A 
INVENTORY PROTOCOL99 
 
 
1. Aim and Set-up of the Inventory100 
 
The aim is to achieve a thorough insight in different (types) of pork chains throughout Europe 
and to define major bottlenecks and opportunities for these chains to be tackled by future 
R&D programmes.  
 
The inventories take place in four steps: 
1. General description of the pork sector in your country 
2. Analysis of selected chains/cases 
3. SWOT analysis 
4. Comparison and bundling of inventories from different countries and identification of 
research topics 
  
2. Choice of Experts per Country: 
 
Assignment  
 
Assignment  
Choose approximately 15 experts from research, business and government covering various 
aspects of the pork chain as identified below (Additional aspects may be taken into account). 
The aim is to arrive at a balanced representation of experts with different knowledge fields, 
functions and views on the pork sector in your country. Therefore, the number of experts 
chosen may differ per country.   
Give a short description of organisation and function per expert and give good argumentation 
for your choice of these experts.  
 
 
3. General Description of Pork Chains per Country  
 
First 3-5 experts have to be selected with an overall insight in the pork chain of your country. 
They must deliver a basic overview of the sector and give input for the further selection of 
specific case chains. 
 
                                                           
99
 The general structure for the interviews with the experts and supply chain actors in the first case study phase 
are based on the document outlined in Appendix A (Sections 3-4 in particular).  
100
 The protocol was largely developed by one of my co-promoters, Dr.Trienekens (Wageningen University). 
The protocol was developed to examine a broad range of issues, including topics like ‘sustainability’ and 
‘innovation’. Because the protocol is a very extensive document, only those parts of the protocol which have 
actually been used in the data collection and analysis of the results discussed in Study One are presented here.  
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Figure 1. The pork chain 
 
Figure 1 gives a basic description of the pork chain. An important starting point in our 
analysis is that there exist multiple production systems on the one hand and multiple market 
segments on the other hand, leading to various types of chains connecting these.  
 
Assignment (use this as a structure for your expert interviews) 
- Make a distinction between the different (types of) chains in your country 
- Describe product-market combinations of different types of pork chains in 
your country (including products for export and imported products). 
 Describe also major developments in consumer demand in your country 
(regarding pork meat products). 
- Describe for every link in these pork chains: 
o type of players.  
 include the industry and service sector (consulting, laboratories, 
advisors etc.) in your distinction as detailed as possible. 
 please also note the division in breeding (reproduction), piglet 
production, fattening (if existent) 
 are e.g. the butchers included in the retail link? And self-slaughtering   
o (estimated) number of players 
o value of export, import and domestic production 
o production volumes in each link (in particular breeder, producer and
 slaughterhouse) 
o type of production means and technology used in different links (in the 
context of the European ‘average’) 
o general information about type of investments in the sector and the subsidising 
system 
o description of input-output-process of each link including throughput 
times of processes (excluding processing industry and retail) 
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o short description of most important companies and their market share 
 butchers in the slaughterhouses? 
 
Try to use a figure alike the figure in appendix1 as a basis for your description!  
 
- ask the key experts for a SWOT analysis of the pork sector of your country! (see 
also 5. ‘’SWOT analysis’’ in this protocol) 
 
Assignment 
In your inventory a choice for two or three distinctive chain types should be made. Special 
attention, if applicable, should be paid to regional chains. The choice for these chains should 
be based on the interviews with the 3-5 experts and on secondary literature. Good 
argumentation of the final choice should be given by positioning the chosen chains in the 
context of the (total) pork sector in your country.   
 
 
4. Description of Specific Pork Supply Chains (cases) in Your Country: 
All questions/assignments below should be answered for the 2-3 selected pork chain types.  
For initial answers to these questions approximately 10-12 experts from research, business 
and government should be interviewed. Thereafter companies should be visited to collect 
additional information.  
 
!Please note that the structure of pork chains may differ across countries. If necessary, please 
adjust the below tables if you need to add or remove links/rows (e.g. divide Production in 
Piglet production and Fattening)!  
  
4.1 Governance 101 
 
In table 1 (exchange dimensions in the pork chain) for every dimension the two extreme 
perspectives are given. Of course, it is very well possible that the chains in your country have 
an in-between perspective.  
Assignment 
Describe for every relationship between links in the selected pork chains (one table per chain) 
the exchange dimensions as given in table 1. Give a thorough explanation of the tables filled 
in. Describe also the degree of vertical integration.  
Include, with respect to governance relationships, for every link-to-link relationship also an 
overview of  
- major bottlenecks  
- best practices  
- major changes that have occurred in the last 10 years and expectations with regard to 
changes in the next 5 years (trend analysis). 
 
                                                           
101
 The table for ‘Governance’ shown in Section 4.1 of this Protocol was used to: (1), generate data about the 
type of contracts used in the examined supply chains; and (2), to make a first ordering of the gathered data. 
Subsequently, the data was analyzed by means of the coding rules discussed in Section 3.2 of Chapter Two. Note 
that some of the terminology used in the Protocol, which was developed by a collective of researchers, is not 
completely consistent with the terminology used in the thesis (e.g., ‘governance’ instead of ‘contract’).  
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 Purpose of 
exchange:  
single transaction 
versus long-term 
relationship 
Nature of 
communication: 
anonymous 
versus firm to  
firm 
Formality of 
exchange: 
formal versus 
informal 
Type of contract: 
classic (closed) 
versus relational 
(open) 
Breeder- 
Producer 
    
Breeder- 
Veterinarian 
    
Feed producer- 
Producer 
    
Producer- 
Veterinarian 
    
Producer-
Transporter 
    
Transporter-
Slaughterhouse  
    
Slaughterhouse-
Processor 
    
Processor- 
Retail 
    
Slaughterhouse-
Retail  
    
Table 1: Exchange dimensions in the pork chain 
 
4.2 Quality management and standards102  
Table 2 goes into the quality management used in various links in the pork chain. Quality 
standards are based on quality management. They can be national or international, public or 
private (please distinguish). Quality management is based on the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle  
(PDAC-Cycle) following the spirit of continuous (quality) improvement (see ISO 9000:2000). 
Include also attention to audit tasks of public authorities.  
Assignment 
Fill in this table (one for each chain selected). Give a thorough explanation of the tables you 
fill in. Give, regarding quality management and standards, for every link also an overview of: 
- major bottlenecks  
- best practices  
- major changes that have occurred in the last 10 years and expectations with regard to 
changes in the next 5 years (trend analysis) 
Note: Have also a special look at the quality management elements in case of non-existing 
quality standards/ programs 
                                                           
102
 The table for ‘Quality managements and standards’ shown in Section 4.2 of this Protocol was used to: (1), 
generate data about the type of quality management system used in the examined supply chains; and (2), to make 
a first ordering of the gathered data. Subsequently, the data was analyzed by means of the coding rules discussed 
in Section 3.2 of Chapter Two. 
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  What kind of quality management elements 
are used?103 
 
 Quality 
programs/ 
standards 
(*for 
national 
standards 
add 
general 
description 
as annex) 
Plan  
quality 
objectives, 
hazard 
analysis  
Do  
risk 
treatment,  
process 
control, 
quality 
handbook, 
training 
practices,etc. 
Check 
types of 
internal 
and 
external 
audits 
etc. 
Act  
define and 
implement 
corrective 
measures 
Inspection 
and audit 
tasks of 
public 
authorities. 
(e.g. meat 
inspection) 
Breeder 
 
      
Feed producer 
 
      
Producer 
 
      
Veterinarian 
 
      
Transporter 
  
      
Slaughterhouse 
 
      
Processor 
 
      
Retail 
  
      
Table 2 Quality management in pork chains 
 
4.3 Regulations in the chains 
 
Table 3 makes a distinction between various types of regulations/legislation in the pork chain: 
regulations regarding quality and safety, traceability, animal health and animal welfare, and 
environment (e.g. manure).  
 
Assignment. 
Specify in tables regulations in your country for the various links in the (selected) pork 
chain(s). Give a thorough explanation of the tables you fill in. Give, related to 
legislation/regulations, for every link also an overview of:  
- major bottlenecks (e.g. what is the level of compliance to regulations/legislation; what are 
fines in case of non-compliance) 
                                                           
103
 Note that some of the terminology used in the Protocol, which was developed by a collective of researchers, 
may not be completely consistent with the terminology used in the thesis. For example, in the thesis the terms 
‘monitoring mechanisms’ is used, while in the protocol the term ‘audit type’ is used. The terms have broadly the 
same meaning.  
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- major changes that have occurred in the last 10 years and expectations with regard to 
changes in the next 5 years (trend analysis) 
 
 
 Quality and safety  
(incl. hygiene) 
Traceability Animal health and 
animal welfare 
Environment 
Breeder 
 
    
Feed producer 
 
    
Producer 
 
    
Veterinarian 
 
    
Transporter 
  
    
Slaughterhouse 
 
    
Processor 
 
    
Retail 
  
    
Table 3 Legislation/regulations in the pork chains  
 
 
5. SWOT Analysis 
To identify opportunities and threats for the pork sector in your country, a SWOT analysis 
should be performed, see figure 2. 
 
Assignment 
Make a SWOT analysis (with table and explanation) about the pork sector in your country and 
the selected chains (separate table for each chain)!  
 
 
Strenghts Weaknesses 
Opportunities  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threats  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  SWOT analysis of the pork sector in your country 
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APPENDIX B 
Protocol for semi-structured interviews104 
Section A: Supplier Relations105 
 
Type of supplier(s) 
 
What percentage of the fresh pork meat you market is sold under the <insert brand name of case> label? 
 
From how many different suppliers do you annually source the pork meat that you market under the <…> 
label? 
 
What type of supplier is your main supplier for the pork meat that you market under the <…> label? 
• Slaughterhouse/processor__ 
• Trader/distributor/wholesaler__ 
• Internal supplier (or other company with which your firm has an equity relation)__  
• Other (please specify)__ 
 
What percentage of your annual demand for <…> pork meat do you source from your main supplier? 
 
How many years have you been sourcing <…> pork meat from this supplier? 
 
Type of arrangement 
 
In your relation with your main supplier, what method do you use?  
• Written agreement__ 
• Verbal agreement__ 
• Other__ 
 
What is the duration of this arrangement? 
• Output based agreement (please specify)__ 
• Time based arrangement (please specify)__ 
• Arrangement continues until cancelled by one of the parties__ 
 
 Does the arrangement include a notice of termination period?  (if so, please specify the period) 
 
What terms are included in the arrangement (please mark an X next to the terms which are included): 
> Pre-agreed price__  
> Pre-agreed volume__ 
> Delivery at a specify time of day or day of week__ 
> Minimum quality standards of all deliveries__ 
> Specific production practices__ 
> Restrictions on supplier’s choice of suppliers or other partners__ 
> On-site inspections by retailer or other parties__ 
> Inspection of supplier’s records by retailer or other parties__ 
                                                           
104
 Because the protocol is a very extensive document, only those parts of the protocol which have actually been 
used in the data collection and analysis of the results discussed in Study Two are presented here. The protocol’s 
structure is based on various sources, in particular: Coronado (2010); and Van Plaggenhoef (2007).  
105
 Similar questions were asked to respondents about their demand side relations. Thus, each respondent was asked 
the questions outlined in Section A of this document for both its supply and demand side transaction. 
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> Clauses that define penalties if the terms of the contract are not fulfilled__ 
> Procedures for dispute resolutions__ 
> Product liability or other insurance requirements__ 
> Credit provisions (or other types of financing arrangements)__ 
> Technical assistance__ 
> Other (please specify)__ 
 
Follow-up questions: ask respondent to provide details about each term (see topic list in Section D) 
 
Section B: Brand Participation and Requirements 
 
In order to participate in the <insert brand name of case> did you: 
(See Section D for follow-up questions) 
• Make investments in training of employees, equipment or production process__  
• Obtain additional information about the brand’s requirements from outside the company__  
• Obtain technical assistance outside the company__ 
• Obtain credit/financing (for making the investments)__ 
 
 How frequently are changes made to the following requirements of the <…>: 
 
More than once 
per year 
At least once per 
year, but not more 
frequently 
At least once every 
two years, but less 
than once per year 
Less frequently 
than once every 
two years 
No changes are 
made 
Requirements of 
production process q q q q q 
Requirements of 
inputs 
q q q q q 
Administrative 
requirements 
q q q q q 
Frequency of 
inspections 
q q q q q 
Focus of inspections q q q q q 
Costs of inspections q q q q q 
Other (please 
specify) q q q q q 
 
Whenever changes are made to the requirements of <…>, do you have to 
(see Section D for follow-up questions) 
• Make investments in training of employees, equipment or production process__  
• Obtain additional information about the quality standard from outside the company__  
• Obtain technical assistance from outside the company__ 
• Obtain credit/financing (for making the investments)__ 
 
Section C: Background information 
 
Please obtain the following information about the company: 
• Company output (e.g., annual finishing pig production, tonnage of meat etc.)__ 
• Nr. of employees__ 
• Type of company (proprietorship, partnership etc.)__ 
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Section D: Topic list (for follow-up questions) 
 
Details supplier arrangement 
 
• Price-scheme: 
• Identify how many days before delivery the (base) price is determined__ 
• Identify criteria for premiums/discounts (both product and market related criteria)__ 
• Identify frequency of changes to criteria__ 
• Is the supplier informed in advance of changes to the price-scheme? If so, how much in advance?__ 
 
• Volume requirements  
• Identify minimum/maximum volume requirements__ 
• Identify allowed deviations from requirements__ 
 
• Scheduling process: 
• How far in advance is (possible) delivery planned__ 
• Which party initiates contacts__ 
• If delivery is required at a specific time of day or day of week, identify how strict this requirement is__ 
 
• Quality standards: 
• Identify minimum quality standards requested__ 
 
• Requirements of production practices: (not specified in quality standards) 
• Identify restrictions on choice of inputs__ 
• Identify restrictions on production practices__ 
 
• Restrictions on choice of partners: 
• Identify supplier restrictions on choice of its own suppliers (i.e., second-tier suppliers)__ 
• Restrictions on choice of other partners (please specify)__ 
 
• Inspection rights: 
• Identify monitoring mechanisms (e.g., on-site inspections) employed:__ 
• Type of monitoring organization (e.g., counterparty or third-party):__ 
• Frequency of monitoring__ 
 
• Dispute resolutions and penalties: 
• Identify procedures for dispute resolutions (e.g., third party arbitrage)__ 
• Identify types of penalties (e.g., financial)__ 
• Identify when (formally) penalties should be enacted__ 
• Identify if penalties are (frequently) enacted__ 
 
• Insurance requirements: 
• What type of insurances is the supplier/retailer required to have (e.g., product liability insurance)__ 
 
• Credit/financing provisions: 
• Does the supplier/retailer provide (trade) credit (or other types of financing)___ 
• Does the agreement increases the supplier/retailer’s access to other sources of credit (financing)__ 
• If so, is credit (financing) provided on favourable conditions__ 
• Is credit (financing) tied to the use of a specific type of inputs__  
 
• Technical assistance: 
• Does the supplier have a dedicated technical help-service for retailers__ 
• To what extent does the service provide advice and expertise__ 
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Implementation/modifications to brand requirements  
 
• Investments and sources of credit/financing 
• Identify the types of investments made to implement/adapt to changes in requirements:__ 
• Identify the types of operational changes necessary to implement/adapt to changes in requirements:__ 
• Identify the source of the credit/financing necessary for the investment (e.g., bank, supplier)__  
 
• Sources of information/assistance 
• Identify the types of information sources consulted (e.g., supplier)__ 
• Identify the extent to which technical assistance was acquired in the implementation process__ 
• Identify the extent to which information/technical assistance was useful__ 
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